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1INTRODUCTION
\4
2The philosophy of Borden P. Bowne shows the use of two distinct
types of method, both empirically grounded: the rationalistic and the
pragmatic. This fact is evident to any student of Bowne *s writings as
a whole, and accounts for the various interpretations that have been
given to his philosophy. To same students of Bowne the rationalistic
type of method has seemed the more fundamental and characteristic in
the development of his thought; to others, the pragmatic. Nevertheless,
in no investigation have the pragmatic elements in his philosophy been
carefully isolated and defined; nor has their relation to the rational-
istic emphases been critically exhibited and evaluated. That such a
study of the pragmatic elements is necessary, however, before the rela-
tive importance of the rationalistic and pragmatic types of method in
the thought of Bowne can be critically evaluated is clear. It is to this
problem that the present study is devoted.
As explicitly formulated, the problem may be stated thus: Precise-
ly what are the pragmatic elements in the epistemology of Bowne; how
are they related to the theoretical function of the reason; from what
sources are they drawn; what was Bowne* s relation to the pragmatic move-
ment in general; and finally, to what extent is the term pragmatism ap-
plicable to his methodology ?
Of those who have written in the field of this problem, all have
recognized, to some extent at least, the presence of the pragmatic in-
fluence along with the rationalistic. In every investigation, however,
the tendency has been to emphasize either the one or the other. Those
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3who have regarded Bourne primarily as rationalist in methodology have
interpreted the pragmatic elements as fal ling under rationalistic meth-
od* Those, on the other hand, who have regarded Bowne as characteristic-
ally pragmatic have stressed the pragmatic side of his thought without
attempting to relate it to the rationalistic* In no published writings
has any investigator suggested that these two sides of Bowne *s thought
are, as they stand, incapable of being harmonized
,
although Professor
Edgar S* Brightman has, in personal conversation, expressed the view
that such a conflict probably existed in Bowne* s writings and that he
never fully succeeded in resolving it* This view, I believe, will be
borne out by the results of the present investigation* Indeed, it is
already indicated by the fact that some writers have sought to harmonize
the two sides of the thought of Bowne under the conception of reason,
while others have pointed to practical experience as the unifying concept-
ion*
The first of the investigators whose work we shall notice is Pro-
fessor Albert C. Knudson, who has published the most complete study of
1
Bowne *s work that has yet appeared* Recognizing the practical emphasis
in Bowne, Professor Knudson harmonizes it with the rationalistic under
the conception of the primacy of the practical reason* He points out
that for Bowne an element of practical faith underlies all of the cogni-
tive activities of reason, and that the theoretical reason "must ascend
to the practical reason with its realms of ends and values before thought
can complete itself in a unitary world-view* The disinterested intellect
2
is not sufficient unto itself*" In this sense, therefore, the prac-
1* Knudson, Albert C*, The Philosophy of Personalism (N.Y. s Abingdon
Press, 1927).
(Note: This work appears as an independent presentation of the person-
alistic philosophy, but it is clear that it is intended primarily as
a presentation of that philosophy as found in the writings of Bowne.)
2* Op* oit*, p* 99.
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4tical reason has the primacy* But further. Professor Knudson accepts
without question Bowne 1 s identification of the subjective needs and
interests of the mind with the Kantian conception of the practical
reason* These subjective needs and interests are "constitutional with-
1
in us* And as such they stand in their own right*" Again, the mind
must accept its own presuppositions. "It must assume that whatever its
own inner nature with its various needs and interests requires for
its own satisfaction, is true, if there is no decisive evidence to the
2
contrary*" Although the language here is distinctly pragmatic in
tone. Professor Knudson finds no difficulty in interpreting it under
the conception of reason as both theoretical and practical*
The element of Bowne* s teaching that keeps it from being pragmatic,
according to Professor Knudson, is the view of truth# "Personalism
does not find in utility the criterion of truth or a substitute for it*
It does not subordinate the theoretical to the practical in such a way
that the practical becomes the organizing center and the independent
3
norm of the mental life*" Rather personalism recognizes "the independ-
ent validity of each of the four fundamental interests of the human
4
mind"; it subordinates neither the intellectual to the practical, nor
the practical to the theoretical# It is in this way. Professor Knudson
believes, that the thought of Bowne holds a mediating position between
pragmatism and the old narrow rationalism#
Professor Edgar S. Brightman, in his published writings relating
to this problem (his opinion, loc*cit*, that a conflict exists in the
thought of Bowne is somewhat more recent than the writings here referred
to), has expressed essentially the same view* "Philosophy for Bowne must
1* Op*oit«, p# 162#
2# Ibid*, p* 162*
3* Ibid*, p# 163*
4# Ibid*, p# 164*
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5be religious because life is religious, and philosophy is only an
1
attempt to make life intelligible#" Personalistio method, -which Pro-
fessor Brightman implies is the method employed by Bourne, is essential-
ly synoptic# He -writes*
Personalistic method insists that the facts of logic,
mathematics, and sense experience are not the only nor
the most important facts# The moral and religious exper-
iences of men are also facts# Personalism postulates God
as their explanation# This postulate is aocepted not be-
cause it is a good thing to accept every hypothesis that
occurs to us, but because, when critically defined, ra-
tionally related to the whole of life, and tested by all
the data, at our disposal, it explains more facts and gives
a deeper meaning to life than any other philosophy, 2
Professor Brightman is thus interpreting Bowne, in these writings,
as fundamentally rationalistic in method# Recognizing the pragmatic,
voluntaristic influence, he yet regards it as but a harmonious part of
the rationalistic method as a whole# The unity is to be found in the
view that the real is at once rational and purposive# Bowne adopted
3
the doctrine of Hegel that "the real is rational,” Further, for him,
’’thought seeks internal connection, 1 a rational whole,* which is at-
4
tained only through purpose, the highest metaphysical category#”
In his published writings Professor Brightman also accepts with-
out question Bowne* s identification of our subjective interests and
needs with the Kantian conception of the practical reason# As a conse-
quence his interpretation of Bowne *s statement of method - ’whatever
the mind demands for the satisfaction of it s subjeotive interests and
tendencies may be assumed as real in default of positive disproof* - is
rationalistic# It means fundamentally simply that ’’philosophy should
1, Brightman, Edgar S#, ”Sources of Bowne’s Power,” Meth# Rev ,, 105(1922),
p# 371#
2# Brightman, Edgar S«, “The Personalistic Method in Philosophy,” Meth,
Rev#
, 103(1920)# P* 369#
3# Brightman, Edgar S#, “Personalism and the Influence of Bowne,"
Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy,1926 ,
ed, by E, S. Brightman, (N#Y#t Longnans,Green & Co#, 1927) p# 163#
4# Ibid#, p# 164#
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start with the hypothesis that the universe is full of value •"
The rationalistic character of Professor Brightman’ s interpretation
of method as defined by Bowne is further shown by the fact that he
finds in it essentially ’the duty to believe* rather than ’the will to
believe* *
This does not mean the duty to believe everything that
other personalities believe or that has been handed down
by tradition* As philosophical principle it would mean
that for explaining all of the data of experience we are
in duty bound to form and accept the rbest working hypoth-
esis that we can devise or imagine. ^
This voluntaristic tendency in Bowne, Professor Brightman adds,
made him "one of the forerunners of the recent development of axiology*
He did not formulate his ideas fully, but he spoke of the fact that he
must be guided not alone by the cognitive ideal, but also by the moral,
the aesthetic, and the religious ideals*"
Professor William Ernest Hocking, in a brief.study, has likewise
stressed the rationalistic methodology of Bowne* His interpretation
is given in the following passage:
He (Bowne) has often been ranked with James among the
pragmatists because of his doctrine that the great sources
of evidence for metaphysical truth are in life and not in
logic - James himself thought that the difference between
them was merely one of terminology* The real difference,
however, was profound* For the ’life* which provides the
evidence of metaphysical truth was, for Bowne, not simply
a state of resolve, or of feeling, but a state of empirical
cognition* It is possible to know the truth, and not merely
to choose it as one’s adopted 'hypothesis* Life is will, plus
thought and experience; and Bowne *s critical achievement
is that he worked out a view, which he was willing to call
empirical because based on experience, but ’transcendent-
ally empirical,’ because the experience he was concerned
with far exceeded the realm of the senses* In this tran-
scendental empiricism Bowne anticipates the intuitionism
of Bergson, without falling into the anti-intellectualism
of the intuitionist position* To Bowne ideas which in ab-
1* Loc.cit*, Math* Rev* ., 105(1920), p* 368*
2* Ibid*, p* 376*
3* Loc.cit*, Proceedings - Sixth Intemat* Cong* Phil*, p* 164*
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7stract thought appear conflicting are reconciled in
experience, whereas to Bergson concepts are intrinsi-
cally abstract and conflicting* (See, for instance.
Personalism
, p* 259*) Thus he reaches faith not as
against, but through the labors of critical thought.^
Bishop Francis J. McConnell is another student of Bowne who
has regarded his thought as essentially harmonized under the Kant-
ian conception of reason. He quotes from a letter of Bowne* s, in
which reference is made to Schiller* s Humanism
,
to suggest Bowne
1
s
own point of view: "Schiller’s fancy that he has anything new is
certainly naive. At best, it is only a specification of Kant’s Prim-
2
acy of the Practical Reason*" And so it is with Bowne *s own prag-
matism, Bishop McConnell believes. Bishop McConnell has gone farther
in isolating the pragmatic elements in Bowne *s thought than any other
writer. And he further suggests: "Be it remembered that long before
S
James and Dewey, Bowne taught pragmatism*" But that this estimate of
priority over James is not accurate will appear during the course of
the present investigation.
We turn now to the pragmatic elements in Bowne *s thought to which
Bishop McConnell gives consideration. With respect to Bowne *s conception
of the nature of the human mind and of the method most fruitfully em-
ployed by the mind, he writes:
His contention was that the mind finds itself to be a
living organism required to make its adjustments to the
world in which it must live. If it began by doubting
everything, it would limit itself to practical and theo-
retical barrenness. The fruitful method is, provisionally
at least, to take things as we find them, to assume that
things are giving a true account of themselves, until
reason for doubt appears* 4
With respeot to belief as subjectively determined and as world-product.
1, HockUag, William Ernest, "The Metaphysics of Borden P* Bowne,"
Meth. Rev*, 105 (1922), pp, 372-373*
2, McConnell, Francis John, Borden Parker Bowne (N*Y. : Abingdon Press,
1929), p, 149.
3, McConnell, "Borden Parker Bowne," Meth, Rev ., 105(1922), p. 343.
4, Op. cit., Borden Parker Bowne
, pp. 82-83.
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8Bishop McConnell states* "he did indeed allow full scope to non-log-
ical forces as producing belief” (although he adds, ”but, even so, he
1
judged his own argument by strict logical stafadards*")* Again, "in
his own system Bowne moved frankly on assumption, and on the recogni-
tion of and use of extra-logical factors* — There are interests of
the total self which, be taught, determine the weight we shall give to
2
reasons of one sort or another*" With respect to the tests of truth.
Bishop McConnell, after pointing to Bowne* s view of truth as objective,
5
says* "Bowne was really adding to the tests of truth," by applying
where relevant tests of instrumentality and ’survival of the fittest*
among beliefs* "In the end he defined truth as something much more vi-
tal than a set of abstract propositions* The fullest life of the self
4
was truth*" If, therefore, we may speak of "a higher pragmatism,"
5
suggests Bishop McConnell, "Bowne was a pragjoatist." But his was a
pragmatism that "took into account the demands of the whole nature of
man* We postulate - not prove - God as the demand of our whole nature,
and then note the results in life, as we work on the basis of the postu-
6
late,"
On the other hand. Bishop McConnell emphasises equally the ration-
alistic side of Bowne *s thought* He says*
Confidence in reason must underlie all mental processes.
Bowne laid down the strictest rules for the scrutiny of
the intellectual activity, but all on the assumption that
such activity is to be trusted* He insisted upon limits
within which reasoning is to move, but these limits are
to be set in the name of reason itself* 7
(And further, recognizing as he did) the play of all man-
ner of subjective forces in thinking — He did ask, how-
1* Op* cit*, Borden Parker Bowne
, p* 55*
2* Ibid*, p* 153*
3* Ibid*, p* 156*
4* Ibid*, p* 157*
5* Ibid*, p* 151*
6* Loc* cit*, M©th« Rev*, 105(1922), p* 343*
7* Op* cit*, Borden Parker Bowne, p* 83*
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9ever# that all such subjective elements be brought out
into the full light and examined by reason proceeding
according to reason’s laws# reason maintaining its rights
as the judge of everything laying claim to rationality* 1
Here# then# we have the two sides of Bowne ’s thought as Bishop
McConnell presents them# and apparently he finds no difficulty in
harmonizing them under the Kantian conception of reason* There is just
one point in his treatment at which a sense of difficulty is intimated#
namely# in speaking of the useof assumptions and extra-logical factors#
he says: "Bowne knew and said that all this is a dangerous procedure."
But this sense of difficulty seems quickly to lose its force in the
2
immediately added query: "but what other procedure is possible ?"
Of those investigators who have been chiefly interested in stress-
ing the pragmatic side of Bowne ’s thought, without attempting closely
to relate that side with the rationalistic# Professor George Croft Cell
has done the chief, although not the earliest, work* Though not published#
the results of that work have been available# since 1926, to students in
5
his Seminar in American Thought* Professor Cell’s views on Bowne,
with reference to the problem of this dissertation# are here summarized
from class-notes with his permission:
(1) James was right in saying to Bowne that "our emphatic
footsteps fall on the same spot*" 4 Both James and Bowne#
making proper allowances for differences in emphasis which
are always important, were ’pragmatic personal!sts f in the
final stages of their thinking*
(2) Bowne emancipated himself completely from the intellec-
turlism of the Hegelian tradition and from the rationalistic
prejudice that coherence is the only test of truth* For
Bowne there was no simple logical standard of truth* The
living mind, not the logical mind, is the touchstone of truth*
(3) For Bowne# experience is a larger concept than reason.
Experience includes reason# not reason experience* His formu-
la was ’experience and its indications* * Bowne *s trust in
experience increased in his later work# although indeed it is
1* Op. eit*# Borden Parker Bowne
, p* 84*
2* Ibid*# p* 1.55 •'
3* Seminar in American Thought, given at Boston University School of
Theology since 1926* Professor Cell’s article "Die Philosophic in
Nordamerika," in Ueberweg’s Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie#
(Berlin: E.S.Mittler & Sohn, 1928) 5. Teil# also has relevance here*
4* Letter of William James to Borden P* Bowne, dated August IT# 1908*
Published in McConnell T s Bflrden Parker Bowne. pp* 276-278.
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10
pervasive throughout the whole of it* He accepted Lotze * s
"Reality is infinitely richer than thought," 1 and went
bevond Lotze in its development*
(4) Bowne stressed the importance of the non-intellectual
factors in the mental life* Intellect, indeed, has its
rightful place, and Bowne sought to safeguard it lest it
be denied "its full rights," 2 yet for Bowne, intellect
is not even primus inter pares * But because he was inter-
ested in guarding' tlie' rights of the intellect, he may be
called a * qualified pragmatist**
(5) General conclusions Pragaatism is clearly present in
Bowne* s early works, but it is there present along with
rationalism* In the course of the development of his
thought, pragmatism becomes stronger, and rationalism
correspondingly weaker, until at the end of his work,
pragmatism was dominant, although the rationalistic ele-
ments had not been entirely eliminated*
For Professor Cell, experience is the concept under which the prag-
matic and rationalistic elements of Bowne *s thought are harmonized, al-
though the problem of harmony is clearly not a real one for him with
his judgment that the intellect in Bowne *s view is not even primus in-
ter pares * That the pragmatic elements are just as strong in Bowne *s
earlier work, that is before 1885, as in his later work, contrary to
Professor Cell*s conclusion, will be clear, I believe, in the results
of this investigation*
The earliest emphasis upon the pragmatic side of Bowne *s philosophy
to appear in print, so far as I have been able to discover, was made in
a memorial paper on Bowne written, just after his death in April, 1910,
by Professor George A. Coe* Professor Coe, like Bishop McConnell after
him, attributed priority to Bowne* s pragmatism over that of William
3
James* In speaking of Bowne* s stress on the vital basis of belief.
Professor Coe writes* "We hold to the postulates of religion, he main-
tained, primarily because they are important for life* The function of
logio is not to create them but to adjust thorn to one another and to the
4
other contents of thought*" "Of the merely instrumental nature of the
1* Lotze, Hermann, Metaphysic, English transl. ed* by B* Bosanquet (Oxford
Press, 1877), VoTV 'I," p* T78.
2* Bowne, B* P*, "Gains for Religious Thought in the Last Generation,"
Hibbert Journal
, 8(1909-10), p* 892*
3* Coe, George A*, "Borden Parker Bowne," Meth * Rev *, 92(1910),pp*521-522*
4* Ibid*, p* 522*
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1
understanding he was quite convinced*" And yet. Professor Coe adds,
for Bowne "the process "whereby we move from religious need to religious
2
faith is rational in the deepest sense of the term reason*”
But though reooghizing the rationalistic side of Bowne, Professor
Coe does not regard that as the essential side* He writes:
In spite of his strong liking for dialectic} in spite of the
tendency of many to estimate him in terms of a system, I be-
live that we are nearer the truth, and nearer his own concep-
tion of himself, if we remember him most for the eagerness
and the pointedness with which he reverted to primary data* 3
He who never tired of dialectical contest nevertheless made
”The field of life and action” his supreme court of appeal
as against ”the arid wastes of formal logic.” 4 Metaphysics
was to him not the main thing, but, rather, a sort of police
force with which to defend the life and the liberties which
he prized*
*
With respect to Bowne* s relation to pragjnatism as a movement. Pro-
fessor Coe expresses the following judgment: ”If he never fully appre-
ciated what one may call the historical inevitableness of pragnatism,
6
yet he himself helped prepared the way for it*" And in his ethics, with
his conscious purpose to unite *the intuitive and the experience school
7
of ethics,* "His affinity with utilitarianism is unmistakably close*"
One more writer on Bowne remains to be considered in this survey of
investigations already made in the field of this dissertation - Professor
Ralph Tyler Plewelling* Like Professor Coe and Bishop McConnell, he has
attributed priority to Bowne *s pragmatism over that of James* He writes:
It is no detraction from James to call attention to the fact
that the distinction of Bowne *s philosophy from that of the
idealists with whom he is most frequently classed, lay just
in his insistence upon the pragmatic test for truth in both
1* Loc* cit*, Meth* Rev*, 92(1910), p* 520*
2* Ibid*, p* 522*
3* Coe, George A*, ”The Empirical Factor in Bowne *s Thinking," Studies
in Philosophy and Theology
,
ed* by E* C. Wilm, (N*Y*: Abingdon tress,
1922, p* 18*
4* Ibid*, p* 19*
5* Ibid*, p* 19*
6* Ibid*, p* 19*
7* Ibid*, p« 20*
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philosophy and religion# In the publication of these
views Bowne possessed the priority# Will it be offen-
sive to call attention still further to the fact that
Bowne did a larger work, in that he not only laid down
a method for judging truth but also accompanied it with
an appropriate metaphysics ? When, then, olaim is made
for pragmatism as the distinctly American philosophy,
it is but fair co include Bowne as a pragmatist# *
But though oounting Bowne as a pragmatist. Professor Flewelling
refers to his conception of truth as essentially rationalistic: "Bowne
retains his pragmatism without surrendering truth that shall be
2
valid for all#"
This completes the survey of investigations already undertaken in
the field of this dissertation# The materials and methods of investiga-
tion of the present study, together with the general plan of development,
are next to be indicated# With respect to the materials, the primary are
the works of Bowne# These are listed in the bibliography, which follows
the text of the dissertation, with markings to indicate those that are
of particular philosophic interest# Other materials employed have been
the works of all writers in the field, in so far as they have now been
distinguished, who may have had a direct influence upon Bowne in the
development of the pragmatic side of his thought# These, likewise, are
listed in the bibliography# They include chiefly the works of Spencer,
Lotte, James and Kant#
The methods of in-re stigation employed in this study may be summar-
ized thus:
(1) Historical and developmental, both as regards external
influences upon the thought of Bowne, and as regards the
Bourse of his own thought development#
(2) Critical: the evaluating of the methods used by Bowne
and of the synthesis which he made between the pragmatic
1# Flewelling, Ralph Tyler, “Bowne and Present-Day Thought,” Meth. Rev#,
105(1922) pp# 378-379#
2# Flewelling, Ralph Tyler, Personalism and the Problems of Philosophy,
(N#Y#: Methodist Book Concern, 1915) p# 131#
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and the rationalistic elements in his methodology.
(3) Analytic: the distinguishing and defining of the prag-
matic elements wherever they have appeared in Bowne* s work.
(4) Synoptic: the viewing of these pragmatic elements in
relation to Bowne *s methodology as a whole.
The general plan of the dissertaion involves, first, a preliminary
definition of terms, together with a brief survey of the early develop-
ment of pragmatism as a movement; second, a survey and critical analysis
of Bowne* s theory of thought and knowledge developmentally viewed; third,
the isolation and definition of the pragmatic elements in that general
epistemology, together with an estimate of their place in Bowne* s thought
as a whole and with an examination of their relation to the theoretical
function of reason as conceived by Bowne; fourth, a consideration of
Bowne *s relation to pragmatism as a movement; and fifth, a study of the
sources of the pragmatic elements which Bowne came to employ. Each of
these considerations will be of help in answering the question: to what
extent is the term pragmatism applicable to the thought of Bowne ?
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CHAPTER ONE
RATIONALISM AND PRAGMATISM

15
Section One: Rationalism, Its Meaning and Its Relevance to the Thought
of Bowne*
The term rationalism has been used variously; its different mean-
ings need to be distinguished. It may refer, in the first place, to
the strictly a priori method in philosophy by which the metaphysical
superstructure is deductively derived from a few basic concepts, defi-
nitions, and axioms* The methods of Spinoza and Leibniz illustrate this
meaning of the term par excellence * In the second place, the term may
refer to the Kantian doctrine of the creative activity of t he mind, that
is, the doctrine that the mind is constitutive in the knowing process,
that knowledge is a product of the mind’s active reworking of the mater-
ial sensuously presented to it* Or, in the third place, the term may
refer simply to an essential faith in the trustworthiness of the mind
1
and in the intelligibility of the real world*
The relevance of these various meanings of the term rationalism as
applied to Bowne ’s thought will become clear through the course of this
investigation, but may well be anticipated here* Bowne was cleanly not
a rationalist in the first meaning of the term as here given* One of
the most frequent of Bowne ’s teachings was precisely that the real world
cannot be deduced a priori; it must be thought in terms of eonorete ex-
perience* Bowne scorned every deductive scheme of metaphysics* One of
his first criticisms of Spencer’s First Principles was that it was "written
on the cl priori plan*" Again, referring to the investigation of the
1* These definitions have been formulated in the light of those given
for the term in Baldwin* s Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology
(New ed*, N*Y* : Macmillan Co*, 1928), and in Lalande’s Vocabulaire de
la Philosophie (Paris: Librairio Felix Alcan* 1926)*
2* Bowne, B* P*, "Herbert Spencer’s L'lws of the Unknowable," New Englander,
31 (1872), p* 86.
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laws of mental activity, Bowne says: "This question is not to be answered
by ary a priori speculation, no matter how pretentious, but by an induc-
tive consideration of the mind itself•" Perhaps the most effective
putting of Bowne* s method as he conceived it, in so far as it relates
to this point of view, is the following:
We begin with experience, external and internal* Analysis
and reflection reveal that we cannot stop with them but
must proceed to certain assumptions concerning their cause
and ground* By the necessities of thought we pass from the
faots of experience to the metaphysical notions of cause,
absolute, etc* Hence the absolute can never be the begin-
ing of knowledge, but is raxher the end of investigation* 2
The second and third meanings of the term rationalism as here given
do, however, have definite relevance as applied to Bowne’ s thought.
Bowne fully accepted the essential Kantian doctrine of the creative
activity of the mind in the knowing process* In one of his early papers,
he says: "No fact in psychology is more clearly established than that
the mind is active in all knowledge*" And this doctrine remained an
essential part of the groundwork of his philosophy throughout the course
of its development* Closely associated with this meaning of rationalism,
is the third, namely, faith in the trustworthiness of the mind and the
intelligibility of the world* These are indeed for Bowne conditions of
knowledge and are repeatedly stressed by him* "The trustworthiness of
4
reason is the presupposition of all speculation*" And further:
Our interpreting activity presupposes the intelligibility
and hence the rationality of all existence* It presupposes
that the objective reality is cast in the molds of thought,
so that the irrational is the impossible* 5
1* Bowne, B.P., "Ulrici’s Logic," New Engitander
, 33(1874), p* 463*
2* Bowne, B*P. , "Gott und die Natur," New England *, 33 (1874), p* 626.
3* Loc* eit*. New England *, 33(1874), p* 462*
4* Bowne, B*P*, Philosophy of Theism, (N*Y*: Harper & Brpthers, 1887),
p* 112*
5* Bowne, B*P*, "lfihat is Raxionalism," Independent, 40 (1888), p* 99*
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Bowne is careful, however, to qualify his conception of the ration-
ality of existence. That rationality "is not something actually discerned.
1
in experience* but an ideal believed in," In his judgment post-Kantian
rationalism was extravagant and excessive# It assumed human reason and
human insight as the norms of rationality# Actually, "the rationalistic
ideal is as yet something far off and unattained# In connection with it
we have little more than the conviction that it admits of indefinite
2
approximation by us* and that to perfect insight it would be real#"
After recognizing and pointing to the excesses of post-Kantian rational-
ism, however# Bowne makes his own position clear by saying:
We still believe in the universality of rational law, but
we are far from being so sure that we have fully compre-
hended it# We still believe in the interpretability of
facts# but we are seldom able to say that we have reached
a final interpretation# The only thing that is fixed is
that nothing can be allowed which contradicts the laws of
thought; but these leave a great many possibilities open,
and which of these have been realized cannot be learned
by a priori reflection, but only by experience# It still
remains our faith that the absolute reason at the oenter
of things sees all things in rational connection; but our
reason is neither absolute nor at the center# 3
For Bowne, therefore, the rationality of the world is a controlling
ideal, a working faith, not an experienced fact or a demonstrated truth;
and our investigations of that world are always of the nature of hypoth-
eses - they are seldom final# With this, then, the senses in which the
term rationalism is relevant to the thought of Bowne are clear#
Seotion Two: Pragmatism, Its Early Development and Its Characteristic
Emphases#
The meaning of pragmati sm and its relation to the thought of Bowne
can best be shown through a brief survey of its antecedents and of its
1# Bowne, B.P., loc# cit#. Independent, 40 (1888), p. 100
2# Ibid#, p# 100#
3# Ibid#, p# 100#
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early development as a movement# The scope of the survey is expressly
limited by its purposes: (l) to isolate any possible influences upon
the thought of Bowns, and (2) to exhibit those elements of pragmatism
that are essential and characteristic#
The antecedents of the pragmatic doctrine are unmistakably present
in the thought of Kant# We shall distinguish those elements of Kantian
teaching -which are of significance to pragaatism under the following
topios: (1) primacy of the practical reasons (2) emphasis upon interests
in the life of the mindj (3) the regulative function of the speculative
reason; (4) utility and rational possibility as criteria of belief; and
(5) the *will to believe*
•
Kant conceived reason as a unity functioning in a two-fold manner:
theoretically and practically. In the Kritik der praktischen Vernunft,
he says: "Der theoretische Gebrauch der Vernunft beschftftigte sich mit
Gegenstfinden des blossen Erkenntnisvermflgens," whereas in the practical
use of reason, "besch&ftigt sich die Vernunft mit Bestimmungsgrtbden des
Willens, welcher ein VermBgen ist, den Vorstellungen entsprechende Gegen-
stfinde entweder hervorzubringen oder doch sich selbst zur Bewirkung der-
1
selben — zu bestimmen#" And, in the Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der
Sitten
,
teils erfordere ich zur Kritik einer reinen praktischen
Vernunft, dass, wenn sie vollendet sein soli, ihre Einheit
mit der spekulativen in einem gemeinsch&ftlichen Prinzip
zugleich mftsse dargestellt werden kttxmern, weil es doch am
Ende nur eine und dieselbe Vernunft sein kann, die bloss
in der Anwendung unterschieden sein muss# 2
(Practical reason, then, is reason that) Kausalit&t in
Ansehung ihrer Objekte hat# Nun kann man sich unmSglich
eine Vernunft denken, die mit ihren eigenen Bewusstsein
in Ansehung ihrer Urteile anderw&rtsher eine Lenkung
empfinge, derm alsdann wftrde das Subjekt nioht seiner
1# Kant, Immanuel, Sfimtliohe Werke
,
ed# by Karl Vorl&nder (Leipzig:
Felix Meiner, 1920-1922), Vol# II, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft,
p# 18 (Akademie-Ausgabw, p# 15)
2# Ibid#, Vol# III, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, p# 8, (Akademie-
Ausgabe, p# 391)#
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Vemunft, sondern einem Antriebe die Bestimmung der TJrteils-
kraft zusohreiben* 1
Kant»s doctrine of the primacy of the practical reason is stated
in a brief seotion of the Kritik der praktisohen Vemunft under the
title, "Von dem Primat der reinen praktischen Vemunft in ihrer Ver-
bindung mit der spekulativen*"
Wenn praktische Vemunft^ nichts waiter annehmen und als
gegeben denken aarf, als*alpekulative Vemunft ftir sich
ihr aus ihrer Einsicht da'rreichen konnte
,
so ffihrt diese
das Primat* Gesetjt aber, sie hfttte ffir sich ursprflngliche
Prinzipien a. priori
,
mit denen gewisse theoretisohe Positi-
onen unzertrennlich verbunden w&ren, die sich gleichwohl aller
mflglichen Einsicht der spekulativen Vemunft entzdgen (ob sie
zwar derselben auch nioht widerspreohen mfissten), so 1st die
Frage, welches Xnteresse das oberste sei (nicht, welches weioh-
en mflsste, denn eines widerstreitet dem anderen nioht notwend-
ig)* 2
And this supposition of original a. priori principles belonging to
pure practical reason is the doctrine which Kant is defending* For him,
then, the question of the primacy of the practical reason refers solely
to the independent rights of those a priori principles of practical
reason which cannot be established by the speculative reason, but which
do not contradict it* Kant is very careful to safeguard his meaning
by specifying*
In der Tat, sofem praktische Vemunft als pathologisch
bedingt, d«i* das Interesse der Neigungen unter dem sinn-
lichen Prinzip der Glfiokseligkeit bloss verwaltend zum
Grunde gelegt wttrde, so liesse sich diese Zumutung an die
spekulative Vemunft gar nioht tun* Mahomet
s
Paradies Oder
der Theosophen und Ifcrstiker schmelzende Vereinigung mit der
Gottheit, sowie jedem sein Sinn steht, wdrden der Vemunft
ihre Ungeheuer aufdringen, und es wflre ebensogut, gar keine
zu haben als sie auf solche Weise alien Tr&umereien preis-
zugeben* 3
The meaning of Kant is rather this*
Allein wenn reine Vemunft ffir sich praktisch sein kann
1* Kant, loc*oit*, Vol* III, G*M*S*, pp* 76-77 (Akademie-Ausgabe,p* 448)*
2* Ibid*, Vol* II, K*d*p* V *, p* 154 (Akademie-Ausgabe, p* 120)*
3* Ibid*, pp* 154-156 (Airademie-Ausgabe , pp* 120-121)*
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und es wirklich ist, wie das Bewusstsein des moralischen
Gesetzes es ausweist, so ist es doch immer rtur eimmddie-
selbe Vernunft, die, es sei in theoretisoher Oder prak-
tischer Absicht,' nach Prinzipien a priori urteilt, und da
ist es klar, dass, weim ihr Vermflgen in der ersteren gleioh
nicht zulangt, gerrisse Sfitze behauptend festzusetzen, in-
dessen dass sie ihr auch eben nicht widersprechen, sie eben
diese S&tze, sobald sie unabtrennlioh zum praktischen Inter-
esse der reinen Vernunft gehflren, zwar als ein ihr fremdes
Angebot, das nicht auf ihren Boden erwachsen, aber dooh hin-
reichend beglaubigt ist, annehmen raid sie mit allem, was sie
als spekulativ© Vernunft in ihrer Maoht hat, zu vergleichen
12nd zu verkn&pfen suchen nrftsse; dooh sich bescheidend, dass
dieses nicht ihre Einsichten, aber doch Erweiterungen ihres
Gebrauchs in irgend einer anderen, n&alich praktischen Ab-
sicht sind* 1
In der Verbindung also der reinen spekulativen mit der rein-
en praktischen Vernunft zu einer Erkenntnis fQhrt die letzt-
ere das Primat , vorausgesetzt nimlich, dass diese Verbindung
nicht etwa zuf&llig und beliebig, sondern a priori auf der
Vernunft selbst gegrflndet, mithin notwendig sei* Derm es
wflrde ohne diese Unterordung ein Widerstreit der Vernunft
mit ihr selbst entstehen; well, wenn sie einander bloss bei-
geordnet (koordiniert) wftren, die erstere fftr sich ihre
Grenze enge verschliessen und niohts von der letzteren in
ihr Gebiet aufnehmen, diese aber ihre Grenzen dennoch ttber
alles ausdehnen und, wo es ihr Beddrfnis erheischt, jene
innerhalb der ihrigen mitzubefassen suchen wflrde, 2
For Kant, the moral law is an a priori principle of pure praotioal
reason, and as such is valid independently of any fact of experience,
that is, of any sensuous presentation, any impulse, feeling, or instinct.
As such an a priori principle, any propositions inseparably connected
with it, as Kant believes the postulates of freedom, God and immortality
to be, though not capable of being established by theoretical reason,
may be regarded as sufficiently authenticated, provided they do not con-
tradict theoretical reason* In the field, therefore, of a priori prin-
ciples of practical reason, in which theoretical reason is able to estab-
lish nothing, the practical reason must be regarded as having the primacy.
As Kant puts it in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, "Es wird sich aber in
1* Kant, loc*cit*, Vol* II, K*d*p*V», p* 155 (Akademie-Ausgabe, p* 121),
2* Ibid*, pp* 155-156 (Akademie-Ausgabe, p* 121)*
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der Folgo zeigen, dass doch, in Ansehung des praktisohen Gebrauchs, die
Vernunft ein Recht habe, etwas anzunehraen, -was sie auf keine Weise im
Felde der blossen Spekulation ohne hinreichende Bowelsgrande voraus-
1
setzen befugt w&re," Although the pragmatic bearing of thi.3 doctrine
is immediately apparent, it cannot be too strongly insisted that for
Kant it was interpreted in striotly rational terms. In no sense whatever
did Kant mean to open the way to such beliefs as we might wish to hold,
or as might prove useful to us, or as might satisfy some need other than
the need of the pure practical reason* Even the much quoted "Ich musste
2
also das Wissen aufheben, urn zum Glauben Platz zu bekommen," refers,
for Kant, only to those beliefs which are attached to the moral law,
that is, to a priori principles of pure practical reason. Nevertheless,
that this doctrine suggested an opening which could later be capitalized
by pragmatism is clear,
Kant*s emphasis upon interests in the mental lift would seem mani-
festly to be an important element in the historical background of prag-
3
matism. For example, such a statement as the following would suggest
a pragmatic tones "Lasset demnaoh euren Gegner nur Vernunft sagen, und
Moi>
bekampfet ihn^mit Waffen der Vernunft# Uebrigens seid wegen der guten
Saohe (des praktisohen Interesse) ausser Sorgen, denn die kommt in bloss
4
spekulativen Streite niemals mit ins Spiel," To examine more carefully,
however, Kant*s use of the word interests*, we shall turn to his more
explicit expositionss
Einem jedem Vemdgen der Gerattts kann man ein Interesse
beilegen, d,i, ein Prinzip,> welches die Bedingung enth&lt,
unter welcher allein die Austbung desselben befdrdert wird.
Die Vernunft, als das VermBgen der Prinzipien, bestimmt da3
1, Kant,loc,cit«, Vol, I, K»d,r,V», p, 646 (Original 2nd Ed,, p, 804),
2, Ibid,, p, 37 (Orig, 2nd, Ed*, p, xxx),
3, I am indebted to Professor Edgar S* Brightman for suggesting a study
of Kant»s use of the word *interests*,
4, Kant, loc,oit«, Vol,I, K*d,r,V», p, 622 (Orig, 2nd#Ed*, p, 772),
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Interasse aller Gemtttskr&fte , das ihrige aber sich selbst*
Das Inter© sse ihres spekulativen Gebrauchs besteht in der
Erkenntnla das Objekts bis zu den hBohsten Prinzipien a
priori* das des praktischen Gebrauchs in der Bestimmung des
Willens in Ansehung des letzten und vollstfindigen Zweoks# ^
And further*
Inter© sse ist das* wodurch Vernunft praktisch, d#i# eine
den Willen bestimnende Ursache* wird# Daher sagt man nur
von einem vernfinftigen Wesen* dass es woran ©in Inter© sse
nehme, vernunftlos© Geschdpfe ffihlen nur sinnliche Antriebe
•
Ein unmittelbares inter© sse nirarat die Vernunft nur alsdann
an der Handlung* warm die Allgemeingdltigkeit der Maxine
derselben ein genugsamer Bestiraraungsgrund des Willens ist#
Ein solehes Intore sse ist allein rein# Wenn sie aber den
Willen nur venaittelst eines anderen Objekts des Begehrens*
Oder unter Voraussatzung eines besonderen Geffihles des Sub-
jekts be stinmen kann* so nimmt die Vernunft nur ein mittel-
bares Inter© sse an der Handlung* und da Vernunft fftr sioh
allein weder Objekte des Willens,noch ein besonderes ihm zu
Grunde liegendes Geftihl ohne Erfahrung ausfindig machen kann*
so wflrde das letztere Interasse nur empirisch und hein reines
Vemunftintere s se sain# *
It is clear* therefore* that Kant distinguishes between those inter-
ests which belong directly to pure reason* both theoretical and practical,
and those interests which rest on empirical grounds* and that Kant*s cox&»
cern is with the former, -that is’, with the direct interests of pur© rea-
son# Here again* though Kant is specific in his own use of the concept
•interests** his treatment, by suggestion* opens the line of development
which pragmatism has subsequently followed# For Kant the interests of
pure reason alone have objeotive standing; for pragmatism the interests
of reason have no greater validity than any other interests# The follow-
ing is of significance in showing how carefully Kant attempted to safe-
guard his doctrine from precisely the development which pragmatism has
carried out*
so ist die Erkl&rung, wie und warum uns die Allgemein-
heit der Maxima als Gesetzes, mithin die Sittlichkeit inter-
im Kant* loc#cit#* Vol# II* K#d#p#V#* p# 153 (Akademie-Ausgabe, p# 120)#
2# Ibid#* Vol# Hi* G#M#S#* Footnote* p# 90 (Akademie-Ausgabe* p# 460)#
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essiere, uns Mensohen gfinzlich unmflglich# So viel ist nur
gewiss: dass as nicht darum fttr uns Gttltigjceit hat, -roil
©s interessiert (donn das ist Heteronomie und Abhfingigkeit
<Ier praktiscWn Vernunft von Sixmlichket, n&alich einem zum
Grand© liegenden Geffihl, wobei si© niemals sittlich gesetz-
gebend sein kdnnte), sondern dass es interessiert, wail ©s
ffir nns als Menschen gilt, da ©s aus unserem Willen als In-
telligenz, mithin ans nnserem ©igentlichen Selbst ©ntsprung-
en ist# 1
Kant’s view of the speculative reason as regulative is one that
has led naturally into the pragmatic view of the mind as instrumental,
although indeed the doctrine of evolution and not the Kantian teaching
itself has stimulated that development# Kant’s view is expressed in the
following passage:
Die grdsste und vielleicht einzige Nutzen aller Philosophic
der reinen Vernunft ist also wohl nur negativ , da sie nla-
lich nicht, als Organon, zur Erweiterung, sondern, als Dis-
ziplin, zur Grensbestimmung dient, und anstatt Wahrheit zu
entdeoken!, nur das stille Verdienst hat, Irrthttrner zu ver-
hfiten# 2
The "source of positive cognitions which belong to the domain of
3
pure reason" is the reason in its "practical employments," that is,
truths concerning the real world cannot be attained by speculative rea-
son, but they may come as postulates required by practical reason# The
function of the speculative reason, therefore, is one of regulation, of
limiting its own activities in the interests of those propositions required
by the a priori principles of pure practical reason#
Again, Kant’s treatment of the use of reason in connection with
objects "reoammended to us by the senses," though intending to show that
this is not the sphere of aotivity of pure reason, is clearly suggestive
of the instrumental view of the mind:
Wenn die Bedingungen der Ausflbung unserer freien Willkflr
aber empirisch sind, so kana die Vernunft dabei keinen
1# Kant, loc#cit#, Vol# III, G#M,S #, p# 91 (Akademie-Ausgabe, pp# 460-461)#
2# Kant, loc#cit#, Vol* I, K#d#r#Y*, p# 639 (orig* 2nd* ed*, p# 823)#
3# See ibid#, pp# 659-660 ( or£g# 2nd# ed., pp# 823-824), trans# by
J • M#D .Meikle john*
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anderen, als regulativen Gebrauch haben und nur die Einheit
empirischer Gesetze zu bewirken dienen, wie z* B# in der
Lshre der Klugheit die Vereinigung ailer Zwecke , die tins von
unseren Weigungen aufgegeben sind, in den einigen, die Glftok-
seligkeit, und die Zusammenstimmung der Mittel, um dazu zu
gelangen, das ganze Gesch&ft der Vernunft ausmacht, die um
deswillen keine anderen, als pragmatische Gesetze des freien
Verhaltens, zu Erreichung der uns von den Sinnen empfohlenen
Zwecke, und also keine reinen Gesetze vdllig a priori bestinnnt
liefern kann# *
Another of the elements of Kant*s teaching that have significance
for pragmatism is the suggestion of utility and rational possibility
as criteria of belief* The reference to utility as a warrant for belief
appears only incidentally in Kant, but it is sufficiently striking to
be mentioned among those elements of his thought that have a pragmatic
tone# It appears in the following passages
— so ist doch die Zweckmfissige Einheit eine so grosse Beding-
ung der Anwendung der Vernunft auf Natur, dass ich, da mir iiber-
dem Erfahrung rexchiich davon Beispiele darbietet, sie gar nicht
vorbeigehen kann# Zu dieser Einheit aber kenne ich keine andere
Bedingung, die sie mir sum Leitfaden der Katurforschung maohte,
als wenn ich voraussetze, dass eine hdchste Intelligenz alias
nach den weisesten Zwecken so geordnet habe# Folglich ist es eine
Bedingung einer zwar zufftlligen, aber doch nicht unerheblichen
Absicht, nSmlich um eine Leitung in der Nachforschung der Katur
zu haben, einen weisen Welturheber vorauszusetzen# Der Ausgang
meiner Versuche be st&tigt auch so oft die Brauohbarkeit dieser
Voraussetzung und nichts kann auf entscheidende Art dawider ange-
ftthrt werden, dass ich viel zu wenig sage, wenn ich mein Fflrwahr-
halten bloss ein Meinen nennen wollte, sondern es kann selbst in
diesem theoretischen Verh&ltnisse gesagt werden, dass ich festig-
lich einen Gott glaube# 2
Here, clearly, Kant is suggesting utility ( Brauohbarkeit ) as the
positive warrant for belief in the theistic hypothesis# Even recognizing
this occurrence of the criterion as incidental, it is of extreme interest
as an element in the background of pragmatism# The negative warrant,
which Kant indicates in the same connection, is the fact that "nothing
can be adduced against it* n This, indeed, is an essential element in Kant’s
1# Kant, loc# cit#, Vol.I., K#d#r*V», p# 663 (orig. 2nd* ed#, p# 828)#
2# Ibid#, pp# 681-682 (orig* 2nd* ed., p# 854)#
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doctrine as a -whole, as we have already observed in our consideration
of the primacy of the practical reason# Any proposition required by
the moral law, as an a priori principle of pure practical reason, may
be regarded as authenticated so long as it is not found to be in con-
tradiction with speculative reason# This criterion of rational possi-
bility is specificajily used with respect to the ideas of God and im-
mortality:
Folglich kann und muss ihre M8glichkeit in dieser praktisohen
Beziehung angenommen werden, ohne sie doch theoretisch zu
erkennen und einzuseben# Fftr die letztere Forderung ist in
praktischer Absicht genug, dass sie keine innere TJnmflglich-
keit (Widerspruch) enthalten# *
The last of the pragmatically toned elements in the thought of
Kant to be distinguished is one that may be designated by the well
known phrase of William James: the will to believe# The example which
Kant has used to illustrate what he calls "den pragmatischen Glauben"
is immediately suggesti*re of the ’will to believe* doctrine, although
Kant dearly intended it to apply only in immediate circumstances of
emergency and not to have relevance for metaphysical belief# Kant’s
example is this:
Der Arzt muss bei einem Kranken, der in Gefahr ist, etwas
thun, kennt aber die Krankheit nicht# Er sieht auf die Er-
scheinungen, und urtheilt, weil er nichts Besseres weiss,
es sei die Sohwindsuoht# Sein Glaube ist selbst in seinem
eigenen Urtheile bloss zuf&llig, ein anderer mBchte es
vielleicht besser treffen# Ich nenne dergleichen zuf&lligen
Glauben, der aber dean wirkliohen Gebrauche der Mittel zu
gewissen Handlungen zum Grunde liegt, den pragmatischen
Glauben# 2
There is, further, another passage in which Kant allows a certain
place, though carefully restricted, to choice in the matter of belief#
Speaking of the perfect proportioning of happiness to worthiness as
required in the summum bonum, he says:
1# Kant, loo# cit#, Vol# II, &#d#p#V «, p# S (Akademie-Ausgabe, p# 4)
2# Ibid#, Vol# I, K#d»r»V#, p# 680 (Orig* 2nd# ed#, p# 852)#
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rtur die Art , wie wir ms eine solche Hamonie der Natur-
gesetze mit denen der Freiheit denken sollen, hat etwas an
sich, in Arisehung dessen uns eine Wahl zukommt, weil theoret-
isehe Vernunft hierflber nichts mit apodiktisoher Gewissheit
entscheidet, und in Ansehung dieser kann es ein Moralisohes
Interesse geben, das den Ausschlag gibt* 1
—
- aber die Art, auf welohe Weise wir es (l,e, the promotion
of the minimum bonum ) uns als mdglich denken wollen in uhserer
Wahl steht, in welcher aber ein freies Interesse der reinen
praktischen Vernunft fttr die Annehmung eines we isen Weltur-
hebers entscheidet —
-•
*
In one additional passage Kant specifically uses the ooncept of 'will-
ing* in the achievement of belief. He writes:
— zugestanden, dass das reinen moralische Gesetz jedermann
als Gehot (nicht als Klugheitsregel) unnachlasslich verbinde,
darf der Rechtsdiaffene wohl sagen: ich will, dass ein Gott,
dass mein Dasein in dieser Welt auch ausser der.Haturverknfipf-
ung noch ein Dasein in einer reinen Verstandeswelt, endlich auch,
dass meine Dauer endlos sei, ich beharre darauf und lasse mir
diessen Glauben nicht nehmen; denn dieses ist das einzige, wo
mein Interesse, weil ich von demselben nichts nachlassen darf ,
mein Urteil unvermeidlich bestimmt, ohne auf Vernfinfteleien
zu achten, so wenig ich auch darauf zu antworten Oder ihnen
soheihbarere entgegenzustellen imstande sein m8elite • 5
These, then, constitute those elements of Kant*s thought which are
either in themselves pragmatically toned, or which, by change of emphasis,
have been transformed into the developed doctrines of pragmatism. The
number of such elements in Kant is indeed strikingly large.
With this consideration of the antecedents of pragmatism as they are
found in The philosophy of Kant, we turn new to a brief survey of the
beginnings of pragmatism as a movement in America, Charles Sanders Peirce
is regarded as the father of American pragmatism. But that Peirce felt
a direot indebtedness to Kant is clear from the statement: nThe writer
was led to the maxim (i,e, the doctrine of moaning) by reflecting upon
4
Kant’s Critic of the Pure Reason." And that Peirce did not intend that
his teaching be taken in a purely pragmatic sense is further clear from
1* Kant, loc,cit,, Vol. II, K.d,p,V,, p, 184(Akademie-Ausgabe, pp* 144-145).
2, Ibid.,Vol. II, K,d,p,V.
, p, 185 (Akademie-Ausgabe , pp, 145-146),
5, Ibid., Vol, II, K*d,p,V
., pp, 182-185 (Akademie-Ausgabe, p. 145),
4, Baldwin, James M«, Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology (Hew Ed,,
H,Y. :Macmillan Co#,' 1928) Vol.II, section of article on"Pragmatism"
by C.S,Peirce, p, 522*
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his own comment on the development of the doctrine:
The writer subsequently saw that the principle might easily
be misapplied, so as to sweep away the whole doctrine of in-
commensurable s — In 1896 William James published his Will
to Believe , and later his ‘Phil, Conceptions and Pract* Re-
sults, • which pushed this method to such extremes as must
tend to give us pause* ^
The pragmatism of Peirce, in so far as it is pragmatism, is largely
that of his doctrine of meaning* His article on ”Hw to Make Our Ideas
Clear, tt published in The Popular Science Monthly for Januray, 1878, is
usually regarded as marking the beginning of the pragmatic epoch in Amer-
ican thought* He writes: "There is no distinction of meaning so fine as
2
to consist in anything but a possible difference of practice*" And
again, "I only desire to point out how impossible it is that we should
have an idsa in our minds which relates to anything but conceived sensi-
ble effects of things* Our idea of anything is our idea of its sensible
3
effects*" Hence the rule, as Peirce lays it down:
Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practi-
cal bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to
have* Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of
our conception of the object* ^
If ideas have no practical effects, they have no real meaning} and
if two ideas have the same effects, then their moaning is the same*
The essence of belief is the establishment of a habit, and
different beliefs are distinguished by the different modes
of action to which they give rise* If beliefs do not differ
in this respect, then no mere differences in the manner of
consciousness of them can make them different beliefs, any
more than playing a tune in different keys is playing a
different tune* »
For Peirce, then, meaning is to be conceived practically, actively,
dynamically* But it is important to note that Peirce did not identify
meaning and truth* Though effects give us the meaning of an idea, they
1* Baldwin, loc*cit», o* 322*
2* Peirce, C«S*, "Illustrations of the Logic of Science: Second Paper -
How to Make Our Ideas Clear*" The Popular Science Monthly, Jan*1878,p*293*
3* Ibid*, p* 293*
4* Ibid*, p* 293*
3* Ibid*, p* 291*
.
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do not constitute its truth* It was the carrying over of this doctrine
of effects from meaning to truth by William James that constituted the
most characteristic formulation of pragmatism; it was first expounded
by him as a philosophic doctrine in an address at the University of Cal-
ifornia in 1898 under the title "Philosophical Conceptions and Practi-
cal Results*"
Before this formulation of the pragmatic doctrine of truth, however,
James had written other essays of significance in the development of the
new movement* Of these we shall here consider what may be regarded as the
two most important* The first of these appeared as an article in The
Journal of Speculative Philosophy for January, 1878, under the title
"Remarks on Spencer's Definition of Mind as Correspondence •" Professor
R.B. Perry speaks of this article as of "unique historical importance as
perhaps the key to all of James* later thought*"-*- Certain it is that
many of the later pragaatic emphases of James* thought are present in
the germ in this early essay*
The first of these early emphases of James is that of the importance
of interests in controlling the development, indeed, the entire cognitive
activity, of the mind*
•Mind," as we actually find it, contains all sorts of laws -
those of logic, of fancy, of wit, of taste, decorum, beauty,
morals, and so forth, as well as perception of fact* Common
sense estimates mental excellence by a combination of all of
these standards, and yet how few of them correspond to any-
thing that actually is - they are laws of the Ideal, dictated
by subjective inte reHTEs pure and simple*^
Again:
We are all fated to be a priori teleolo^ists whether we will or
not* Interests which we bring with us, and simply posit or
1* James, William, Collected Essays and Reviews, Ed* by Ralph Barton Perry,
(R.Y. : Longmans , “Green & CO., l§2t> ), pp. vii-viii*
2* Ibid*, p* 46*
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S
%
bake our stand upon, are the very flour out of which our
mental dough is kneaded,1
And further, '’Interests are the real a priori element in cognition,"
They determine which elements in the environment shall be singled out
for cognition, "The interests precede the outer relations noticed"; before
those outer relations can be altered, something must first "awaken an
„2
interest,"
A second element of pragmatic significance in this early essay of
James is the suggestion of survival value and workability as criteria
of belief. The chief of James* formulations follow: Referring to diff-
erences in judgment as to what constitutes rightness or excellence, he
says:
The formula which proves to have the most massive destiny
will be the true one,-—Our respective hypotheses and post-
ulates help to shape the course of thought, but the only
thing which we all agree in assuming is, that thought will
be coerced away from them if they are wrong,—The idealists
and the empiricists confront each other like Guelphs and
Ghibellines, but each alike awaits for adoption, as it were,
by the course of events.
Again, with respect to our individual hypotheses, convictions, and
beliefs:
Far from being vouched for by the past, these are verified
by the future. They are all of them, in some sense, laws
of the ideal. They have to keep house together, and the
weakest goes to the wall. The survivors constitute the
right way of thinking,^
And again, after stating that there is no reason for assuming
priority of cognitive over other interests, James asks:
How shall I say that knowing fact with Messrs, Huxley and
Clifford is a better use to put my mind to than feeling
good with Messrs, Moody and Sankey, unless by slowly and
gpainfully finding out that in the long run it works best?
1, James, Collected Essays and Reviews
,
op,cit,, p, 61,
2, Ibid,, p, So, footnote,
o, Ibid,, pp, 60—61,
4, Ibid,, p, 65,
5, Ibid,, p, (6*
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Another characteristic pragmatic element appearing in this early
essay is the notion that truth is made , although in the form here pre-
sented it does not differ essentially from the Kantian doctrine of the
creativity of thought:
The knower is not simply a mirror floating with no foothold
anywhere, and passively reflecting an order that he comes
upon and finds simply existing# The knower is an actor, and
co-efficient of the truth on one side, whilst on the other
he registers the truth which he helps to create# Mental in-
terests, hypotheses, postulates, so far as they are bases for
human action - action which to a great extent transforms the
world - help to make thetruth which they declare#*
Likewise the germ of the ’will to believe’ dootrine is present
here# Referring to our various individual beliefs, competing as they
are for survival, James says: "While the issue is still undecided we
can call them our prepossessions# But, decided or not, ’go in’ we each
must for one set of interests or another#"^
The second of the essays of James written before 1898 to which we
shall refer is that which bears the title ”The Will to Believe#" It was
written in 1896# Here appears the doctrine of the ’will to believe’ in
its developed form:
Our passional nature not only lawfully may, but must, decide
an option between propositions, whenever it is a genuine
option that cannot by its nature by decided on intellectual
grounds; for xo say, under such circumstances, ’Do not decide,
but leave the question open,’ is itself a passional decision, -
just like deciding yes or no,- and is attended with the same
risk of losing the truth#
3
The basic questions of morality and religion, James believed, are
all questions that must be decided primarily in this volitional way#
In his essay, "Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results,"
written in 1898, James carries over, as we have already mentioned.
1# Collected Essays and Reviews, op#cit#, p# 67#
2# Tbid.
, pp# £5»£8#
3# James, William, The Will to Believe, (N.Y#: Longmans, Green & Co#, 1927
;
First Ed# 1897) /“p^Li;
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Peirce’s doctrine of sensuous effects from meaning to truth itself,
and he enlarges the notion of sensuous effects to that of "practical
results." Referring to the principle as formulated by Peirce, he
writes*
I think myself that it should be expressed more broadly than
Mr. Peirce expresses it. The ultimate test for us of what a
truth means is indeed the conduct it dictates or inspires.
And I should prefer —- to express Peirce’s principle by say-
ing that the effective meaning of any philosophic prbp6§?+t©n
can always be brought down to some particular consequence, in
our future practical experience,
,
whether active or passive.!
As for logical consequences of the principle thus formulated:
Suppose there are two different philosophic definitions or
propositions, or maxims, or what not, which seem to contra-
dict each other, and about which men dispute. If, by sup-
posing the truth of^one, you can foresee no conceivable prac-
tical consequences to anybody at any time or place, which
is different from what you would focesee if you supposed the
truth of the other, why then the difference between the two
propositions is no difference - it is only a specious and
verbal difference, unworthy pf further contention.
2
This pragmatic conception of truth, as taught by James, is expounded
most fully in his two volumes Pragmati sm and The Meaning of Truth
,
pub-
lished in 1907 and 1909, respectively. His treatment, however, is not
always unambiguous. Often he seems to identify truth with workability,
the one constituting the exhaustive definition of the other. This view
is suggested by such a passage as the following: 7!henever an idea becomes
relevant to a particular situation, he says:
You can say of it then either that "it is useful because it
is true" or that "it is true because it is useful." Both these
phrases mean exactly the same thing, namely that here is an
idea that gets fulfilled and can be verified.3
Elsewhere James seems to make workability simply an attribute, not
^
the essence of truth. Indeed, in one passage, he seems to speak of this
1. Collected Essays and Reviews, opscit., p.,412.
2. Tbi&.y" pp . "41"2'-4lo
•
3. James, William, Pragmatism, (N.Y. : Longaans, Green & Co., 1907), p.204.
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view as specifically the one he intends, end contrasts it with the
broader usage in England*
All that the pragmatic method implies, then, is that truths
should have practical consequences* In England the word has
been used more broadly still, to cover the notion that the
truth of any statement consists in the consequences, and part-
icularly in their being" good oonse quence s
James lays large stress on the dynamic character of truth; it is
not simply statically found; rather it is created*
The truth of an idea is not a stagnant property inherent
init# Truth happens to an idea* It becomes true, is made
true by events'*; Its verity is in fact" an event, a process*
the process namely of its verifying itself, its verifica-
tion.^ 2
In speaking ofthe instrumental quality of truth, James reports
approvingly the doctrine as already taught by John Dewey, which we
shall notice shortly, thus* "Ideas become true just in so far as they
help us to get into satisfactory relation with othe r parts of our ex-
25
perience*" Elsewhere James states again* "The possession of true
thoughts means everywhere the possession of invaluable instruments of
4
action*"
Yet with all of this emphasis upon the utility and instrumentality
of truth, James did not mean to reject the criterion of logical harmony
among ideas* He says*
If theological ideas prove to have a value for concrete life,
they will be true, for pragmatism, in the sense of being good
for so much* For how much more they are true, will depend
entirely on their relations to the other truths that also have
to be acknowledged*®
This recognition of the need of harmony between new propositions
and truths previously arrived at made James feel that the pragsmti©
method as he conceived it was not wanting in intellectual rigor* He
1* James, William, The Meaning of Truth, (H*Y*: Longmans, Green & Co*, 1909),
p* 52*
2* James, Pragmatism, op,cit*, p*201*
3. Ibid., p75|
4* Ibid*, p*202*
5* Ibid*, p* 73*
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writes:
In the choice of these man-made formulas we can not be capric-
ious with impunity any more than we can be capricious on the
common-sense practical level* We must find a theory that will
i work; and that means something extremely difficult; for our
theory must mediate between all previous truths and certain new
experiences* It must derange common sense and previous belief
as little as possible, and it must lead to some sensible termi-
nus or other that can be verified exactly* To *work* means both
these things; and the squeeze is so tight that there is little
loose play for any hypothesis**
This completes our exhibition of the essential features of James*
pragmatism* Primarily, with him, pragpiatism was a philosophical method*
We shall notice in this survey one other important work of pragma-
tism that falls within the period of possible influence upon Bowne and
that is needed to complete our outline of the essential and character-
istic elements of pragmatism as a developed doctrine, namely. Studies in
Logical Theory
,
by John Dewey, published in 1903* For Dewey, the thought-
situation is always a problem-situation, end thought arises for the pur-
pose of resolving that situation* The thought process, like every other
process, must be understood in evolutionary terms, namely, "as an instru-
ment of adjustment or adaptation to a particular environing situation* ”2
The character of thought is "strictly instrumental *"s "Thinking is adapt-
ation to an end through the adjustment of particular objective contents*”4
The fundamental position of Dewey is succinctly expressed in the follow-
ing passage:
All the distinctions of the thought-function, or of conception
as over against sense-perception, of judgment in its various
modes and forms, df inference in its vast diversity of opera-
tion - all these distinctions come within the thought-situation
as growing out of a characteristic antecedent typical forma-
tion of experience; and have for their purpose the solution of
the peculiar problem with respect to which the thought-function
is generated or evolved: the restoration of a deliberately in-
1* James, Pragmatism
, op.cit*, pp*216-217*
2* Dewey, John,’ 'Studies in Logical Theory, (Chicago: Dhiv* of Chicago
Press, 1903),“2nd* 'Impress*, ISO'S', p*15*
3* Ibid*, p* 79*
4* Ibid*, p* 81*
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tegrated experience from the inherent conflict into -which
it has fallen* 1
If thought is essentially an instrumental process, it follows that
its validity, its truth, must be understood in instrumental terms, accord-
ing to Dewey* "The test of validity of (an) idea is its functional or in-
strumental use in effecting the transition from a relatively conflicting
2
experience to a relatively integrated one."
For Dewey, instrumental logic is a method, and, as suoh,constitutes
the major portion of his philosophy* It has no concern for system-build-
ing* "It makes no pretense to be an account of a dosed and finished
3
universe,"
With this survey of the early development of pragmatism, we are now-
able to indicate, by way of summary, those emphases of pragmatism which
are characteristic and definitives
(1) Our practical, vital interests control the development of our
mental life, and are determinative in all cognitive activity* This use
of •interests* by the pragmatists is not equivalent to the Kantian doctrine
of the primacy of the practical reason, for as we have seen in our con-
sideration of that doctrine, Kant was speaking solely of a priori prin-
ciples of the pure practical reason; his emphasis was upon control by
reason, not upon determination of reason by subjeotive interests*
(2) Knowledge is essentially hypothetical, not final; it is always
relative to a problem-situation which it is purposing to solve* Mind-
activity, therefore, is fundamentally instrumental*
(3) The criterion of the validity of an idea or belief is its
utility or workability, that is, the suitability of the practical con-
sequences that follow from it, the results which it brings about that
1* Dewey, Studies in Logical Theory
, p* 47*
2* Ibid*, p* 75*
3* Ibid*, p* 19*
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mean the control of the problem-situation, the success of the adaptation
to the environment-problem. These various expressions carry different em-
phases, but their common significance is that of workability or instru-
mentality.
(4) With the validity of the ideas so tested, truth itself tends
to be defined as that -which is verifiable, as that which -works, as that
which can be made to solve a problem-situation. Truth becomes, therefore,
essentially instrumental.
(5) The ••will to believe* doctrine is not characteristic of prag-
matists in general, but beloxg s ohibfly to such religiously-interested
leaders in the movement as William James and F.C.S. Schiller.
This, then, gives us a working conception of pragmatism. The relation
of such thought-emphases to the methodology of Bowne is the problem of
this investigation.
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CHAPTER TWO
A CRITICAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL ANALYSIS OF BOWNE*S THEORY OF
THOUGHT AND KNOWLEDGE.
—
37
Introduction#
In our analysis of Bowne* s theory of thought and knowledge, we
shall proceed developmentally, beginning with his earliest epistemo-
logical references and writings# The published work of Bowne covers a
span of nearly thirty-nine years, beginning in 1872, and continuing to
the time of his death in 1910# To facilitate our study we shall divide
these thirty-nine years, somewhat arbitrarily, into four different per-
iods# The first period we shall designate as that from 1872 to 1878,
representing the beginnings of Bowne* s critical work# The second period,
from 1879 to 1883, is marked by the publication of Studies in Theism#
The third period, from 1884 to 1896, is that beginning with the publi*
cation of the two articles: "Science Must Go," and "The Logic of Relig-
ious Belief# " The final period, 1897 to 1910, is dated from the publi-
cation of the Theory of Thought and Knowledge #
In each period we shall deal with Bowne *s theory under the follow-
ing topics: (1) Nature of the Mind, (2) The Nature and Scope of Know-
ledge, (3) Philosophical Method and Criteria, and (4) The Nature of
truth#
Section One: First Period, 1872-1878#
(1) Nature of the Mind#
In his view of the nature of the mind, Bowne followed in the activ-
istic tradition of Leibniz, Berkeley, and Kant# And under the direct
influence of Lot ze and Ulrici, his conception was as empirical as it was
logical# "In consciousness, " he says, "we know ourselves as self-deter-
1
mining activities#" And again, "Self as perceiving, is the most funda-
1# Meth# Quart# Rev#, 56 (1874), p# 274#
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1
mental datum of consciousness*" Bowne rejected outright the sensation-
alistic view of the mind, as taught, in his day, chiefly by fpencer# "Mind,"
he says, "is neither a state nor a series of states, but a being which ex-
2
periences these states." With Bowne, the empirioal emphasis accompanied,
it did not replace, the logical# We cannot comprehend even the possibility
of experience until we grant the unified self which experience logically
presupposes* "Knowledge is not knowledge until it is related to self# It
is only the enduring and identical ego which gives unity to experience
,
3
“
and makes memory possible#" Again, "The subjective unity of self must
4
be given before knowledge of any kind is possible."
The mind, experienced thus as a unified, self-conscious, self-deter-
mining activity, is capable of thought and knowledge# But in all thought
and knowledge, indeed in all experience of any sort whatever, the mind
continues in its active function# It never passively receives impressions
from the outside world# Bowne emphasizes that "sensation is impossible
5
without an inner activity of the soul," and again, "The mind is active
in all knowledge# Yfithout attention by the inhabitant within, the nervous
6
messengers knock in vain at the chambers of the soul." The mind inter-
prets what is sensuously presented to it; by attending, it excludes
what it is not interested in; it compares, recognizes, judges, imagines,
7
constructs - in all these the mind is active#"
Bowne acoepts, in this period, tflrici’s conception of the knowing
8
mind as "in essence a differentiating activity#" With the mind exper-
1# Bowne, B*P#, The Philosophy of Herbert Spencer
,
(N#Y#: Phillips & Hunt,
1874), p# 159#
2# Ibid*, p# 119#
5# Ibid#, p# 180*
4# Ibid*, p# 18b#
5# Ibid*, p# 153#
6# Hew Englander
, 32 (1873), p# 19#
7# Hew Englander
, 33 (1874), p# 462*
8# Ibid*, p# 466#
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iencing itself as such a differentiating activity, it follows that it
must contain within itself the norms of differentiations "The universal
points of comparison, according to which the soul proceeds in that
differentiation whereby it comes to knowledge *"^ These norms or points
of comparison are the categories* They could not be borrowed or abstract-
ed from sense-experience, because they are presupposed by that experience*
Rather they "lie in the nature of the mind, and are the a priori condi-
O
tions of knowledge*"
In his treatment of the nature of the mind in this period, Bowne
attempts no critical distinction between the function of reason as
theoretical and the function of reason as practical* In one article,
2
however, "Moral Intuition vs* Utilitarianism," Bowne seems to mean, in
4
his emphasis upon "the moral instinct," what Kant meant by the practical
reason, although Bowne is not willing to accept the Kantian principle
of moral action determined by duty without regard to consequences* Bowne*
s
use of instinct here, however, is extremely loose* The term would seem
to suggest something entirely subjective, something lacking in rational
objectivity, yet Bowne makes it clear that he thinks of the moral instinct
as binding upon all alike* He says: "We look upon our moral instincts
as a part of the primary furniture of the soul, and like all the intuitions,
as authoritative in their sphere*" Indeed "The bulk of humah action
is instinctive, and though it would cease if it were found to be result-
less, yet the primary cause is the promptings of the instinct*" But the
moral instinct is objectively valid* "Our claim is, that when two motives
n
appear in the soul, we instinctively know which is higher*" Again:
1 .
2 *
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
New Engl*, 33 (1874), p* 468*
Tbid*
, p • 470*
New Engl *, 32 (1873), pp. 217-242
Ibid*, jp* 218*
Ibid*
,
p* 226*
Ibid*, p* 234*
Ibid*, p* 229*
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Not a common and consistent code, but a common and con-
sistent conscience, is one of the most patent facts of
human history# Remember that by a moral judgment we mean
a decision upon the relative worth and dignity of motives;
and we claim that in such judgments all men agree# *
Bowne is thus using the term ’moral instinct* < as synonymous with
* conscience •* He says:
This faculty, power, instinct, or whatever it may be, which
when two motives disclose themselves, intuitively pronounces „
upon their relative worth and authority, we call conscience#
In moral conduct, Bowne sets the moral instinct, or conscience,
alongside of reason:
Conscience judges actors; reason judges actions# Conscience
selects the motive; reason selects the act which will best
express that motive# Conscience gives the principle of ac-
tion; reason applies it# 3
Thus, though it would seem clear that in giving objeotive validity
to the moral instinct Bowne is intending essentially the Kantian doc-
trine of the practical reason, h$s use of the term * instinct* is not
clear, suggesting as it does an extra-rational factor in human exper-
ience •
(2) The Nature and Scope of Knowledge.
The cognitive relation Bowne conceives dualistically from the be-
ginning of his work# "All knowledge inplies a thing to be known, and a
4
faculty for knowing it#” ”In every act of knowledge two things are
always given - the knower and the known - and they are given as distinot
5
from each other#”
”But what is it to know?” Bowne asks# He answers: ”It is —- to
comprehend the manifold of existence under the various categories of
1# New Engl ., 32(1873), p# 239#
2# Ibid#, p# 229#
3# Ibid#, p# 242#
4# Loo.cit#, H# Spencer (1874), p# 45#
5# Ibid#, p# 158#
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thought,”^ But more explicitly.
To know in the only sense possible to men is, first, to
be sure that a thing exists; and second, that it falls
under certain categories, or has certain definite attrib-
utes or ways of working, Assuming, for example, that
the soul exists, our knowledge thereof would consist not
in an insight into its substance, but in our certainty:
first, that it exists; and second, that it has certain de-
finite modes of activity,^
Bdcause Bowne interprets all of reality in activistio terms, as
well as the knowing mind, knowledge itself must be of things actively
conceited, A completely passive thing could not act on our sense organs
to produce any impression upon us, just as a passive mind could not in-
terpret what was presented to it. Knowledge of anything therefore, is
knowledge of it through its activity-modes,
Bowne assumes, in this period, the possibility of scientific know-
ledge, although he undertakes no systematic treatment of the problem
involved. The distinction between the field of science, on the one hand,
however, and of religion and metaphysics, on the other, which was to re-
ceive large emphasis in his later work, already appears in The Philosophy
of Herbert Spencer, He writes: Science discovers laws, but is forced to
provide an ever-active administrator; this satisfies religion. Religion
proves an ever-living Will, but is compelled to grant its steady method;
2
this satisfies science,” Therefore, ”To religion the cause, to science
the method; to religion the power, to science the path,”^
From the beginning Bowne assumes the possibility of metaphysical
knowledge , He write s
:
In this way we gain all our knowledge. Going out from the
facts of experience, we are forced to assume, first, that
a thing exists; and second, that it has certain properties.
This cohstitutes our knowledge of the thing. Plainly, a
1, Meth,Quart, Rev,, 58 (1876) p, 657,
2, Ibid,, p, ”657,
3, Loc.cit,, H.Spencer (1874), p, 126®
4, Ibid,, p, T27I
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knowledge of the fir^t cause in this sense must he possible,
because phenomena force us to assume its existence, and to
attribute to it definite properties* 1/1/hat these properties
may be, must be determined from a study of the facts; but
when the facts force us to assume such a first cause, and
force us to attribute to it certain definite properties, then
we know that first cause in precisely the same sense in which
we know anything*^
Again, "While insisting upon a real knowledge of God, I am very
2
far from claiming a complete one*"
Bowne rejects completely the Kantian and Spencerian assumption of
a fundamental reality which we cannot know* Of any reality of which it
is possible to affirm the existence, knowledge is possible, for without
knowledge of it, there could be no justifiable affirmation of its exist-
ence* Our khowledge of appearances is our knowledge of reality; it is
3
our knowledge of things as they appear*
In the moral sphere, knowledge of right and wrong is possible,
and is objectively valid, as iddicated in our discussion of Bowne 1 s
view of the moral instinct, or conscience* "Our claim is that as two
motives appear in the mind, we intuitively know which is the higher*"^
(3) Philosophical Method and Criteria.
Although Bowne presented no systematic statement of his conception
of philosophical method in this period, it is possible to bring his
various judgments into something of a unified whole* It is clear that
at the basis of Bowne 1 s whole procedure was a fundamental faith in the
trustworthiness of reason* "The law of our thought are true for all
5
intelligence*" And again, "We refrain from imposing our categories
upon other beings, but insist that they are nevertheless true* To deny this.
1* Meth*Quart*Rey
, 58 (1876), p* 658*
2* Loc.cit*, A. Spencer (1874), p* 72*
3* Hew Engl * 3l~(Y8727> pp* 92-97*
4* flew 5ngl * 32 (1873), p* ;s34*
5* flew Eingi* 31 (1872), p* 97*
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is to commit intellectual suicide#"* Indeed, all cognitive activity
assumes the validity of these categories:
All our mental operations proceed upon certain assumptions#
The reality of an external world, the validity of logical
laws, the truth of causation, the reality of space and time:
these facts are assumed in all reasoning; and reasoning cannot
proceed one step without them#
2
Another basic assumption, closely associated Yfith that of the trust-
worthiness of reason and its categories, is that of the intelligibility
or rationality of the world# "All science implicitly assumes that
Nature is a harmonious system, and its aim is to reproduce that system
in thought# But only the rational can be thus reproduced# Hence, the
system of Nature is either a rational system or our science is worthless#"2
But though resting upon the assumed trustrorthiness of the mind
and intelligibility of the world, philosophical method for Bowne, in this
period, must avoid mere deductive speculation and root firmly in the
facts of conscious experience# This empirical emphasis became very strong
after Bowne f s contact with Ulrici# It is conspicuous in his critical
references to post-Kantian German philosophy# He writes: "The critic
is compelled to declare that German philosophy since Kant has had little
in common with logic, less yet in common with the facts of conscious-
ness#"4 Hegel and his followers, Bowne says elsewhere, "were even more
superior to facts than Schelling; while they took logic itself by the
horns and announced the identity of contradiction as the first principle
5
of philosophy#" Ulrici was one of the few who, in the seventies, were
"making heroic efforts to recall philosophy to the facts of life and
consciousness#"^
The positive statement of Bowne *s conception of empirical method
1# New Eftgl # 31 (1872), p. S7#
2# ITew ‘Ehg'l . 32 (1873), p# 500#
3# Independent
, 29 (July 5, 1877), p# 2#
4# New1 fengl.' 33 (1874), pp# 461-462#
5# TEIcrTTp. 623.
6# Independ# 26 (Jan#22, 1874$, p#4#
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in this period is perhaps best found in the following passage in which
Bowne is reviewing the Logik of Ulrici# Referring to the nature of the
laws of thought, he affirms that this question:
is not to be answered by an apriori speculation, no matter
how pretentious, but by an inductive consideration of the
mind itself* — The facts of the common consciousness, must
decide this question# And since any being manifests its
nature only in its activity, we can only hope to discover
the nature of the mind by an examination of its activity#1
Again, with respect to metaphysical procedure:
We rise to the absolute from the conditioned facts of exper-
ience, and the content which we put into the absolute must
be determined entirely by those facts#^
This empirical emphasis in Bowne* s early methodology does not ex-
clude the logical, however# The essence of the method is rather the
working out of the logical presuppositions and implications of the facts
of consoious experience# Both reason and experience are essentially
trustworthy#
As to the criteria of knowledge, here also there is no systematic
statement in this period# Nevertheless, it is clear that Bowne intends
to judge all claims to knowledge by two criteria: consistency and what
he comes later to call "adequacy to the facts," for certainly the em-
pirical emphasis here, as well as the logical, is unmistakable# Bowne
criticizes Spencer for using inconceivability as a truth criterion on
the ground that he confuses inconceivability with incomprehensibility#
Only that which is contradictory, which violates the law of reason, Bowne
insists, is truly inconceivable# Referring to such inconceivables, he
says:
Violating, as they do, the fundamental intuitions of the
mind, as long as we have any faith at all in reason, we
must believe these inconceivables +o be wn possibles #3
1. New Engl * 33 (1874), p# 463#
2# Ibid#
, p* 644#
3# Loc.cit#, 5, Spencer (1874), p#88#
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Bowne was severe in his criticism of the "Hegelian doctrine of the
identity of contradictories" "because he understood by it the abandonment
of the fundamental law of reason# He believed, too, that this same
tendency to disregard the demands of logic was characteristic of much
of the work of the scientific agnostics, of Huxley, Spencer, and Fiske#
He accumulates illustrations to show "how strong is the reaction among
the advanced scientists against ronsistency as a test of truth#”"*" That
Bowne clung to consistency as the first criterion of all thinking is shown
by such a statement as the followings Referring to the true conception
of change and causality, he affirms that this is "not a question which
o
the eyes can settle, but rather one of consistency of thinking#"
The empirical criterion we have already illustrated in our exposi-
tion of Bowne 1 s empirical method# Though not critically formulating if, he
insisted that thought begin with the "conditioned facts of experience,"
and that the content of any speculation be "determined entirely by those
3facts#" This empirical criterion was later expressed by Bowne as "ade-
quacy to the facts#"
In this early period, Bowne seemed to favor Ulrici*s formula for the
criterion of truth, namely, "thought-necessity#" In reviewing Ulrici,
he writes)
"When I am compelled to think a thing as so, and not otherwise,
then I am certain that it is so* Tihen I am uncertain,that means
that I an not compelled to conceive it in the given way# But
when a true thought-necessity is present, then all doubt is ex-
cluded, andonly certainty remains#4
Again, "TShatever a thought-necessity forces upon us, we must acce pfc
C
as real," and "Whatever we cannot help admitting must be admitted} and
£
nothing else can lay claim to reality#" The loose and subjective char-
1# Zion 1 s Herald 54 (1877), p#361#
2# ihdepend# 2 3 (July 5, 1877), p#3#
3# 1'ew Engl # 33 (1874), p. 644#
4# Ibid*, p# 474#
5# Ibid#, p# 474-5#
6# Ibid#, p# 626#
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acter of such a formulation is immediately obvious* Tilhat may be necess-
ary to the thought of one person, may not seem at all necessary to the
thought of another* It needs further explication, although Bowne prob-
ably intended the formula to cover the two criteria which we have already
mentioned, consistency and empirical adequacy; that is, thought is co-
erced by both logical and factual necessity, and when so coerced may be
regarded as true*
That Bowne was thinking also in this period of the pragjnatic crit-
erion of fruitfulness, even though only incidentally and without any
connection with concrete cases of truth-testing, is suggested by his
dismissal of that type of scepticism, which, without any rational basis,
holds that though our conclusions may be subjectively necessary for us,
they do not possess objective validity* He says of such scepticism that
1
it is "forever irrefutable and forever barren*
Another isolated and incidental statement in this period that is
pragmatically toned is one which occurs in Bowne 1 s criticism of Spencer*s
doctrine of the unknowable* Bowne does not criticize the doctrine in
pragamtic terms; he holds only to the strictest logical treatment; but
he does say that this doctrine, which logically can be shown to be in
error, is one that would never disturb science or practical life:
Science would go on in just the same way as at present, collect-
ing and coordinating its facts, though the facts were proved to
be phantoms* Common life would experience no change* The most
thorough-going know-nothing would be as eager to get bread as the
realist; he would be as careful to keep out of a relative fire
or a relative river, as out of an absolute one* In all these
cases the practical necessity would override the speculative
error*2
That Bowne was not, in this period, conceiving these notions of
d
1* Meth.Quart*Rev* 58 (1876), p*662*
2* Loc* cTt,, & Spencer
,
(I874j[, p*76*
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"barrenness" and practical necessity,” even though in isolation prag-
matically toned, in any real pragpiatie way is shown by the paragraph
which follows the last quotation* There Bowne insists that it is not
enough that an idea be good for us to believe, or that it hare merely
regulative value, it must be true in fact*
It is useless to leave us our religious ideas as regulative
truths - that is, things good for us to believe, but without
foundation in fact* A regulative truth will regulate until
one discovers the fraud; but he must have very little know-
ledge of human nature Yfho imagines that it will have any au-
thority after the trick has been found out*l
A pragmatic emphasis would seem more definitely to have entered
into the thought of Bowne in this period in the field of ethical theory*
Bowne found strength in both the intuitional and utilitarian views of
ethics, but was not satisfied with either alone* Interpreting the in-
tuitional view, that is, conscience conceived as moral intuition or
instinct, in Kantian terms of rational objectivity, he sought to com-
bine it with the utilitarian view of consequences as the criterion*
In his article, "Moral Intuition vs* Utilitarianism," he writes: "For
the control of life intuition is blind without the guidance of utility
and utility is the purest selfishness apart from moral intuition *"^
As we have already observed in our exposition of Bowne* s view of the
nature of the mind in this period, Bowne separates the function of con-
science from that of reason:
Conscience judges actors; reason judges actions* Conscience
selects the motive; reason selects the act which will best
express that motive* Conscience gives the principle of ac-
tion; reason applies it*3
With reason thus functioning in the application of the principles
of conscience, its only criterion is consequences:
1* Loc*cit*, H.Spencer (1874), p* 76*
2* New Engl* ^2"”(TWIT) , p*218*
3* ibid*, p*242*
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As actions ftave no moral quality in themselves, we resign
without hesitation the making of a code, or the determina-
tion of specific action, to the judging intellect; and we
admit consequences to be the only standard of judgment. The
only rational aim of action is to secure good of some kind
for ourselves or others; and actions are to be selected with
reference to their fitness to secure this end. Things hurt-
ful are not to be done, things indifferent may be left un-
done, things helpful must be done,l
The utilitarian emphasis here is strong, Bowne even goes so far
as to say:
Justice and truth have no absolute obligation; it is only as
they are the bond and cewent of society that they are bind-
ing upon us,-— Profanity is forbidden because it destroys
reverence for God and his law. Even chastity derives its ob-
ligation from its necessity to the family relation, and the
proper physical and moral education of the raoe#^
And referring to Kant*s demand for unconditional veracity even where the
life of an innocent person is at stake, Bowne writes:
This is conscience gone mad. Truth must be told because
society and human happiness are based upon it, and any
tampering with it is sure to result in mischief, Whenever
it does not hold this relation, it may innocently be dispensed
with,3
And again, "We hold this to be the infallible test of codes as well as
of men. By their fruit ye shall know them#"^
Yet Bowne was insistent in urging that utilitarianism without
moral intuition was incomplete. We must recognize the moral instinct
or intuition as giving those principles of right and wrong, by which
consequences are to be judged, "Why," Bowne asks, "should I follow the
higher motive? Because it is higher. How do I know it to be higher? By
C
insight, not by foresight," It is Bowne *s insistence upon the object-
ivity, the binding-upon-all-alike quality, of the moral judgment that
keeps these utilitarian statements from being out-and-out pragmatism.
These moral intuitions, he writes, are "authoritative in their sphere#"®
1, New Engl,
2, ibid,
, p,
3, Ibid,
, p,
4, Ibid,, p,
5, Ibid,, p,
6, Ibid,, p.
32 (1873), p,
222 #
222 #
224,
235#
226#
221-222 #
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And again, "wo claim that in such judgments all men agree *”^ These
views, therefore, amount to this: the judgment of action in terms of
consequences in the light of the objectively valid moral principles
established by conscience* That this view is essentially rationalistic
is, therefore, clear, but it is also clear that Bovme was modifying his
inherited Kantian rationalism in the light of the pragmatic emphases of
utilitarianism*
(4)
,
The Nature of Truth*
3owne has very little to say in this period concerning the nature
of truth* Two passages, however, make clear that he was thinking of truth
as independent and rational, and not as relative or mechanical* His
purpose is to show that truth is without significance on a necessitarian
basis* He writes:
Logically, uhe materialist has no right to talk of either
the true or the good* Upon his theory, there is neither
true nor good* For thought is only a product of the brain;
and by what right can we say that this product is true and
that one is false? Both are produced with equal necessity,
and why is not one as good as the other?2
Again:
If the universe be anything but an irrational botoh, man’s
salvation must lie in knowing the truth about it* The notion
that truth could be destructive and falsehood conservative,
is a view which none of us would care to entertain* Helpful
superstitions and beneficent lies can have no place in a
rational system* They may serve for a time as palliatives,
but in the end notiling but truth can save* "3
Helpfulness and utility in themselves are no guarantee of truth,
although indeed truth must be regarded as conservative*
Summary of Epistemology for First Period (1872-1378):
Mind, experienced as a unified, self-conscious, self-determining
1* New Engl , 32 (1873) p* 239*
2* Sndepend, 26 (July 30, 1874) p* 2o
3* ^on , rgerald 54 (1877), o* 40i*
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activity, and logically presupposed as an enduring and identical ego by
experience, is active in all knowledge, interpreting, comparing, differ-
entiating, according to a priori norms implicit in its activity; it include
the moral instincts the principles of which are objectively valid# Know-
ledge, dualistio in its distinction between knower and known, is the
active interpreting of presentations in accordance with the a priori
categories; knowledge is possible for metaphysical reality and for
questions of right and wrong# Philosophical method, beginning with a basic
faith in the trustworthiness of reason and in the intelligibility of the
world, must root firmly in the facts of experience; all speculation must
begin with facts and its content must be determined by facts# The criter-
ia of knowledge, therefore, are those of logical consistency and wadequacy
to the facts” (this latter phrase does not actually appear until later
in Bowne, but the intention is present in this first period)# Two iso-
lated suggestions of pragmatic criteria in this period are clearly inci-
dental and are given no applicability to concrete truth-claims, except
in the field of ethical judgments, where consequences are made the em-
pirical criterion for judging the moral quality of any action in the light
of the a priori principles established by conscience; but even here the
introduction of the utilitarian emphasis upon consequenoes does not alter
the fundamental rationalism of Bowne* s ethical theory in this period, in-
asmuch as moral intuition is the seat of the a priori, objectively
valid moral principles which must guide all judgments of consequences#
Nevertheless, these pragmatic elements indicate an openness of mind on
Bowne *s part, even in this early period, to those eiaphases which were to
become characteristic of pragmatism# . Truth is rational, independent,
and absolute, though at the same time beneficial and useful wherever it is
realized#
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Section Two: Second Period* 1879-1883*
(1) . Nature of the Hindi
^
Aside from a pragmatic emphasis upon feelings and interests as
determinants in the development of the mind, there is no essential change
in the second period in Bowne* s views of the nature of the mind# As in
the first period, he starts with the experience of the conscious self
and then proceeds to develop the logioal presuppositions of that exper-
ience* The pmpirical and the logical are kept, therefore, in close
conjunction, although with somewhat greater emphasis on the logical devel-
opment because of Bowne*s desire to penetrate beneath appearances to their
underlying ground* ”The unity of the thinking subject is less a deliverance
of consciousness than a necessary condition of all consciousness,” he
writes in Studies in Theism*^ And in the first edition of the Metaphysics
,
published three years later: ”It does not follow that we are unitary agents
because we appear to ourselves as such, but because we appear to ourselves
- 2
at all*” that is, "Consciousness of any sort is impossible without the
unity of the conscious subject*” Again, "Thought and feeling demand a
subject. In experience, tto know nothing of thoughts and feelings exist-
ing apart by themselves* The universal fact is, not feelings and thoughts
exist; but I think and I feel* ,,4: And once again, "My thoughts demand a sub-
ject, and that subject is myself* I know myself as a thinker and an
agent* As such subject or agent, I am substance, in the only intell-
igible use of that word*"®
The activity of the mind in the knowing process remains an essential
tenet in the developing epistemology of Bowne* In Studie s in Theism, he
1
1* Bowne, B*P*, Studies in Theism
,
(N*Y*: Phillips and Hunt, 1879), p. 387*
2* Bowne, B.P*, Metaphysics, AStudy in First Principles, (N.Y. : Harper and
Brothers, 1882")", r>. 369.
3# Ibid*, p* 368*
4o Ibid*, p* 361—362*
5* Ibid*
,
p* 382*
# :
»•
'
••• '
.
'
.
" ’ "
•
’
. ijj
' A
.
'
•
,
'
rr ‘a .m; c . Jr - - >
bzu
'Ic •.
’
: • ;•
V
.
:•
'
'
-
•
r»
..
•
-
•
•
*
.
. ; ::;yx at o .
.
* • r.
'
Z in-
...
.
. » • *
.
V .
,
...
.
, . t .
f
(
* •
52
writes* "The activity of the mind in knowing is a principle which ration-
al philosophy will never consent to give up*——the failure to grasp it
nl
is at the bottom of the chief errors of ancient and modern philosophy*
And in the Metaphysics *
Knowledge is not passively imported into the soul, but is devel-
oped by the soul within itself* Just as we perceive another^
thought by constructing it in our own minds, so we perceive the
universe by a similar act of construction* The process is active,
and not passive* It is constructive rather than receptive; or
rather it is reception only through construction^
The mind activity is essentially a process of relating, which in turn
involves discrimination and comparison* Bowne is here carrying forward
the doctrine of thought as a differentiating activity, which he again
3
specifically acknowledges as having been developed chiefly by Ulrici.
The mind proceeds in its cognitive activity according to the prin-
ciples of interpretation implicit within it* "Perception proper does
not exist at all until the raw material of sensation has been
differentiated, and interpreted, and systematized* But the principles of
interpretation and differentiation must be in the mind itself*"^ Primarily
these principles are "forms of our knowing; and are carried into things
rather than found in them*"^ Again, "The mind deals with its objects
under the forms of cause and effect, substance, and quality, identity,
continuity and space* These forms we regard as contributed by the mind,
and for the reason that there is nothing in simple sentiency which shows the
le-ast tendency to produce them*
"
6
The most striking development in Bowne f s view of the nature of the
mind in this second period is the emphasis which he now places upon the
determinative character of feelings and interests in the life of the mind*
1* Loc.cit*, Studies, (1879), p* 120*
2* Loc.cit*, Metaph*
, (1882), p* 407*
3* Ibid*, p« 367*
4* Loc*cit*, Studies
, (1879), p* 123*
5* Ibid*, p* 124*
6* Metaph*
, (1882), p* 507*
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1
This emphasis may well be related to the doctrine of moral instincts which
we found developed by Bowne in a single article of the first period, "Moral
Intuition and Utilitarianism*"^ There we found Bowne using the term in-
stincts rather loosely to designate the demands of the moral nature* Here
we find Bowne using the terms interests and feelings, and again in de-
fense of the rights of the moral, together with the re ligious^ nature* It
is in Studies in Theism that the doctrine of the determinative character
of feelings and interests in the life of the mind is first developed by
Bowne; and it is here developed with positiveness and vigor* In the
Chapter on "Knowledge and Belief," we find the following:
Both in ethics and esthetics the ultimate fact upon which
all theory is built, is a movement of the sensibility, which
thus founds the distinction of good and bad, beautiful and
ugly* The most rigorous rationalist in morals cannot escape
the ultimate appeal to feeling to sanction his theories*
the whole mental life, also springs out of feeling* It is
extremely doubtful if a purely perceptive being, without any
subjective interests, could attain to rationality, even if
its physical existence were secured* Indeed, it is demon-
strable that our sentiments outline and control all mental
development* Before mental growth can begin, there must be
an awakened interest*
2
And further:
When the human mind comes to self-consciousness, it becomes
aware of many interests* These are practical, speculative,
esthetic and moral interests* These are the motive power of
the mind, and outline its development*^
It is clear that Bowne intended by this emphasis upon feelings and
interests as outlining and cont ro1ling* development simply a restatement
A
of the Kantian doctrine of the primacy of the practical reason* Indeed,
in the same chapter from which the two preceding passages are taken,
Bowne writes:
It is not without ground, therefore, that Kant insisted
upon the primacy of the practical reason, and the subor-
1* New Engl * 32 (1873), See pp. 218, 226, 229, 234*
2* Loc* cit*, Studies
, (1879), pp. 65-66*
3* Ibid*, p. 6157
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dinate character of the speculative. Man is life rather than
reason} and reason only strives to formulate what life and
reality are. Life has the field, and the might of the
actual will always prevail at last over aberrant speculation.
1
But though Bovme intended this stress upon feelings and interests
as a restatement of the Kantian doctrine of the primacy of the practical
reason, it is clear that his restatement differs in character from Kant*s
original doctrine, in so far as it is pragmatic rather than rationalistic
in form, Kant, as we have seen (v. pp. 21-23), recognized the place of
interests in the mental life, but he distinguished between those inter-
ests which belong direotly to pure reason and those which rest on empir-
ical grounds. Further, he was careful to specify of the moral law: "dass
es nicht darum fiir uns Gttltigkeit hat, weil es interessiert , w but rather
"dass es interessiert, weil es f&r uns als Menschen gilt, da es aus un-
serem Y/illen als Intelligenz, mithin aus unserem eigentlichen Selbst ent-
2
sprungen ist." As we have seen, further (v. pp. 19-21), for Kant, the
primacy of the practical reason meant the validity of the a priori prin-
ciples of the practical reason, independent of the possibility of their
being established by the speculative reason, as long as they do not
contradict the speculative reason, and their validity lies precisely
in the fact that they are a priori principles of pure practical reason,
and hence objective and necessary. Bowne, on the other hand, makes no
attempt to establish the validity of the beliefs whioh grow out of
these interests of the mind beyond affirming their essential character
3
in the life of the mind and their empirical generality and utility.
For Kant the moral law and its religious postulates are objectively valid
because they are required by pure reason. For Bowne moral and religious
feelings are objectively valid because they are no more subjective than
1. Loc.cit., Studies
, (1879) pp. 74-75>.
2. Kant, loc.cit., Vol.III. G.M.S., p. 91 (Akademie-Ausgabe,pp. 460-461)
3.
Loc.cit., Studies, pp. 75, 76, 77
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the postulates of science and philosophy and because they are univer-
sally found in human experience# Kant approached the problem of moral
and religious beliefs from the point of view of reason* Bowne approached
the problem from the point of view of our experience* There was still
the possibility of founding the objective validity of these feelings
and interests on the ground that the objectivity of their reference is
required by the most coherent view of experience* But Bowne made no use
of such method in this second period* Ee built his case rather upon a
circle argument: The feelings require God, therefore God must be; and
if God is, then the feelings for God may be regarded as having objective
validity# In other words, he simply assumed the validity of the moral
and religious interests, without attempting in any way, other than prag-
matically, to establish them# It is for this reason that we must judge
that, though intending the Kantian doctrine, Bowne succeeded, in this
period, in achieving only a pragmatic formulation# We shall examine
this view of Bowne more closely in our consideration of the philosophical
methods and criteria of this period#
Bowne’ s view of the function of the speculative reason in relation
to these interests of the mind appears as one of regulation# Referring
to the interests, be says: "The only function of the logical understanding,
with regard to them, is to expound their implications, and determine their
mutual relations#"* Again:
Just as sensation is an absolute condition of perception,
so this feeling of God is an absolute condition of theis-
tic belief# The reflective reason does not originate it,
but justifies or rectifies it# The arguments for theism
have never originated the belief, but have only aimed to
give reasons for the belief already there#2
1. Loc*cit*, Studies
. (1879), p. 69#
2# Ibid#, p# 81#
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(2) The Nature and Scope of Knowledge.
Bourne* s treatment of the nature of knowledge in the second period is
more broadly developed than that of the first period* although including
the essential points outlined in the earlier treatment. This fuller de-
velopment is shown chiefly in the distinction which he now makes between
knowledge and belief. Although closely limiting the scope of that which
is strictly knowledge, he treats rational belief as answering our cogni-
tive needs in the largest part of our experience. We shall notice first
his definition of knowledge, as given in Studies in Theism :
Knowledge is the certainty that our conceptions correspond
to reality or to truth. By reality, we mean any matter of
fact, whether of the outer or inner world. By truth, we
mean rational principles. By certainty, it is plain that
we cannot mean any thoughtless assurance, but only that
which results from the necessity of admission. *
Thus, "Rational principles, and the facts of consciousness and im-
2
mediate perception, are all that can claim to be strictly knowledge."
Our knowledge of rational principles consists in having a "clear insight"
3
into them so that they are seen to be "geIf-evident." And, "Our know-
ledge of things consists (1) in the certainty -chat they exist, and (2)
that they have certain attributes or ways of working, and certain rela-
4
tions among themselves."
By rational principles, Bowne means those propositions "at the
5
foundation of our mental life — which cannot be mediated or deduced."
6
They are immediate and original." They include such truths as the log-
7
ical laws, the law of causation, and mathematical truths.
This close restriction of knowledge, as thus defined, to rational
principles and the facts of consciousness and immediate perception means
1. Loc.cit., Studies (1879), pp. 13-14.
2. Ibid., p. 61.
3. Ibid., p. 15.
4. Ibid., p. 15.
5. Loc.cit., Metaph
., (1882), pp. 451-452.
6. Ibid., p. 514.
7. Ibid., pp. 521-523*
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that very little of our so-called knowledge is positively knowledge#
"Still," Bowne says:
It does not follow that all else is delusion; for, though
not strictly certain, it may be rationally probable, and
thus a subjeot for rational belief# By rational belief,
then, we mean the acceptance of any thing on grounds which,
while they render it probable, do not strictly compel its
admission# They justify the mind in accepting it, but do
not exclude the possibility of the opposite#^
Bowne defines his meaning further: "A belief, to be rational, must
have rational grounds# V?ben held without grounds, it is a volition;
when held on irrational grounds, it is a prejudice or a superstition#" 2
The grounds of rational belief are essentially of two classes: ob-
jective and subjective# "The former are the facts of sense -perception;
the latter are the manifold facts of feeling and instinct, the longing
for the true, the beautiful and the good, the sense of dependence and
moral obligation, the desire to worship, and the fervors of religious
aspiration#"
From these definitions it is clear that science and philosophy, the
latter including metaphysics, ethics, and philosophy of religion, are
assigned to the field of rational belief, and it is precisely the assump-
tions upon which they are based that constitute their sphere one of be-
lief rather than of positive knowledge# Their work is the solution of
the problems of our experience, not the demonstration of theorems# Bowne
writes:
The demonstration of theorems belongs only to the formal
sciences; all the sciences which deal with reality aim only
at the solution of problems# They find their problems in
the facts, and then they raise the question how we must
think of the backlying cause, or causes, or antecedents, in
order that the facts should be as they are #4
1# Loc.cit#, Studies
, (1879), p#61#
2# Ibid*, p# <d2#
3# Ibid#, p# 63#
4# Meth#Quart#Rev# , 61 (1879), p#226#
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In this sense, then, of empirically grounded rational belief, meta-
physical knowledge, as well as scientific, is possible* This represents
a more precise formulation of the meaning of metaphysical knowledge than
that which we found in the first period of Bowne*s work* It is those
thought interpretations of ultimate reality which seem rationally most
probable* And because common sense the world over inevitably holds cer-
tain spontaneously evolved notions of the nature of the world, metaphysics
becomes the critical examination, correction, and elaboration of those
common-sense notions* with the aim of securing the most rational solution
of our ultimate thought-problems* It is, writes Bowne, "an exposition
«1
and criticism of our fundamental philosophical concepts* Or again,
"Our aim," in metaphysics, "is to criticise our notions of reality and
2
thus determine the true nature and connections of things* This deter-
mination, however, never goes beyond the limits of rational belief, so that
"The question of metaphysics — finally becomes. How must we think of
feality?" And this thought of reality will always be in the nature
of an outline-conception* The details of the system cannot be specula-
4
tively arrived at, but must be furnished by experience*
(3) . Philosophical Method and Criteria*
References to methodology in Bowne* s writings of this period are
numerous* Any attempt to render a systematic formulation of these vari-
ous statements of view, is rendered difficult, however, by the lack of
assimilation of the methods involved to one another* There are present,
for example, in the writings of this period three distinct types of meth-
ods inductive, deductive, and pragmatic* At no point does Bowne attempt
1* Loc.cit., Metaph*, (1882J, pp* vi-vii*
2. Ibid*, p.
3* Ibid*, p* 7*
4* See Ibid* p*viii, and pp* 529-530*
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a systematic presentation of these various types to clarify their rela-
tions to one another* For example , Bourne continues with the emphasis
of the first period, though somewhat more mildly, that speculation must
begin with facts; yet the inductive approach is largely confined to his
presentation of the theistic arguments* In his systematic fietaphysics,
on the other hand, his method is very largely that of a deductive exam-
ination of basic concepts* Again, in his examination of moral and relig-
ious beliefs, his approach is largely pragmatic* There is less difficulty
in harmonizing the inductive and deductive methods, than in harmonizing
these, in turn, with the pragmatic, for indeed, the inductive and de-
ductive supplement each other* Vie may follow the investigation of facts
as far as such investigation will lead us, but there still remains the
problem of examining the fundamental concepts of interpretation which w©
have carried into our deductive procedure* It is this latter task that
is the chief function of metaphysics as Bowne conceives it* The prag-
matic, on the other hand, cannot be harmonized with rationalistic induction
and deduction unless it too is carried over to an essentially rationalistic
basis* In other words, the final criteria of khowledge and belief must
be rational if objectivity is to be established* . No genuine objectivity
can be established on purely pragmatic grounds* It is the presence, there-
fore, of these various, and by Bowne unrelated,types of methods in the
writings of this period that renders a systematic formulation difficult*
An examination of the methodology as it relates to the different phases of
knowledge and belief, however, is possible, and it is that to which we
now turn*
With the definitions of knowledge and rational belief with which
Bowne proceeds in this period, his methodology is manifestly concerned
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primarily with the field of rational belief# In the field of strict
knowledge the methodology is already included in the definition of that
knowledge* That is, the knowledge of ultimate principles is immediate
and original, whenever, after its psychological conditioning, it comes
to the mind*^ It cannot be mediated or deduced} it is incapable of
demonstration* "Acceptance or rejection alone is possible*" Its
criteria are the inconceivability of its opposites and immediate self-
evidence* "With rational principles —- their opposites are not only
incredible, they cannot even be conceived* Their denial is possible
3
in word, but not in thought*" Again, "When asked, then, for the ulti-
mate Y/arrant of rational principles, we do not hesitate to declare it to
be reason itself* Whatever appears as truly self-evident and necessary,
the mind will always feel justified in regarding as true*" It rests,
therefore, solely "on the authority of the mind*"^ The basic faith in
the essential trustworthiness of reason which we found at the foundation
of Bowne* s conception of method in the first period remains as the ground
of all knowledge#
g
Bowne includes in his definition cf strict knowledge
,
as Yre have
noticed, not only rational principles but also "the facts of conscious-
7
ness and immediate perception*" Bowne 1 s meaning v/ith respect to "the
facts of — immediate perception" is made clear by the following passages
Allowing the uniformity of nature, natural science falls
into two parts* There are first, the perceived facts and
their orders of coexistence and sequence* xhere is, sec-
ond, the department of theory and hypothesis, whereby yre
seek to explain the observed facts* If, now, we reckon
the facts perceived to the realm of knowledge, we must
reckon scientific theories mainly, if not entirely, to the
realm of belief*
1* Loc.eit*, Metaph*, (1882), p* 514*
2* Ibid., pp*“£SL-£*
3* Loc.oit*, Studies, (1879), p* 54-55*
4* Ibid., p* ^3*
5* Loc.cit*, Metaph* , (1882}, p*519*
6# Loc.cit*, gtudie's
, (1879),* 13-14; *61*
7* Ibid*, p# &1#
8# Ibid*, p# 87#
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>
In classifying the facts of immediate perception with the facts of con-
sciousness, Bowne is here disregarding the interpretative element that is
present in all perception* Fa*is of consciousness, indeed, are facts
j
they are immediately given; they are indubitable possessions of the mind#
There is no possibility of error in them; hence no criterion for them;
they are simply present to conscious experience# But by facts of immed-
iate perception, as is clear from the passage quoted above, Bowne means
the tested facts of perception, that is, presentations -whose objective
reference is correctly interpreted and verified# But clearly our percept-
ions may be erroneous; they may deceive us# The problem of how our per-
ceptions are verified is one that Bowne does not consider; indeed he does
not even isolate it as a problem#
With strict knowledge defined as rational truths and the facts of
consciousness and immediate esperience, it is clear that the bulk of the
so-called cognitive field belongs to rational belief rather than to strict
knowledge# This is the field of assumption and of mediate inference;
nothing belonging to this field is ever immediately certain or immediate-
ly given or self-evident# At best the field of rational belief is the
field of rational probability; there always remains therefore the poss-
ibility of error, and, therefore, the need of revision and correction#
The one fundamental assumption upon which all rational belief rests is that
of the intelligibility of the external world, ,the assumption that the
world is knowable and knowable by us, that the categories of our thought
are valid for the external world# There is no proof, in any strict sense
of the word, that our conceptions are valid for reality# As Bowne puts
it: "The only proof which the nature of the case admits of, is the feel-
ing of necessity or of fact, which attends knowledge, together with the
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>
inner harmony of our experience*"’*’ At bottom, therefore, it remains an
assumption, although an assumption, indeed, that our experience would
seem to confirm*
Rational belief falls into two principal spheres as a consequence
of the two types of grounds upon which it may rest* objective and sub-
jective, as has already been observed:
The former are the facts of sense-perceptioan : the latter
are the manifold facts of feeling and instinct, the longing
for the true, the beautiful and the good, the sense of de-
pendence and moral obligation, the desire to worship, and
the fervors of religious aspiration*^
The facts of sense-perception, or the objective grounds, are "such as
3
appeal only to the passionless understanding*" The subjective grounds,
on the other hand, are such
as appeal not only to the understanding, but also to the
esthetic, and moral, and religious nature* As such, they
are no less rational than the former, though their validity
would not be recognized by any in whom the esthetic and
religious elements were lacking* All beliefs are of this
class into which sentiment of any kind enters, whether it
be of patriotism, or of duty, or of love, or of art, or
of religion*4
Science and metaphysics (apart from moral and religious belief) belong
to that sphere of rational belief whose grounds are objective* Moral
and religious beliefs, on the other hand, belong to that sphere of ra-
tional belief whose grounds are subjective* We shall first consider
Bowne’s methodology, as developed in this period, as it relates to sci-
ence and metaphysics, and then consider it as it relates to moral and
religious beliefs*
Bowne shows no interest in the writings of this period in science
qua science* He attempts no definition of scientific method, in any
1* Loc.cit*, Studies
, (1879), p* 49*
2* Ibid*, p* 63*
3* Ibid*, p* 62*
4* Ibid*, p* 62*
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>
strict sense* The fairly frequent references to science are made for
the purpose of justifying methodology in the field of moral and relig-
ious belief and of contributing to the progress of various metaphysical
arguments* In Studies in Theism
,
the chapter on “Postulates of Scientific
Knowledge ” presents certain basic assumptions whioh science, like all
cognitive procedure, must make: (l) the existence of the knowing mind
with its own interpretive categories; (2) the validity of those categories
for the external world; and (3) the existence of a free and rational
creator lying back of the world-process if there is to be ary distinction
between truth and error*
The question of the nature of scientific verification is one that
Bowne refers to only as it relates to verification of the theistic hy-
pothesis* He writes:
How is a theory verified? If it be such that observation
is possible, it is verified by observation* But most
theories are not susceptible of such a test, and here
verification takes another form* In this case, we reason
back from the facts to a sufficient cause; and verifica-
tion consists in showing that only this theory will meet
the conditions of the problem. ^
That Bowne did not conceive of scientific criteria in pragmatic
terms is clear from the following:
The guiding principle in forming hypotheses is, the law of
the sufficient reason; and the justification of a theory
is not to be found in its utility, but in its providing
an adequate cause *2
That Bowne held a thoroughly rationalistic view of scientific criter-
ia is further borne out by his criticism that science is too often sat-
isfied with practical fruitfulness at the expense of theoretical consist-
ency*
1* Loc*cit*, Studies
, (1879), p* 97*
2* Ibid., pp*§9-100*
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Thus the doctrine is held in each department with only
such exactness as the facts of that department call for 5
and if the conception prove a fruitful one in practice,
or even a convenient one for representing the facts to
the imagination, little attention is paid to theoretical
consistency or to agreement with the results in other
departments* 2
Bowne is clearly implying here that the two fundamental criteria
for science must be self-consistency and coherence with the rest of
scientific knowledge*
In the methodology of systematic metaphysics, Bowne falls away from
the essentially empirical and induotive procedure which he stressed so
strongly, in the first period, under the influence of Ulrici* There, as
we found, Bowne insisted that all speculation begin with facts* (v*
pp* 43-44) This empirical and inductive approach is stilled retained,
in the second period, in the theistic argument, but not in the system-
atic metaphysics* This method in the theistic case is shown in Bowne *s
argument that in exactly the same way that we infer the existence of
other finite minds we may infer the existence of an intelligence back of
the world-process* "The only data for inferring other minds are the in-
telligible and purpose-like activities which are seen to issue from
3
human forms* 11 And it is similarly such purpose-like activities in
the world-process all about us that are the data for our inferring an
intelligent world-power* Every theory, Bowne holds, must be judged
4
"chiefly by its own positive adequacy to the facts*"
In the systematic metaphysics, Bowne does not abandon the require-
ment that our conceptions be adequate to explain the facts, but his meth-
od becomes essentially deductive rather than inductive* This difference
is the logical consequence of Bowne* s conception of metaphysics as an exam-
1* The doctrine here referred to is the atomic*
2* Loc.cit*, Metaphy* (1882), pp* 275-276*
3* Math* Quart * Rev*, 61(1879), p* 244*
4* Loc.cit*, Studies (1879), p*5*
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ination of basic philosophical concepts* Bowne specifically relates
his procedure in systematic metaphysics to that of Johaan Friedrich
Herbart* In the Preface to the Metaphysics , he writes: "Herbert supplies
the method,"'1' and again, in the Introduction, "It will not escape notice
that our conception of metaphysics is identical with that of Herbart, who
o
defined it as ’the working-over of the notions* 1 " In further expos-
ition of Herbart’ s method, Windelband’s summary is pertinent:
He (Herbart) knows no other logic than the formal logic
whqse principle is the principle of contradiction, i*e*
the prohibition to commit a contradiction* The supreme
principle of all thought is, that which contradicts it-
self cannot be truly real or actual*
How it is evident that the conceptions ih which we think
experience are full of internal contradictions — This
experience (therefore) can be only phenomenon; but —
whatever seeming there is, there is just so much indica-
tion of Being. To discover this is the task of philosophy;
it is a working over of the conceptions of experience
which are' given and wETch must be're -shaped 'according to
the rules of formal logic, ihntil we know the reality that
has no internal contradictions *3
It is clear that Bowne folldws this Herbartian method with rigor
in his systematic metaphysics* He writes: "Our fundamental notions
are always loosely and often contradictorily conceived in spontaneous
thought* Our practical thinking is moulded by practical needs, and
hence we never spontaneously give any greater precision to our ideas
than practice calls for*"^ Consequently, "The metaphysical aim is to
rectify our fundamental ideas so as to make them consistent with them-
e
selves and adequate to their function*" And this is the procedure which
Bowne follows* His systematic metaphysics is a critical examination of
the fundamental concepts of being, change and becoming, action and inter-
action, the finite and the infinite, space and time, and motion, matter,
and force* The strictly rationalistic procedure is illustrated by such
l/ Loc.cit., Metaph* (1882), p* vii*
2* Ibid., p. 23.
3* Windelband, W*, A History of Philosophy, Transl* by James H. Tufts,
(N*Y. : MacMillan Co*
,
2nd U2C*, 1901 J , pp. 583-584*
4* Loc.cito, Metaph* (1882), p*3*
5* Ibid*, p*x*
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statements as the following:
Matter as phenomenon is given in sense-perception; but
matter as cause can be reached only by reflection* It
is a purely speculative and metaphysical notion, wfrose
content can be determined only by reason*^
In his examination of the notion of change, he writes: "Our guiding
principle throughout the entire discussion is, that a contradiction in
2
a notion proves its untenability." And in his examination of the notion
of interaction, he says: "The simple analysis of the notions of interact-
ion and independence shows them to be incompatible* Whichever we retain,
the other must be given up* And, as the notion of interaction is essen-
tial to the notion of a system, we give up the independence of the inter-
3
acting members*"
Bowne summarizes his view of the criteria of khowledge in Metaphys-
ics in ai strictly rationalistic way, without reference to any of the prag-
matic emphases that have occurred elsewhere in his writings:
It being absurd to demand that the mind shall transcend its
conceptions and compare them with reality, it follows that
the test of knowledge must be found in the content of knowl-
edge itself. Ultimately this test will consist (1) in the
self-evidence or necessity of conception, and (2) in the in-
ner haxmony of our conceptions with one another* When a
conception is self-evident or necessary, and avhen no mental dis-
cord results from it, we have the only test of'Knowledge poss-
ible to any intelligence whatever.^
With respect to methods and criteria in this period, there remain
to be considered moral and religious beliefs* These, as we have noticed,
rest for Bowne upon "subjective" grounds* Yet, "as such," he insists,
"they are no less rational then the former*" 5 But though holding to
their rationality, Bowne’ s methods with respect to them are characteris-
tically pragmatic rather than rationalistic* At no point does he treat
1* Loc.cit,, Metaph*, (1882), p* 273.
2. Ibid., p. 119
3* Ibid*
,
p* 126.
4* Ibid*, p, 8.
5, Loc.cit., Studies
, (1879), p* 62.
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the facts of moral and religious experience strictly as a thought-problem
requiring a solution that will meet the rationalistic criteria of con-
/
sistency and coherence* Bather he rests the case for the validity of
moral and religious belief essentially upon pragmatic considerations* At
no point does he attempt a speculative solution of the facts of moral
and religious experience* He restricts the speculative case for theism
to establishing the world-ground as unitary and causal, on the ground
that any other conception of ultimate reality is involved in contradiction;
as free and rational, on the ground that there could otherwise be no dis-
tinction between truth and error and no basis for parallelism of our thought-
A
categories with those of the thing-world as required by the possibility
of knowledge. His speculative case for theism is built, as he himself
puts it, without ”reference to ethical and religious bearings of the
question* These must be considered by themselves*”^ The sum of the
matter is, therefore, this: Bovme did not conceive of value-experiences
as facts to be explained rationalistically; rather they are feelings.
Subject
which, though inherently rational, are, at the same time and can be de-
fended only on the grounds of their satisfying the essential needs and
interests of the mind*
Bowme*s first step in the process of validating moral and religious
beliefs in this period is the attempt to show that they are no more sub-
jective than the assumptions upon which all of science and philosophy rest,
and if no more subjective, then their validity is not to be questioned
simply on thegrounds of their being subjective* Like the assumptions of
science and philosophy, they grow out of basic interests of the mind*
Indeed all views of the world, he writes}
1* Loc*cit., Metaph
, (1882), p* viii*
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start from subjective sentiments • Mental unrest causes us
to assume that law and reason are universal# Mental unrest
causes us to assume that the universe has magnificent mean-
ings hidden in it# Mental unrest also causes us to assume
that its most magnificent, its all-interpreting meaning, is
love and righteousness# Thus we see that the great, leading
manifestations of the mind are based entirely on subjective
interests; and thus these interests become to us the great
interpreters of the universe #^
The essential point of this emphasis is to show that moral and religious
beliefs rest no more upon subjective grounds than those of science and
philosophy# Indeed, he stresses positively the subjective grounds of
science and philosophy# "lhat we wish especially to insist upon,” he
writes, "is the subjective character of the scientific and speculative
2
sentiment#" This emphasis is most strikingly shown in the following
passage:
The speculator finds himself unable to rest in an unrelated
manifold, and hence he posits unity in the diverse# His
mental discontent leads him to assume the possibility of
unification# But why should nature be unifiable? Why should
a mental unrest be made the ground for assuming, that the
system really is what we wish it to be? ••• The scientist
does not hesitate to regard this mental unrest as pointing
to the conclusion that reason and law are universal# If we
ask him why, he replies that on any other assumption, science
would not be possible# But why should science be possible?
••••The scientist often mistakes his enthusiasm for science,
and his passion for formulation, for proofs that reason and
law are universal# It never occurs to him that this is a
tremendous assumption, based only on his subjective needs#3
Bowne is surely selling his rationalism cheaply here, and introducing
a purely pragmatic justification for the assumptions of knowledge# But
the difficulty lies in an obvious confusion in Bowne f s use of the word
subjective# As applied to those assumptions and beliefs which grow out
of the interests of the mind, its use is strictly psychological and con-
cerns only the origin in the mind Of those assumptions# It in no way
1# Loc.cit#, Studies
, (1879), p# 72
2# Ibid#, p# 72#
3# Ibid., pp# 69-70#
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settles the question of the logical validity of those assumptions • Bourne's
argument thus rests on the confused treatment of subjective in terms of
psychological origin while it constantly implies the opposite of logical
objectivity* The assumption of the intelligibility of the world may in-
deed rise out of a subjective (in a psychological sense) cognitive need,
but reason does not find the rational validity of that assumption in the
fact that it rose out of a subjective need, but rather in the fact that
it permits a logioal, consistent, coherent view of experience, whatever
its psychological origin# Certainly we have no rational right to argue
to the objective validity of the moral and religious postulates on the
ground that they are no more subjective than the assumptions of soience
and metaphysics# The only question of logical importance is, not to what
extent these assumptions are similarly subjective in their origin, but
to what extent they are logically objective and rational# The confusion
in the use of the word subjective is thus responsible for Bowne’s rest-
ing the case for moral and religious belief, in the first place, upon
the fact that they, like the postulates of science and speculation, sat-
isfy basic interests and needs of the mind# In the Metaphysics, published
three years after the Studies in Theism
,
Bovme would seem to have avoided
this error of confusing the psychological and the logical by distinguish-
1
ing, after Balfour, between belief as effect and belief as conclusion#
Nevertheless, it is a confusion that carries over even into Bowne*s later
work#
In the second place. Borne raises the purely pragmatic criterion of
workability in judging the interests of the mind# He writes:
We conclude, then, — that all general theories of life and the
world are based on subjective interests,and that the only
questions which can be raised here are, which of these inter-
ests should rule, and which works best as a ruler# In this
1# i-oo* cit*, Metaph * (1882), pp* 15-16#
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inquiry, too, we cannot help making the general assumption
that nature is no more of a step-mother to man than to the
lower animals, and that his instincts are equally trust-
worthy# Those views, therefore, of man and his relations
which must develop and dignify human nature, and which
work best in practice, are at least presumptively true.
Pessimism and despair are the only alternative# In addi-
tion, then, to beliefs deduced from formal data, there
are other beliefs which are based on results. Such beliefs
have not the support of formal proof, but they have what
is better, the attestation of reality,!
It is true that Bowne presents this criterion only for judging
that which is "presumptively true," but it is also true that he supports
the criterion with nothing that is more sxibstantial, That he felt the
weakness of these criteria of the trustworthiness of instinctsand of the
utility of beliefs is shown by the paragraph which follows immediately
after the one just quoted, Bowne continues:
But still we have not shown that feeling points to any thing
objective.#. Thus far we have only made out, that all theor-
ies are subjective; why not, then, abandon all, and have faith
in none? One reason is, that it cannot be done#— - Teleology
is the framework of both the speculative and practical reason#
But, it will be urged, do you seriously mean to say that s
thing is real because we wish it? — We reply, that of course
we cannot intend to base any conclusion on individual and non-
essential feelings and interests, but only on the essential
needs of the mind; and these, we hold, render an objective
correspondence highly probable#2
But, the question must be raised, how are the essential needs of the
mind to be distinguished from the non-essential? This introduces us to
the third step in Bowne* s attempt to validate moral and religious beliefs.
The essential needs and interests of the mind are distinguished by the empirical
generality of the beliefs which grow out of them. He writes:
We do hold that a general belief renders a corresponding reality
highly probable, even when no sufficient formal defense is poss-
ible, Such a belief represents the total outcome of a race-ex-
perience, the impression which the universe has made upon us,
We ate not prepared, then, to reject the argument from general
1, Loc#cit,, Studies, (1879), p, 75# See also, p, 64
2. Ibid., pp.7T-7S7"
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feeling and belief, because on any theory of knowledge, a
feeling or wont which is common to men is the expression of
a fact; it is the way in which reality manifests itself in
us* Our feelings are the subjective side of the universe*
Upon this point we are in full accord with the evolutionist*
They conserve well-being, point out duty, and outline develop-
ment*1
But this account is largely a theory of the relation of our feelings
and beliefs to the universe; it in no way whatever establishes the ration-
al validity of those beliefs* It is, further, essentially the Stoic doc-
trine of consensus gentium as developed in the interests of religion
by Herb&rt of Cherbury*^ Even though used by Bowne simply as an argument
to establish probability, it lacks rational cogency both because generality
of belief per se establishes nothing, as witness the generality of erron-
eous beliefs observable through the course of history, end because the
religious beliefs which Bowne was defending cannot be shown to be gener-
al in any strict sense of the term*
That Bowne really mistrusted the weakness of the arguments present-
ed in Studies in Theism is further shown by the sentence with which he
begins the next and final step in the case* He says: "Our position will
•2
appear less strange if we attend to perception in general." He is per-
fectly aware that the case which he is developing is indeed strange*
for any rationalist* The final argument now presented is that religious
belief is coerced, in the same way in which sensation is coerced, and
therefore may be accepted as similarly valid* He writes:
The senses do not give us reality, but only states of self.
The reality is reached only by the mind* Now the final
test of reality in perception is, that it compels and co-
erces our sensations* How the object does this we do not
know; and we know that there is an object only because the
sensations are coeroed* If, then, there is any other ele-
ment in the totality of our experience which equally co-
erces our belief, and which, when denied, invariably comes
1* Loc.cit*, Studies
, (1897), pp.76-78*
2* See Windelband, Loc.cit*, p*436*
»5* Loc.cit*, Studies, (1879), p* 78*
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back, then there is the best ground for saying that in
such experience, as well as in sense-perception, we come
in contact with something not ourselves* There is nothing
in psychology to forbid the thought, that contact with
reality may take place other than xhrough the senses*
The subjective impressions of conscience, the haunting
conviction of things not realized, the dreams of a beauty
and a good beyond all that we have experienced, may well
be the revelation in us of some power which besets us on
every hand, and makes for righteousness*-—The sense of
things unseen often drifts in upon us with such a feeling
of reality that the solid earth grows phantom-like mn con-
trast* This is the conviction which these experiences have
made upon the race* They coerce us, and we cannot escape
them. That they are indeed the working of an objective
power way not be proved, but still lass is it disproved...* If we
find that with the growth of moral character such convict-
ions become firmer and firmer, until they arise to a sub-
jective certainty -which cannot be shaken, then there is good
ground for assuming that they lie parallel to reality, and
are derived from it* On the basis of certain impressions,
we posit material objects. On the basis of other impress-
ions, we posit spirits like our own* On the basis of its _
total mental and moral experience, the race has posited God*
The empirical emphasis here is strong: moral and religious beliefs
must indeed begin with experience, and they must always be tested by
experience* But the rational inadequacy of the argument as it stands
alone is admitted by Bowne in the statement that there may be no proof
that this feeling of coercion is the working of an objective power* Moral
and religious experiences can justify our beliefs as objectively valid,
only as reason finds them to be consistent in themselves, and coherent
with the rest of our knowledge and experience* In other words, important
as the argument from experience is, it cannot stand alone; in itself it
cannot establish rational probability* And Bowne, resting his case as
he has done largely upon pragmatic considerations, fails to support this
empirical argument by the necessary logical methods*
In his Studies in Theism , then, Bowne, rests the case for belief in
the moral and spiritual nature of God largely on pragjnatic considerations*
1* Loc.cit., Studies, (1879), pp. 78-79*
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At the beginning of the investigation, he stressed that belief to be valid
must be rational; but it is manifest that he has not, with the methods he
has employed, established that rationality. He has not treated the idea
of a moral God as required by the most coherent view of experience. Nor
has he established the identity of interests and feelings, ypon which the
pragmatic methods rest, with the practical reason# It is clear, therefore,
that though Bowne intended to ground moral and religious beliefs, as did
Kant, in the doctrine of the primacy of the practical reason, he did not,
as did Kant, follow a strictly rationalistic methodology#
(4) , The Nature of Truth#
Bowne uses the term truth in this period both in the restricted
sense of the rational a priori principles of reason and in the larger
inclusive sense of both the a priori principles of reason and the valid-
ity of our thought for the real world# The narrow meaning is explicitly
given in the statement: "By timth, we mean rational principles#"^ As
applied to truth so defined, Bowne says: "The mind does not make, it
2
recognizes, the truth#"
The use of the tem truth to designate the validity of our thoughts
for things is shown in the statement:
The mind can never transcend its conceptions so as to grasp
things other than through its conceptions; and hence truth
cannot be viewed as the correspondence of thought and thing,
but as the universal !
y
valid in our thought of the thing#3
Again, "As the conscience will not tolerate a relativity of duty, so the
intellect will not tolerate a relativity of truth. Truth is absolute or
nothing#"4
As in the first period, Bowne continues to think of truth as being
at once independent and rational, on the one hand, and useful, on the
1, Loc.cit,,Studies, (1879), p* 14*
2, Ibid#, p# 16, « , . , .
3, Loc,«it,, Metaph,
, (1882), p# 8#
4, Ibid#, p# 488
2 . - . • :
•
•
.
. ' /
, ,
i
.
'
.
• o j' ' j ' i
>•
*'
l si
.
. i . . i o&
,
> •
•'
* . /
'
J- bos', aoe-as-i lo aslqjcttitg Jtloi Ho -
*
1
.
.
. \
d& tiso Ho att : iasf od . rr& artof e.kt Ho sew oxJi’
: . h--, : :/ r. o:i . : cy i it \ )i
'
•
. r • i t:
'
.
r
i >
'•
; -i
.
i : '
.
fill'
2
.
« );
*'
r> "‘4. ’’ ' : o . ; j i.-i
. ;
'
.
, * t
'
•
. ,
'
.
, ,
..
»'’»»» iJ... •
. , ,
• « .V . ... • .. •
74
other; that is, though not defining truth in terns of utility, he does
find truth useful and valuable* There is value in knowing the truth.
In Studies in Theism, he sayst “Truth, as simple correspondence of
thought with fact, cannot arouse enthusiasm. It has, indeed, a low val-
ue of utility, but nothing on -which a soul may live. —- The enthusiasm
1
of knowledge tacitly assumes that the object is worth knowing." Again,
in criticizing the position of the materialist, Bowne refers to the prag-
matic criterion used by some materialists: "This standard is simply
results* Those thoughts and views are true which work well; and those
are false which work ill* In a rational system such a test would be
2
valid; but the materialist has no such system." This is a statement
of extreme interest in showing Bowne’s conception of truth. Truth is
indeed absolute and rational; but the fact that it is also useful and
purposive makes utility itself an indication, if not a criterion, of
truth wherever a belief can be shown to possess it.
Summary of Epistemology for the Second Period. (1879-1883):
The unity and free agency of the thinking self, though indicated
i
by self-conscious experience, are established by the fact that they are
logically presupposed by experience* The mind is active in the knowing
process according to the principles of interpretation implicit in it*
The development of the mental life is outlined and controlled, however,
not by the free activity of the mind but by basic feelings and interests.
Bowne intends this stress upon the determinative character of feelings and
interests in mental development as a restatement of the Kantian doctrine of
the primacy of the practical reason, but it is clear that he gives it a prag-
matic rather than a rationalistic form. With respect to the interests
1. Loc.cit., Studies* (1879), p. 66.
2. Ibid., p# 115.
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of the mind, the function of speculative reason is regulative. The
field of knowledge is divided between strict knowledge - defined as
rational truths and the facts of consciousness and immediate perception,
the criteria of which are their immediacy and self-evidence - and ration-
al belief. The grounds of rational belief are of two types: objective,
namely, the facts of perception, upon which soience and philo sophy are
built; and subjective, namely, basic feelings and interests of the
mind, upon vdiich moral and religious beliefs are formed. Scientific
belief is verified by observation where possible, and always by consist-
ency, harmony, and adequacy to the facts. Metaphysical beliefs, con-
stituted by the criticized and corrected basic philosophic concepts, are
tested by their self-evidence, consistency and mutual harmony. Moral
and religious beliefs, resting upon subjective grounds of feelings and
interests, though rational, are defended chiefly on pragmatic grounds,
namely: (1) they are required to satisfy the subjective interests of
the mind in the same way that the postulates of science and philosophy
are so required; (2) they are justified by their results and their
usefulness for human life; (3) they are validated for reality by their
generality (which latter ground, though not per se pragmatic, is given
pragmatic setting); (4) they are supported by super-sensuous coercion by
the divine reality. Truth is conceived as rational, independent, and
absolute, but is at the same time to be regarded as purposive and useful.
Section Three: Third Period. 1884-1896.
(1). Nature of the Mind*
Although there is no essential modification in Bowne’s conception of
the nature of the mind in the writings of this period, slight development
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of view along two lines is apparent: first, there is a fuller elabora-
tion and a sharper distinction of the phases of mind-activity than appear-
ed in the preceding period; second, the intended identification of the
i
determinative character of feelings and interests with the Kantian prim-
acy of the practical reason is given stronger rational support, although
the pragmatic emphasis is not abandoned. The unity and free agency of the
thinking subject remain basic#
As stressed throughout Bowne* s work, the mind proceeds in its cog-
nitive activity according to forms or norms implicit in it# "The cate-
gories inherent in our mental constitution give a form to experience
and produce original syttHeses, before the mind itself becomes conscious
of its own aims and the principles which govern it« n^ "We do not regard
them," Bownes continues elsewhere, "as existing primarily as ideas, but
as being determinative principles of mental procedure, or as constitutive
2
principles of intelligence," They are the norms of judgment in all cog-
nitive activity, Bowne' does not regard them as admitting of speculative
some
deduction fromAsingle, basic category. Rather, "we have to take them as
given, without any hope of deducing one from another#"^ Likewise, Bowne
is not concerned with establishing any rigid system of categories; indeed,
de says: "Whether a completed system of categories is possible is much
4
discussed; our own conviction is that it is not possible#"
In distinguishing further the nature of mind-activity, Bowne shows
that knowledge is possible because of the abstracting, generalizing and
classifying activity of the mind, by which the logical universal or unit of
thought is developed# Without such logical universals, to which the par-
1 ticulars of experience can be referred, there could be no cognition, for
1# Bowne, B.P#, Introduction to Psychological Theory,
Brothers, 1886), p. ^86#
2# Ibid#, p, 174#
3# Ibid#, p# 174#
4# Ibido, p# 174#
^N.Y. : Harper &
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cognition is, indeed* the recognition of an object, that is, the
"referring it to a known class*"
When many experiences have a common element, the mind
^ tends by a certain psychological necessity to fix at-
tention upon that element, to abstract it from its sur-
roundings, to form it into a fixed unity of thought, and
finally to use it as a standard of classification* 2
The various phases of mind activity are summarized by Bowne
thus:
This, then, is the way in which our world vision is built
up* Sensations are produced in us, and associate accord-
ing to certain laws* The mind next reacts upon them by
classifying and distinguishing them, and finally object-
ifies them under the forms of space and time, of cause
and effect, and of substance and attribute* Our objecti-
fied representations constitute for us the external world* d
The emphasis upon the mind as a complex of vital interests,which
we found appearing in the second period of Bowne* s writings, continues
in this period* That this emphasis is not casual and incidental, but
basic and characteristic, is shown by its repeated occurrence* In
1884, for example, we find Bowne writing:
The driving and directive force of the mind lies in its
living interests, and not in the discursive faculty. The
principles of mental movement are to be sought, not in
logic, but in life* — There is no department of belief
into which subjective interests do not enter as control-
ling* 4
And in 1885:
Mental activity rims in lines determined by our funda-
mental interests, and all our theories are adjusted to
them* &
And again, in 1886:
Our feelings and interests are the deepest thing in us*
They furnish the great impulses to action, and they also
'
1* Loc* cit*, Psychol* Theory
, 1886, p* 263*
2* Ibid*, pp* 281—282*
3* Ibid., p* 258*
4* Meth* Quart* Rev*, 66(1884), p* 660*
5* Independo, 37(Jan* 8, 1885), p* 35*
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outline its direction. The great distinction between
the human and the brute mind lies less in the cogni-
tive faculties than in the motive powers* Man can int-
erest himself in truth, in righteousness, in beauty,
in a great variety of ideal aims, which thus become
the norms and guides of his action. ^
Likewise, in the Philosophy of Theism , in 1887:
Man is not only, or chiefly, an abstract speculator,
he is also a living being, with practical interests
and necessities, to which he must adjust himself in
order to live at all* It has been one of the peren-
nial shortcomings of intellectualism that man has been
considered solely as an intellect or understanding;
whereas he is a great deal more* Man is will, cons-
cience, emotion, aspiration; these are far more power-
ful factors than the logical intellect. 2
And once again, also in the Philosophy of Theism:
The mind is not a disinterested logic^machine, but a
living organism, with manifold interests and tend-
encies* These outline its development, and furnish
the driving power* $
What Bowne means in stressing the controlling character of
these subjective interests is chiefly that they give rise to cer-
tain basic postulates which constitute the ground of all our cogni-
tive procedure* He writes:
As cognitive, we assume that the universe is rational.
— We are moral beings also, and our moral interests
must be recognized* Hence arises a moral ideal, which
we join to the cognitive* The universe must be not only
rational, but righteous at its root* — Finally, we
are religious, and our entire nature works together to
construct the religious ideal* ^
Thus:
In its practical unfolding the mind makes a great var-
iety of practical postulates and assumptions which are
not logical deductions or speculative necessities, but
a kind of modus vivendi with the universe* They repre-
sent the conditions of our fullest life, and are at bot-
tom expressions of our practical and ideal interests or
necessities. &
1* Loc*cit*, Psychol* Theory
, 1886, pp* 217-218*
2* Bowne, B*P*, Philosophy of Theism
,
(H.Y.: Harper & Brothers, 1887),p* 13*
3* Ibid*, p# 19*
4# Ibid*, pp* 20-21*
5o Ibid., pp. 13-14*
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We observed in our consideration of the -writings of the second
period that Bowne intended by this emphasis upon the determinative
character of interests and feelings a restatement of the Kantian doct-
rine of the primaoy of the practical reason, but it was equally clear
that the form that he gave to the doctrine -vms more pragmatic than
rationalistic* In this third period, Bowne* s intention is still the
essentially Kantian position* His usual references, however, do not
make clear just how feelings and interests are to be regarded as rat-
ional, that is, just what constitutes their rationality; nor, if some
feelings and interests are to be accepted as rational, how they are
to be distinguished from those which are admittedly not rational.
Bowne was fully conscious of the objection that our feelings, because
of their particularity and subjectivity, cannot be the legitimate
ground of belief* In referring to this objection, in 1885, he writes:
Our thoughts, feelings, and consciousness in general,
must always be particular* How they *an at the same
tine, have a universal element, is one of the mysteries
which speculation has not yet made over-clear; but the
mystery is no greater in one realm than in another* -1
To designate the universality of feelings and interests as no more of
a "mystery” than the universality of thought is not, indeed, to es-
tablish that universality* The fact of the matter was, it seems clear,
that Bowne was here struggling with the whole problem of the object-
ivity of value-judgments, for by basic feelings and interests of the
mind, he meant what we should call today the feelings associated with
our value-judgments* Nevertheless, it is true that he did scarcely
more than point to the problem* He was satisfied in simply affirm-
ing the rationality of the feeling elements* In the Introduction
to Psychological Theory
,
he writes:
1* Independ*
,
37(Jan* 8, 1885), p* 36
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A scruple is sometimes raised as to the possibility
of a judgment founded on feeling; as feeling is said
to be subjective and particular, while the judgment
must be objective and universal* But there is no rea-
son why there may not be universal elements in the
sensibility as well as in the reason* *
But such a statement establishes nothing; it simply assumes the point
at issue* The question is, if our interests and feelings, any or all
of there, have cognitive value, if they possess rational, objective
validity, how is that validity to be recognized, and what is its
ground ? In just one passage in this period does Bowne approach a
careful answer to this problem* In the Introduction to Psychological
Theory
,
he writes;
It is often objected that feeling cannot be a basis
for ethics, because feeling is particular while eth-
ical law must be universal, and hence must be founded
in reason* This is merely a war of words* —- The fact
is not made universal by calling it an utterance of
the reason; nor is it made less than universal by call-
ing it feeling* Its universality depends upon its con-
tent, and not upon its psychological classification*
— We have here the mistake — of holding feeling
and reason apafrt in unreal separation# ^
That Bowne is coming closer to the problem here is clear, but un-
fortunately this is only a casual reference, and is at no other point
systematically elaborated* If foe were to take this passage as repre-
sentative of Bowne* s thought in this period, it would certainly mark
an advance over the teaching of the preceding period* There Bowne
defended the rationality of our feelings and interests on ifche grounds
that they are universal and necessary in our experience, which uni-
versality he sought to establish inductively* But here Bowne is sug-
gesting for the first time in his published writings that rational feel-
ings and interests are to be distinguished from the non-rational and
1* Loc.cit*, Psychol * Theory
, 1886, p* 198*
2* Ibid*, pp* 206-207*
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irrational by their content* But even this position, representing as
it does an advance over the earlier teaching, is not, as Bowne has
suggested it, free from difficulty* For clearly, if it is the rational
content which determines the validity of a belief generated by feel-
ing and interest, then it is that rational content and not the fact
that it is generated by feeling or interest that provides the criter-
ion* The relevant question, therefore, is not whether feelings may 4r
may not have a universal element, but whether feeling qua feeling or
reason is to be the arbiter of the beliefs which grow out of those
feelings*
The difficulty here is that Bowne is treating feelings and inter-
ests in a two-fold and essentially incompatible manner* On the one
hand, he designates them as of basic importance in subjectively deter-
mining our fundamental beliefs and in outlining and controlling mental
development* On the other hand, he refers to them as essentially object-
ive and rational* We find here the same confusion which appeared in the
earlier period as a consequence of designating these fundamental inter-
ests of the mind as subjective* Clearly if they actually determine what
the mind believes, then their rationality must rest not upon any free
activity of the mind, but upon a teleological theory of the universe
by which all fundamental determining factors in human experience are
regarded as rational* But this, of course, is the circle argument again*
The critical question is, what is the cognitive validity, if any, of these
feelings and interests ? Clearly the question must be answered entirely
aside from a pre-determined metaphysics*
Although, therefore, Bowne has cane much closer to a rationalistic
view of feelings and interests in the field of value-judgments in this
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period, it is true that it is not yet correct to designate his position
as a restatement of the Kantian doctrine of the practical reason. This
is clear on two grounds: first, because reason for Kant was altogether
free in its value-judgments, that is, in its moral judgments* in no
sense did Kant think of reason as being controlled by feelings and
interests; second, because. the validity of the moral law for Kant
rested in its a priori necessity and universality, not in its induct-
ively discovered generality* That Bowne brought far stronger rational
support to his position in this period than in the preceding will ap-
pear in our consideration of philosophic methods and criteria, but
the point to be stressed here is that feelings and interests, consid-
ered by themselves, as defined by Bowne, are not to be identified with
the Kantian practical reason*
As regards the function of the speculative reason in relation to
the basic interests and feelings of the mind, Bowne conceived it, as
in the preceding period, to be strictly regulative* "For these basal
interests, the intellect is simply instrumental, and the will is merely
1
executive •" Again:
What, now, is the function of logic with regard to these
postulates ? Plainly not to prove them, but to bring them
and their Implications out into clear consciousness, and
to keep them from losing their way* 2
And again: "Speculative thought has had the function of criticizing and
&
clarifying religious beliefs, but never of originating thejju" Religious
beliefs rise only in the moral and spiritual nature, and with respect
to them, "the understanding has only the negative function of maintain-
ing consistency and preventing collision with the laws of thought."
1* Loc*cit., Psychol * Theory, 1886,pp*217-218*
2* Loc*cit*, Phil , of Theism, 1887, pp* 25-26*
3* Ibid*, p*4.
4* Ibid*, p$*262*
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(2) The Nature and Scope of Knowledge
Bowne* s treatment of the nature and scope of knowledge in the
third period follows closely that of the second period* No new element
emerges in his teaching* The field of cognition is again divided be-
tween strict knowledge and rational belief* "Fa,6ts which are immediately
given in experience, and propositions which are either proved or directly
seen to be true, are elements of knowledge* Besides these, there is a
1
great realm of belief*" Or, as Bowne elsewhere classifies the matter
of cognition:
An inventory of our mental possessions reveals three classes
of facts* These are (1) the data of experience, internal
or external, (2) the laws and forms of pure thought and
their implications, and (3) interpretations of experience*
The first class is found, or given, and admits of no quest-
ion* The second class expresses the essential build of in-
telligence, and is questioned only by the professional skep-
tic, and by him only verbally* In the third class, the mind
aims to unite the first two by giving the facts of exper-
ience a rational form and interpretation* ^
The first two classes constitute the sphere of strict knowledge; the third
O' V.
constitutes that of rational belief*
As a consequence of this classification, logic and mathematics,
apart from the facts of conscious experience, are the only parts of
the cognitive field that can be called strict knowledge* Science and
philosophy, on the other hand, as well as moral and religious belief,
belong to the field of rational belief* "In this realm," Bowne says,
"we reach conclusions, not by logical demonstration, but by a weighing
of probabilities, or by a consideration of practical needs, or by a tak-
o
ing for granted in the interest of ideal tendencies*" The field of
belief is thus divided between that portion which rests upon objective
grounds and that portion which rests upon subjective* The beliefs of
1* Loc.cit*, Psychol*Theory
, 1886, pp* 295-296.
2* Independ*
, 40 (Jan*26,1888 j, p* 99*
3* Loc*cit* Phil* of Theism, 1887, p* 261*
:•
i
,
'-o '.
~o:' bobtri > r ; -%;.s ’ v O'?
• •
*
...
*
'
, t
er,j- ao.'"xiacalo a”', arfi . .J .? o."
:
•
'
'
t
‘
.
"
•
:
'
•
"
"
. r •
'
t
~ .
*
-
-
'
•
- ,:o .:
.
**'<
_
v 0.1 -1C ...SO. ‘I "• • -
*
*
o' •.
.
,
rl
•: ' o‘.
„
.
-
' r ntriuQ'ig
-
a *
. * • • *
* *
c
(
*
rf 1
84
the first class are ”those which are deduced from facts, either as
their explanation or as their consequence. They are not knowledge be-
cause they do not compel acceptance; but they may be rational, because
1
the probabilities are in their favor.” The beliefs of the second
class are those which:
are not founded on objective facts, but on subjective
tendencies, and express only subjective interests or
postulates. They are not inferences from given facts,
either as their explanation or as their consequence.
They are rather the implication of our nature itself,
or its reaction against our total experience. ^
The entire field of belief rests upon basic assumptions or post-
ulates; it is indeed the necessity of such assumptions that distinguish-
es this field from that of knowledge.
(3) Philosophical Method and Criteria.
Bowne , s consideration of methodology in the third period belongs
largely to the field of moral and religious belief, although several
references of importance to systematic metaphysics also appear. His
treatment of logic, mathematics, and science, however, is only casual
and incidental. In the field of strict knowledge, the facts of con-
scious experience are indubitable; they are simply given. Likewise the
rational truths of logic and mathematics are either immediately evi-
dent or are derived by strictly logical processes from truths that are
original and immediately evident. Their sole authority is the mind’s
insight. With reference to mathematics, Bovme writes:
For mathematical truth there is no source beyond the mind
itself* The science is built upon the basis of definitions,
and the corresponding intuitions. — In all these cases
the mind works by methods of its own invention, and tests
these methods by its own insight, s
1. Meth. Quart . Rev. , 66(1884), p. 649.
2. Ibid., p. 649.
3. Loc. cit., Psychol . Theory , 1886, pp. 294-295.
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In the realm of rational belief, faith in the essential trustworthi-
ness of reason remains basic for all procedure* "No theory can be al-
lowed which would overturn reason itself* The trustworthiness of reason
is the presupposition of all speculations and when a theory conflicts
1
with this, it must be rejected*"
As in the preceding period, Bovme recognizes that science and phil-
osophy must be built upon probability rather than upon strict demonstra-
tion*
It is plain that all thought of strict demonstration must
be given up* Demonstration is necessarily confined to the
subjective and logical relation of ideas, and can never
attach to reality without some element of assumption* —
This is as true for physical science as it is for religion*
— There is no such thing as an objective and self-suffic-
ient demonstration* &
Science and philosophy, like religious belief, proceed upon basic
assumptions* "All investigations of the world of reality rests upon
certain postulates, and is absurd without them* These are interaction,
&
law, and systey." In every investigation, "our starting-point -
—
is the conception of things interacting according to law, and forming
4
an intelligible system." Again,
Our interpreting activity presupposes the intelligibility
and hence the rationality of all existence* It presupposes
that the objective reality is cast in the molds of thought,
so that the irrational is the impossible. It presupposes,
also, that what we need to make the facts rational to us is
necessary to the facts themselves* Without these suppositions
our theorizing is but a projection of our mental nature upon
the world of reality*
The distinction which Bowne repeatedly made between the respective
provinces of science and metaphysics is characteristically suggested
in the following sentence: "Evolution, — in the scientific sense.
£1 hi
1* Loc^ Phil* of Theism
, 1887, p* 112*
2* Ibid*, pp* 30-31*
3* Ibid*, p* 47*
4* Ibid., p* 49*
5* Independ*
,
40(Jan*26,1888), p* 99*
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carries -with it no theory of metaphysics; for the ouestion of method
1 .
is forever distinct from the question of cause*" The province of
science is the phenomenal world, that of metaphysics is the causal
ground of that phenomenal world*
Bowne*s conception of metaphysics as empirically rooted and tenta-
tive in its formulations is strikingly suggested in his article "What
is Rationalism ?" published in 1888* The speculative excesses of post-
Kantian philosophy accomplished, Bowne believed "an invaluable service."
By their very absurdities, they "taught us that man must become a learn-
er and submit his reason to the facts, instead of submitting the facts
*<&*
to his reason, before knowledge can advance*"
This empirical grounding of metaphysics does not mean an abandon-
ment of the assumption that the universe is essentially rational,but:
It does involve a very decided abatement of the claims con-
cerning actual human insight* We still believe in the uni-
versality of rational law, but we are far from being so sure
that we have fully comprehended it* We still believe in the
interpretability of facts, but we are seldom able to say that
we have reached a final interpretation* The only thing that
is fixed is that nothing can be allowed which contradicts the
laws of thought; but these leave a great many possibilities
open, and which of these have been realized cannot be learned
by a priori reflection, but only by experience* °
Bowne* s distrust of speculation that pretends to a fixed and final
view of the universe finds further expression in the following passage:
One of the most promising features in the present outlook
is a growing indifference to abstract and finished systems
and speculative finalities of all sorts, end a growing re-
spect for living^aslaving full right to be* Existence is
too large, too manifold, too mysterious, to be shut up in
any neat little scheme, whether molecular or theological* ^
The chief development in metaphysical method in this period is the
insistence that ultimate explanation must be teleological* Purpose is a
metaphysical category, and reality cannot be understood without it* The
1* Meth* Rey,
, 75(1893), p. 687.
2* Independ
., 40(Jan* 26, 1888), p. 100*
5* Ibid*, p* 100*
4* Independ . , 4b(Feb. 2,1893), p* 138*
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general point of view represented by this emphasis was undoubtedly
present in the thought of Bowne in the first two periods of his work,
but it was not clearly and sharply articulated until this third per-
iod* In an article, "Explanation - A Logical Study," published in
1888, Bowne considers the various types of explanation* Among rat-
ional principles, explanation is simply the comprehension of a truth
as a necessity of reason* In the world of things, explanation largely
X
"consists in referring the fact or event to a class or law**' This
is essentially the method of science* But for the questions of meta-
physics, the only ultimately satisfactory form of explanation is the
teleological# "The mind demands the thought of a goal, an end toward
which things are working* When this thought is given, our explanation
Z
is formally complete*" That this emphasis upon purpose in explana-
tion was becoming basic with Bowne is indicated further by another
striking passage written in the same year as the preceding* Bowne
asks, "What is rational?" and answers, "First, that is rational
whi ch accords with the fundamental laws of thought* Second, that is
rational which is viewed as fitting into an intelligible system* Third,
that is rational which has in it evidence of purpose, outcome, final
5
cause*" The fundamental criteria of the rational become for Bowne,
therefore, consistency, coherence, or harmonious system, and intelli-
gent purpose*
Included within the scope of metaphysical method is the speculative
argument for theism based on inference from the facts of experience*
With this method "God appears as an hypothesis to explain the facts
of experience, or to satisfy the demand of the reason for a sufficient
1. Meth * Rev,, 70(1888), p* 648.
2# Ibido, p* 662*
3* Zion* s Herald, 66(1888), p* 401*
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cause* As thus conceived, theism belongs to the realm of probabilities,
1
and our faith should vary directly as the evidence • ” But empirical
arguments alone, Bowne holds, are not sufficient to establish the
validity of religious belief* ’’They all rest upon picked facts, and
2
ignore some of the most prominent aspects of experience • ” Neither
by the way of deduction nor by inductive inference can the moral and
spiritual nature of God be established* The validity of religious be-
lief must depend, in the final analysis, Bowne holds, upon the demands
of our subjective nature*
The field of moral and religious belief stands apart, therefore,
from the field of scientific and metaphysical belief; its grounds are
subjective rather than objective* The beliefs of science and metaphys-
ics ”are founded on objective facts, and— their strength varies direct-
ly with the objective evidence* — All such beliefs belong to the
realm of probability; that is, our belief rises and falls with the
&
amount of objective evidence*” Moral and religious beliefs, on the
other hand,
are not founded on objective facts, but on subjective tend-
encies, and express only subjective interests or postulates*
They are not inferences from given facts, either as their
explanation or as their consequence* They are rather the
implication of our nature itsdlf, or its reaction against
our total experience* They are also psychologically differ-
ent from the preceding class of beliefs in that they are
not matters of probability, and our conviction does net rise
or fall with each new fact experienced, but only with the in-
tensity of the emotion which produced it* In the realm of
probability, opposing facts weaken belief; but here they are
set aside as something not understood, and do not weaken
our faith* 4
In the distinction which Bowne is here making between the two classes
of belief, it is clear that he is not thinking of moral and religious
1* Meth* Quart * Rev* 66(1884}, pp* 649-650*
2*Loc*cit*, Phil * of Theism
, 1887, p* 221*
5* Meth * Quart * Rev * 66(1884), p* 649.
4* Ibid*, p* 649*
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belief as resting upon rational evidence. "They are not matters of
probability,” and ”opposing facts — are set aside as something not
tinderstood.” If Bourne were speaking simply descriptively he re , the
^ acoount would be essentially valid; but his intention seems also to
be to speak normatively. And if the account is normative, it is mani-
festly pragmatic in the most narrow sense of the word rather than
rationalistic. He is not dealing with the facts of moral and religious
experience as rational evidence for the probability of a theistic world-
view. Rather he is claiming that moral and religious interests stand
in their own right; they are their own justification, regardless of the
facts of experience. That this goes beyond the position of rationalism,
or indeed beyond that of ary normal empiricism, would seem to be clear.
We have seen that Bowne stressed repeatedly -che determinative
character of the basic interests and feelings on belief. We have further
observed that the question of the psychological origin of belief is one
thing, and the question of rational validity is another. This distinction
is one to which uowne gave little critioal attention in the earlier per-
iods. In the third period, however, he defines sharply the line between
the psychology and the logic of religious belief. We need, he says, a
"better knowledge of the psychology of belief”; we need to understand
that "our deepest beliefs are not deduced, but grow; they are not made
1
by logic, but developed from life." Bowne indicates as examples of
such beliefs: "the existence of God, the effioaoy of prayer, and life
2
beyond the grave." Elsewhere he summarizes the psychology of belief
thus:
^ A very slight consideration of the actual procedure of
" the human mind shows that it does not live by logic alone.
1. Meth
.
Quart . Rev ., 66(1884), p. 646.
2. Independ ., S6(Jan.24, 1884), p. 98.
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The fundamental outlines of human belief are determined
by various circumstances, chief" of which are the essent-
ial interests of the mind* Mental activity runs in lines
determined by our fundamental interests, and all our the-
ories are adjusted to them* Accordingly, we find a vari-
ety of postulates underlying our mental procedure, which
are at bottom only expressions of those interests; and we
also find that any theory which cannot be adjusted to them
is sure, sooner or later, to be set aside* As intellect-
ual, we make certain assumptions; as ethical, we make
other assumptions; and as religious, we make others still*
Primarily, all of these assumptions are but the projection
upon theuniverse of the demands and interests of our total
nature • ^
In contrast to the psychological description of the origin of fund-
amental beliefs there stands the need of determining the logical val-
idity of those beliefs* In his artiole "The Logic of Religious Belief,”
referring to these psychological considerations, Bowne states explicitly:
These considerations, however, only refer to the origin of
belief, and do not establish its truth* We may allow that
belief has a highly complex genesis which admits of no very
clear presentation; but we must not affirm that therefore
belief has no accountability to logic* That men do believe
does not prove that they have a right to believe* Hence,
after the genesis of a belief has been described its truth
remains an open question* It is therefore the province of
logic to go through the luxuriant growths of credulity and
cut down such as cannot prove their right to exist* &
That there may be no question about the importance of this distinct-
ion as drawn by Bowne, it is worth quoting the following passage from
the Philo sophy of TheiSm:
Beliefs can be viewed in two ways: as produced by causes,
or as deduced from grounds* That is, beliefs may be merely
mental events due to certain psychological antecedents, and
they may be logical convictions which rest on logical grounds.
The distinction of rational from irrational beliefs is that
the former have grounds which justify them,while the latter
are only effects in us, deposits of habit, prejudice, tradi-
tion, caprice, etc* They have their sufficient psychological
causes, but no justifying rational grounds* $
1* Independ *, 37(Jan* 3, 1885), p* 35*
2* Meth. Quart. Rev*, 66(1884), p* 648*
3* Loc. cit*, Phil* of Theism, 1887, p* 112
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And again:
The rational value of a proposition can he determined
only by considering its content and the reason* which
are offered for it,
Now it would seem perfectly clear that Bowne, while recognizing
on the one hand the determinative character of interests and feelings
in the gene&is of religious belief, purposes to ground that belief
rationally before accepting it as objectively valid* We turn, there-
for* specifically to Bowne *s methods of establishing the validity of
religious belief* It quickly becomes apparent that those methods
are just as pragmatic as those of the preceding period, although there
are in addition certain definite rationalistic elements* We shall
consider the pragmatic first*
After the careful distinction which Bowne has made between the
origin and the validity of belief, it is somewhat surprising to find
him approving as method in belief simply the acceptance of whatever
has been determined by our subjective interests. We may accept religious
belief as valid, he affirms, in so far as it satisfies the basic sub-
jective interests of the mind, so long as no positive disproof stands
in the way* After distinguishing, therefore, between the psyhhology
and the logic of religious belief, Bowne actually identifies them by
finding in the causes of belief their rational grounds* This is re-
peatedly affirmed by him in his statement of the method which the mind
actually follows in validating its beliefs, in contrast to the logical
method:
The law which the logician lays down is this: Nothing may
be believed which is not proved, or at least made probable.
1* Loc*cit*, Phil* of Theism, 1887, p* 6*
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by objective facts* The law which the mind actually follows
is this: whatever the mind demands for the satisfaction
of its subjective interests and tendencies may be assumed
as real, in default of positive disproof. L
But Bowne carries the method even farther; he affirms that so long as
„
beliefs satisfy the subjective interests of the mind, even contradict-
ory facts are not to be allowed to weigh against those beliefs# The
fundamental postulates of the rationality of the universe, its moral
grounding, and the reality of the absolute ideal, must stand, Bowne
holds, even though facts stand over against them# The mind ’’prefers
— to maintain its faith in the ideal, and to set aside the conflict-
ing facts as something not yet understood, but which to perfeot in-
2
sight would fall into harmony#”
As it stands, the argument that those beliefs are to be regarded
as true which satisfy our basic interests in the absence of positive
disproof is pragmatically toned# Any rational force that the argument
would have would depend upon the presupposition that those basic inter-
ests are themselves essentially rational# But as we have seen in our
consideration of Bowne 1 s conception of the nature of the mind, in this
period, Bowne did not succeed in identifying interests and feelings with
the practical reason# He assumed their rationality, indeed, but he
rested the assumption upon the theory that they are the product of a
purposive world-intelligence# Indeed, Bowne himself recognizes that
these subjeotive interests have rational value "only as we assume some
theory of their origin." Yet, this theory of their origin, namely,
a theistic world-view, is itself the point eventually to be established#
Certainly there is no rational justification for assuming a theistic
1# Meth
.
Quart . Rev#
, 66(1884), p# 652. See also Phil #of Theism,pp.l3,14,25.
2# Loc.cit., Phil .of Theism, 1887, pp. 220-224; See also ibid., pp. 21, 260;
and Independ #, 37(Jan# 8,1885), p# 35.
3* Meth# Quart. Rev#, 66(1884), p# 661#
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position to validate religious belief# Such would clearly be a petitio
principii# Keligious beliefs may indeed servo as partial evidence for
a theistic -world-view, that is, they are facts that have to be considered
in our total view of experience# but clearly their cognitive validity
cannot properly be made to rest upon the theory that they are products
of the world-process# Occasionally, however, Bovme does so treat them#
When it is seen that belief is made for us rather than
by us, that the great outlines of belief are drawn in
life and by life, then the great catholic beliefs of
humanity begin to acquire the significance of any other
groat natural product# They show the direction of the
evolving movement, the trend of the universe of mind# 1
But even assuming the theistic position, the designation of true beliefs
as products of the universe of mind is valueless as a criterion; for
manifestly all beliefs, true and false alike, can be so considered as
natural products# There is no basis here for distinguishing the true
from the false* That Borons realized that he had not established the ration-
ality of our interests and feelings as he defined them is clear from his
2
recognition that "our nature must finally be taken on trust#" But this,
clearly, gives us no basis for deciding between the conflicting claims
of any given individual *s nature or between the claims of different
individuals#
A second step in Bowne* s treatment of religious belief is one which
we found stressed in the writings of the preceding period, namely, that
religious beliefs are no more subjective than the assumptions upon which
all of soience and philosophy rests, and if no more subjective, then
their validity is not to be questioned on the grounds that they are
subjective# Bowne, in the article "Scienoe Must Go," writes:
"We propose to point out that the logical procedure which seems
1# Independ #, 48(Apr#2,1896), p# 439#
2# Meth# Quart . Bev», 66(1884), p# 661
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so scandalous in religious thinking also underlies scientific think-
1
ing, so that, if religion must go as illogical, science must go too*"
Bowne * s point is that all knowledge of the external world proceeds on
the basis of certain fundamental postulates or assumptions which are
not logically derived,but are required by the interests of the living
mind* ”A purely speculative knowledge of reality, which shall be strictly
2
deductive and free from assumption, is impossible • " The mind assumes,
because of its speculative interest, the intelligibility and rational-
ity of the world, and because of its moral and religious interests, it
assumes the moral and spiritual government of the world* But ’’the desire
to find the universe intelligible is as purely subjeotive as the desire
to find it moral* The desire to comprehend it is as subjective as the
b
desire to worship*" As for the postulates of science, Bowne writes:
This reign of law, especially of intelligible law, is a
subjective postulate* The admissibility of interpretation
is a pure assumption* All this is done in the interests of
the cognitive faculty* It could not deal with the facts
without the assumption of law; but what right has it to
deal with them ? — From a logical point of view, science
is simply an idol of the human tribe, a projection into
the world of reality of the subjective interests and post-
ulates of the cognitive faculty* As to the objective val-
idity of these postulates, cognition stands on the same
logical plane as ethics and religion* 4
And further, "If the instinctive affirmations of the mind are accepted
in default of proof in the field of sense-perception, there seems to be
no good reason why similar affirmations should be rejected in the field
of morals and religion*"
Bowne* s argument here, therefore, is this: the ultimate warrant
for our accepting the postulates of the intelligibility and rationality
of the world is the satisfaction which it gives to our subjective specu-
1* Independ *, 36(Jan*24,1884), p* 98*
2* Loc* cit*, Phil * of Theism
, 1887, p* 22*
3* Meth * Quart . 5ev ., 66(1384$, p* 657*
4* Independ., 36 (Jan.24,1884), p* 98*
5* Meth. Quart. Rev*, 66(1884), pp. 6b5-6b6
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lative interest; on the same ground, therefore, the postulate of the
moral and spiritual government of the -world is to be accepted because
of its satisfaction of the subjective moral and religious interests*
But the first difficulty in Bourne* s procedure at this point, as we
found in the preceding period, is that of designating the speculative
or cognitive interest as subjective* Unless the purely rational int-
erest of the mind is objective and universal then it is manifestly
absurd to attempt to deal objectively with anything* The practical
needs of knowledge may indeed account for the genesis of the belief
or postulate that the world is intelligible, but only reason can est-
ablish the rational justification of that assumption on the ground
that it yields the most reasonable
,
that is, the most consistent and
coherent view of experience* And it follows at once that if the war-
rant of the cognitive postulates is to be found in their rational
character rather than in the fact that they satisfy "subjective”
interests of the mind, the warrant of the moral and religious post-
ulates must be found in the same way, and not on the pragmatic grounds
that they, like the cognitive postulates, satisfy subjective interests
of the mind* The weakness of Bowm®*s method, therefore, lies not in
his affirmation that assumptions and postulates are necessary, for this
has indeed been manifest since the failure of Descartes to reach the
external world by strict deduction, but rather in his repeated treat-
ment of the purely rational interest as subjective and his consequent
attempt to validate the cognitive postulates in terms of the satisfact-
ion which they give to this subjective interest*
A third step in the pragmatic side of the methodology is the arg-
ument from favorable results, which we also found in the writings of
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the second period* Bowne argues:
An immoral and godless universe is a conception which
could not lie long on the human mind in general without
producing pernicious results, either in the form of in-
subordination and violence, or in the form of listless-
ness, paralysis, and a gradual abandonment of moral ideals*
What avails it to fight the universe ? On the other hand,
the opposite conceptions are full of blessing both for
the individual and for society* If, now, this is no
ground for believing them, we are under the disagreeable
necessity of admitting that a true belief may be paralyz-
ing and pernicious, while a false belief may be necessary
to our best development* ^
And because Bowne does hold that truth is beneficial and useful, al-
though not constituted by that utility, he accepts the argument from
results as contributing to the case for religious belief* Because
religious beliefs are fruitful in their favorable results for human
life, and because atheistic beliefs are pernicious in their results,
we may assume the truth of the one and the falsity of the other*
The rational validity of this argument rests, manifestly, on the
arbitrary definition that truth never has results that are harmful
to human life, but the definition itself is essentially pragmatic*
The rationalist may hold that utility is a presumption of truth, but
in itself it does not establish truth; and conversely he may hold
that results harmful to human life may constitute a presumption
against the truth of a given view, but they do not establish its
falsity, for truth and falsity must, in the final analysis, depend
upon considerations other than simply results qua results*
Another pragmatic element in Bowne* s case for religious belief,
though presented only incidentally, is the argument from history and
survival* As between beliefs, he says, "More and more history becomes
2
the argument, and the survival of the fittest the judge.” Again,
1* Meth * Quart , Rev*, 66(1884), p* 654*
2* Ibid*, p* 665*
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"If there be others with a different set of fundamental sympathies
and interests, and no mediation is possible, history and the survival
1
of the fittest must decide between them*
1
' The validity of this argu-
ment depends, as in the case of the argument from the satisfaction of
our interests, upon a metaphysical presupposition* If the universe is
rationally and purposively controlled, then indeed we may believe
that the Creator will allow only true beliefs to survive, although
even this rests upon the assumption that we understand the purposes
of the Creator* In any event, the argument has no rational validity
as method independent of a metaphysical presupposition? its completely
pragmatic character is obvious
o
The *will to believe* doctrine appears in Bowne in this period
even before the publication of the famous essay by James* In the
Philosophy of Theism
,
Bowne writes: "There is an element of faith and
volition latent in all our theorizing* Where we cannot prove, we be-
2
lieve* Where we cannot demonstrate, we choose sides*" And this,
Bowne held, was essentially the position of Kant* With respect to
the question of theism, Bowne wrote of Kant: "Ee claimed to have shown
that, by way of speculation, neither proof nor disproof is possible; and
in this balance of the speculative reason practical interests may be
3
allowed to turn the scale*"
A further pragmatic emphasis that appears in this period is the
doctrine that beliefs must be tested in action* No one, Bovme says, can
really test the belief in God, for example, until he has tried to live
on the basis of such a belief; only then can he be genuinely certain of
1* Independ *, 42(0ct*2,1990), p* 1401* See also Phil.of Theism, p* 52*
2* Loc*cit*, Phil * of Theism
, 1887, p* iii.
3* Ibid*, p* 242*
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its validity# Belief reaches full power only as it "is put into action,
and life is Built into and around it# Indeed, in a great many cases,
the test of belief would appear to be just the willingness to act upon
it; and through acting upon it the belief acquires reality, and passes
1
from assent to conviction#** The practical value of this emphasis is
clear; and likewise its rational value# Nevertheless it should be seen
that the rational value lies in the fact that practice gives to us data
for interpretation and that it is not the practice itself which pro-
vides the criterion# He who acts on the basis of faith in God finds
certain facts of experience which would not otherwise be presented to
him# To the extent that those facts require a theistic view as their
rational e:cplanation it may be said that practice and action open the
way to a validation of belief in God# From a critical point of view,
however, practice and action must be seen as providing the data for
belief; they are not themselves the criteria#
As in the first period, Bowne continues to include the utilitar-
ian emphasis in his moral theory, combining it, as in the earlier period,
with the Kantian formalism# In his The Principles of Ethics
,
he sum-
marizes his view by saying that "morality has a subjective and an ob-
jective aspect# The former looks to the motive, the disposition, the
spirit of the agent# The latter looks only to the objective nature and
Z
consequences of the deed." Though taken from the Utilitarian doctrines,
this emphasis in Bowne is not in itself characteristically pragmatic for
the reason that it presupposes the moral will as the source of moral
principles; it does not make consequences an exclusively empirical
criterion#
1# Independ#
,
48(Apr# 2, 1896), p# 439#
2# Bowne, B#P#, The Principles of Ethics
,
(N#Y#s Harper & Brothers, 1892),
p# 140#
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Thus far we have considered simply the pragmatic emphases in
Bowne *s methodology in the field of moral and religious belief in
this period* Their validity rests largely, as we have seen, upon meta-
physical presuppositions* They are not in themselves valid methods for
establishing the rational validity of belief* That Bowne had not felt
it necessary carefully to distinguish the criteria of belief is indi-
cated by the very fact that he so often speaks of truth-criteria as
being too complex to formulate# Only the living mind can serve as cri-
terion of the truth# "The test of fundamental beliefs can never be any
1
simple rule, but will rather be as complex as our nature itsdlf#"
Again, "There is no simple and compendious standard of real truth as
distinct from formal truth# To seek for such a thing is to follow a
2
chimera#'* It is precisely because Bowne never made the criteria of
religious belief a critical problem for investigation that he achieved
no systematic formulation of methodology in the field of religious
belief* He depends largely, as a consequence, upon considerations
that are essentially pragmatic* In addition to these pragmatic elements,
however, there are certain emphases that are distinctly rationalistic,
and it is to these that we now turn*
In so far as Bowne argues for the validity of moral and religious
beliefs on the basis of their harmony and coherence with experience as
a whole, his method is essentially rationalistic and sound? and occasion-
ally he does so argue* In the article, "Science Must Go," for example,
we find him writing:
It is not correct to say that the mind believes its post-
ulates because it wishes to, but because it cannot bring
1* Meth# Quart * Rev* , 66(1884), p# 665#
2• Independ#, 37 (Jan* 8,1885), p. 36#
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its total experience into harmony -without them so that
every side pi* our complex nature shall receive full re-
cognition* *
In so far as Bowne intends "harmony” to be understood rationally,
and not psychologically, he is approaching here the criterion of
coherence* But the coherence criterion is suggested more clearly
in the following:
It is in this sense of having many implications which
can be unfolded in systematic statement that the ethical
and religious consciousness may be spoken of as an in-
dependent source of truth*
That is, the objective character of moral and religious beliefs is in-
dicated by their capacity for systematic and coherent representation*
Again, in 1890, Bowne writes:
But, it is said, this is to declare that one is free to
believe what he pleases* By no means* Of those basal in-
terests and sympathies which determine belief, one must
be sure that they are well founded, either in their own
right as expressions of our nature, or in some other
fact, or facts; and one must also invoke logic to secure
consistency in unfolding them into a formulated system* ^
Bowne* s argument here is not by any means clean-cut in the ration-
alistic sense; it is still confused with interest-satisfactions without
establishing any criterion for rational interests* nevertheless, there
is significance in the point that these beliefs must be capable of
being unfolded into a "formulated system*" In this case, coherence
is made the incidental and secondary criterion, rather than the prim-
ary; but that Bowne should use it at all in the case of moral and rel-
igious beliefs is indeed a point of interest*
A second rationalistic element in Bowne* s methodology in the field
of religious belief is the moral argument* "We demand," he says,
1* Independ *, 36(Jan* 24,1884), p* 98*
2* Meth * Quart * Rev*, 66(1884), p* 662*
3# Independ*, 42 (Oct* 9, 1890), p* 1401*
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expanation -which shall satisfy the conscience as well as the intellect*
1
Accordingly, we interpret the First Cause morally* 1 ’ At this point,
Bowne is certainly speaking of conscience in terms of practical reason,
for he is implying the objectivity of moral judgments entirely apart
from any interest or instinct satisfactions# This is borne out further
in the following passage, in which he is speaking of the postulates of
the mind as axiomata
,
that is, as "things worthy to be believed" :
In the last analysis these axiomata have an ethical root*
They rest upon the idea, not of what must be, but of what
ought to be* They are accepted because of their practical
value, or their unconditioned worth# Th$s basal faith rests
upon nothing deeper than itself, and hence iu cannot be
argued# 2
That is, it is not feeling qua feeling that establishes these postulates
but rather the rational conviction that that which is neceessary for
the moral life must be true, so long as reason can establish nothing
to the contrary# And the rationality of the moral life, in turn, rests
precisely on the objectivity of the moral judgments, in so far as that
objectivity can be shown to be rationally probable# Bowne’s use of
this rational moral argument is, however, not systematic; it occurs
only incidentally*
A third rationalistic element in Bowne’s attempt to validate reli-
gious belief is the argument that the facts of moral and religious exp-
erience require God as thdir explanation# This is so highly significant
in any rational case for belief in God that one would expect that Bowne
would have made much of it* Actually, however, the argument is found only
once, and in an incidental connection, in the writings of this period*
He says: "The existence of the conscience and of religion demands an
3
explanation; and this must finally be found in God#"
1# Meth # Quart , Rev* , 66(1884), p* 651#
2# Ibid#, p# S61o
3# Ibid*, p# S53#
I :
,
• •
.
'
•'
j.
.
*
-
.
,
•
,
,
.
*" "r
-
-
*
*
‘
r-:..
.
•
>o .
’
r.. •
^ «
lo'l v^as-»ooa£: ;:J-
'
t
*
,
T 0
c ic&t&a
.
’ l
- T ; . -
'
• 31 ..."
.
• *-
*
.
•
'
,
i
u
t
’
.
102
Thus, though some rationalistic considerations are adduced in
Bourne’s treatment of religious belief, they are not systematically de-
veloped; in the main the case for the validity of religious belief is
allowed to rest upon essentially pragmatic arguments# The substance of
his positi on is that religious belief is valid because it satisfies our
religious interests# which interests we must assume to be trustworthy#
The essential position of Bowne is certainly defensible on a rationalistic
basis, but the methods whioh he has employed are more pragmatic than
rationalistic#
(4) The Nature of Truth#
There is no change in Bowne* s conception of truth in the writings
of this third period# He distinguishes as before between rational truth
and the truth of contingent fact, but holds that ultimately all truth is
grounded in purposive intelligence#
Rational truth, as distinct from truth of contingent fact,
is never anything more than an expression of the necessary
relations of ideas, or of the way in which reason univer-
sally proceeds# As such it is nothing apart from the mind
or antecedent to it, but is simply an expression of the
mental nature# There is no realm of truth apart from
the world-ground; and we must look in this being for the
foundation of truth itself, and of all those principles
whereby the distinction of true and false, consistent and _
contradictory, possible and impossible, themselves exist# 1
Bowne makes the conception of truth somewhat more explicit in the
following passage, in which he defines truth relationally:
The relation of ideas in the judgment is not merely a sub-
jective fact in the individual consciousness, but claims
to represent an independent truth# — This claim pre-
supposes an order existing independtly of individual vol-
ition and consciousness# This may be an order of fact
or an order of reason# In the order of fact there are
certain things in certain relations and with certain
1# Loc.cit#, Phil# of Theism, p# 162#
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laws* In the order of reason there are certain ideas
•which belong together, and others which are mutually
repugnant* Judgments are true which agree with this
order; those are false which depart from it* In the
true judgment conceptions are joined which in the nat-
ure of things or in the nature of reason belong togeth-
er; in the false judgment conceptions are joined which
in the nature of things or in the nature of reason
should be kept apart* *
That Bowne continues to regard truth as not only independent
and absolute but also beneficial is indicated in a passage already
quoted from the article on MThe Logic of Religious Belief*" After
affirming the pernicious influence of atheistic beliefs and the
beneficial influence of theistic beliefs, he says, "If, now, this
is no ground for believing them (i*e* theistic beliefs), we are
under the disagreeable necessity of admitting that a true belief
may be paralyzing and pernicious, while a false belief may be
2
necessary to our best development 4 "
Summary of the Epistemology for the Third Period (1884-1896):
Bowne continues in this period with the activistic view of the
thinking subject, its cognitive activity proceeding according to norms,
or categories, implicit in it, which norms are empirically discover-
able, not logically deduoible from some basic category* Mind-activity
is to be further distinguished as an abstracting, generalizing, and
classifying activity* The emphasis upon the determinative character
of interests and feelings in the life of the mind continues in this per-
iod* Though Bowne thinks of these basic interests and feelings, as he
has defined them, in terms of the Kantian practical reason, it is clear
that his formulation is far more pragmatic than rationalistic* The
1* Loc* cit*, Psychol * Theory, 1886, p* 290
2* Meth* Quart* Rev*, 66(1884), p* 654.
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function of the theoretical reason with respect to these interests
and feelings is regulative* As regards the nature and scope of know-
ledge, the treatment is the same as that of the preceding period.
The cognitive field is divided between strict knowledge and rational
belief* TJnder the former are included logic and mathematics, with the
criteria of self-evidence and consistency* Under the latter are in-
cluded science, metaphysics, and moral and religious beliefs* The
criteria in science and metaphysics are consistency, harmony, and
adequacy to the facts* Metaphysical explanation is further defined
to include purpose* Science and metaphysics rest on objective gfcounds;
moral and religious beliefs rest on subjective grounds, namely, feel-
ings and interests* Bowne distinguishes between the psychology and
logic of religious belief, but he finally identifies the two by find-
ing in the causes Of beliefs their grounds* His pragmatic methodology
includes: (1) interest-satisfaction as warrant of belief; (2) the
acceptance of the subjective determination of our religious beliefs
on the ground that our acceptance of scientific and philosophical
postulates is also subjectively determined; (3) beneficial results as
warrant of belief; and (4 ) the measure of belief in terms of survival*
The *will to believe* doctrine is also suggested in this period, to-
gether with the teaching that beliefs must be tested in action* The
rationalistic emphases are not systematically developed* They include:
(1) the criterion of harmony with experience as a whole and the possibil-
ity of systematic formulation; (2) the argument from the objectivity of
our moral judgments; and (3) the argument to God as the most rational
explanation of the facts of moral and religious experience* The concep-
tion of truth is essentially that of the earlier periods, rational and
independent, yet beneficial and fruitful*
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Section Fours Fourth Period. 1897 - 1910*
(1) Nature of the Mind*
The only change in Bowne’s conception of the nature of the mind
in this fourth and last period is in the direction of a more articulate
emphasis upon its teleological character, -which -we shall consider in
connection -with the categories# The fundamental notion of the mind as
a unified, self-directing center of activity remains unchanged* The
unity of the thinking subject is known both through experience and
through logical deduction from that experience# We notice first the
empirical emphasis:
In affirming the self we affirm nothing picturable or
sensuously presentable, but only what we mean and exper-
ience when we say *1*. And this self, so far from being
a questionable fact, is one of the surest items of exper-
ience • 1
Again:
The self itself as the subject of the mental life and
knowing and experiencing itself as living, and as one and
the same throughout its changing experiences, is the sur-
est item of knowledge we possess* £
The logical necessity of accepting the unity of the thinking sub-
ject is shown by such a consideration as the following:
Lot us take the judgment a is b, where a and b are any
two particular states of consciousness# How is this judg-
ment possible ?
The answer is. It is possible only as there is a conscious
subject M, which is neither a or b, but embraces both
in the unity of its own consciousness* **
Over against the plurality of coexistent particular states
the self must be one; over against the plurality of succes-
sive particular states the self must be both one and abid-
ing. 4
1# Bowne, B*P*, Theory of Thought and Knowledge
,
(N#Y*: Harper &
Brothers, 1897), p# 27*
2# Bowne, B*P., Personalism
,
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin 0o.,19O8), p#88#
3# Loc* cit#. Thought and Knowledge
, p# 21#
4# Ibid#, p# 22#
.
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The activistic conception of the mind remains basic -with Bowne
to the end of his v/ork* Tn the Preface to the Theory of Thought and
Knowledge
,
he says: "The root thought of the work is that thought is
an organic activity which unfolds from within, and can never be put
1
together mechanically from without. ,! Of the different kinds of
mind-activity, "Thought is that form whose aim is truth or
2
knpwledge." Thought is always active. The fact that impressions
of the outside world are received by the mind does not mean that the
mind is ever passive, for "they become anything for intelligence only
through a constitutive, organizing, classifying activity of thought
3
upon the impressions."
The distinguishing, differentiating activity of the mind, as
Bowne learned to describe it under the influence of Ulrici, proceeds
according to the categories, or norms of differentiation, implicit
in itself. Here again Bowne* s approach to the categories is both
empirical and logical. Hot only are they presupposed by the differ-
entiating activity of the mind as logical forms of that activity,
but they are actually experienced as modes of mental procedure.
Logically, Bowne argues that "experience is possible only through a
certain constitutive mental ectivity, according to principles imman-
ent in the understanding.' 1 But the empirical emphasis here is even
stronger than the logical. For example, Bowne criticizes the Kantian
deduction of the categories as inadequate. He says:
We may say that the categories are the condition of all
knowledge and of all objects, but this is by no means to
deduce them, it is rather to discover them as the actual
conditions of the consciousness we actually possess. &
1. Loc.cit., Thought and Knowledge
, p. iii.
2« Ibid., p. 9#
3. Ibid. j p. 45.
4. Loc.cit., Personal., p. 55.
5. Bowne, B.P., Kant and Spencer : A Critical Exposition, (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1912), p. 77.
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The activities of the mind nfall into certain classes, and these
classes may only be looked upon as expressing general forais of mental
1
action and as founded in the nature of the mind itself." Thus, the
categories are "modes of mental operation* They are the forms -which the
2
mind gives to its experience." Again, "They are the norms by which the
mind proceeds, implicitly or explicitly, in fixing, defining, and relat-
ing its objects* They constitute the framework of thought, and form the
3
contents of the pure reason*" And as suoh, they are "immanent in the
4
activity itself."
The categories, then, are simply abstractions from self-
conscious life* They are the modes of operation of the
intellect and derive their meaning only from that self-
conscious life as they find their only realization in it. ®
Concerning the number of categories, Bowne makes it clear that that
is a matter with which he is not particularly concerned* The important
thing is that that which is designated as a category of the mind should
really be one* He writes*
There is, then, no objection to one*s making as many cate-
gories as he pleases, provided always they represent real
forms of mental aotivity; and there is also no objection
to making as few as one pleases, provided, again, "Che cate-
gories do not put incommensurable thipgs together, and do
not overlook real forms of mental activity. ®
And even more explicitly*
It is not shown that reason admits only of the existing
categories, no more, no less, and no others. Reason - that
is, our reason - is not able to complete its own system;
and is compelled to accept itself in many respects as a
faot which is by no means transparent —- • We make no at-
tempt, therefore, at deduction or systematic completeness* (
1* Loc.cit*, Thought and Knowledge
, 1897, p* 115*
2* Loc. clt.. Personal *, 1908, p* 105.
3* Loc. cit.. Thought and Knowledge , 1897, p. 59*
4* Ibid., p* 61.
5* Kant and Spencer , 1912, pp* 86-87.
6* Loc* cit*. Thought and Knowledge
, 1897, pp* 115-116*
7* Ibid., p* 113*
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Bowne classifies the categories, in so far as he designates then,
as phenomenal and metaphysical* Under the former he places those of
space, time, motion, quantity, and number; under the latter, those of
being and quality, identity, causality, and purpose, with necessity
and possibility indicated as doubtful* Bowne* s inclusion of purpose
among the categories represents a further articulation of the teleo-
logical emphasis which we have found in his writings from the begin-
ing, and which found expression in the third period in the teleolog-
ical definition of metaphysical explanation* In the earlier teaching,
the emphasis was upon the fact that the mind does actually act with
reference to ends* In the third and fourth periods, the additional
point is made that not only does the mind act with reference to ends,
but it can know and understand its experience in any ultimate sense only
within a framework of purpose* ”In our experience of intelligence we
find its activity taking on the purposive form* -— Every where the
mind seeks to relate its objects as means to ends, or to comprise
1
them in a scheme of purpose or an all-embracing plan* 1 * "Thought
2
must become teleological before it can complete itself*" From a
cognitive point of view, however, purpose is not necessary as a prin-
ciple of interpretation on the phenomenal plane, although, indbed, the
mind is teleological in all of its vital activities; but the completion
of the metaphysical interpretation of experience is impossible without
it* Bowne specifies: "The categories are not all on the same plane*
Some are necessary to even elementary experience, while others are
3
necessary only for the reflective systematization of experience*"
Again, "The necessity of purpose as a principle of thought — is reflect-
1* Loc* cit*. Thought and Knowledge
, 1897, p* 107*
2* Ibid*, p* 107*
3* Ibid*, p* 107*
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1
ively rather than intuitively reached*” We see reflectively, for
example, that causality is intelligible only as volitional and pur-
posive* "From this point of view the affirmation of purpose is made
solely to enable thought to maintain itself and to attain to system-
Z
atic completeness*"
With purpose designated as one of the categories of thought,
Bowne , s conception of the mind becomes completely teleological, for,
as we have seen, he holds that the general activities of the mind
are controlled by subjective feelings and interests* This emphasis
upon the activity of the mind in terms of its fundamental interests
continues with the same vigor to the end of his work* He repeats in
the Theory of Thought and Knowledge and in Theism, as well as else-
where, the description of the mind which he has previously given*
Man is not only, or chiefly, an abstract speculator, he
is also a living being, with practical interests and
necessities, to vdiich he must adjust himself in order
to live at all* It has been one of the perennial short-
comings of intellectualism that man has been considered
solely as an intellect or understanding; whereas, he is
a great deal more* Man is will, conscience, emotion, asp-
iration; and these are far more powerful factors than the
logical intellect* 3
And agAin:
The mind is not a disinterested logic-machine, but a
living organism, with manifold interests and tendencies*
These outline its development, and furnish the driving
power, ^
The way in which these interests exercise control over mentAl
development is by giving rise to certain postulates or assumptions which,
while satisfying the interests, determine the direction of mental growth*
1* Loc* cit*. Thought and Knowledge
, 1897, p* 108*
2* Ibid*, p* 108*
3* Bowne, B*P*, Theism
,
(H*Y. s American Book Company, 1902),pp* 17-18;
see also Thought and Knowledge
, p* 376*
4* Loc* cit,. Theism, p* 22*
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As Bovme expresses it again:
In its practical unfolding tho mind makes a great variety
of practical postulates and assumptions which are not log-
ical deductions or speculative necessities, but a kind of
modus vivendi with the universe* They represent the condi-
tions of our fullest life; and are at bottom expressions
of our practical and ideal interests or necessities*
As cognitive we assume that the universe is rational; as moral we assume
that it is fundamentally righteous; as religious we assume the existence
of the inclusive ideal, the Perfect Being* "All of these ideals are,
primarily, alike subjective* They are produced, indeed, under the stress
of experience, but they are not the transcript of any possible experience*"
Thus we see that all our thinking rests on a teleological
foundation* The mind is not driven by any compulsion of
objective facts, but rather by the subjective necessity
of self-realization and self-preservation* 3
That Bowne continued to identify, in his own thought, these inter-
ests of the mind with the practical reason is clear* But the looseness
of that identification is equally clear* In the last article which he
wrote we find this putting of it:
We see that thought roots in life rather than in speculation*
We recognize the primacy of the practical reason* Kant did
not succeed in limiting thought to the sphere of sense phe-
nomena, but he did succeed in showing Tiirhat a large element
of relativity there is in our thinking and in showing how un-
warranted the old-fashioned dogmatism is in any field of
knowledge* —- By breaking down this dogmatism Kant has made
it possible for us to trust our human instincts again, our
higher spiritual instincts as well as the lower animal ones*
-
— Man is now seen to be not merely a speculative intelli-
gence, but a living will with practical necessities, with
instincts that are the outcome of life and which may well
be trusted not to lead us astray* 4
How instincts, whose expression is of necessity heteronomous, can be
rational Bowne does not establish* His assumption is simply that they
stand in their ora right independent of any validation by theoretical
1* Loc. cit*. Theism
, 1902, pp* 17-18*
2* Ibid*, p* 2TI
o* Ibid*, p* 27*
4. Meth, Rev., 105(1922), pp* 363-364.
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reason* Indeed his concern seems to be far more to stress the independ-
ence of instincts and interests of the theoretical reason than to estab-
lish positively their rationality. In Theism , he writes:
Of course if we stun up all the interests and intuitions
of the soul in the term ’reason,* we may make reason
cover the whole field of conviction and insight; but
reason as the faculty of inference through argument is
second and not first; for it presupposes premises. 1
Elsewhere, referring to the beliefs growing out of these basic inter-
ests, Bowne says, "Tflhile reason may be implicit in them, the reflect-
ive, analytic, and self-conscious reason commonly has little to do with
2
their production*" Thus, though constantly assuming their validity,
his emphasis is upon their independence of theoretical reason rather
than upon the critical right of assuming their rational character. In
another of Bowne* s last articles, though making interests and instincts
deeper than logical processes, he spealcs of them as cognitive:
It is now seen that life and action are deeper than logical
processes, that immediate premises are behind all inferences,
that thought cannot begin until life furnishes the data, and
that there is nothing deeper in cognition or life than the.
fundamental needs, interests, and instincts of the mind. 3
We have seen that Bowne even in the earlier periods intended an
identification of interests and feelings with the practical reason;
and we have further observed that he carried the intention scarcely
beyond the assumptive stage* Certainly, at least, he did not establish
them as equivalent to the practical reason as conceived by Kant, for
the reasons already specified, namely, first, that for Kant, the act-
ivity of reason, practical as well as theoretical, was essentially
free; reason as reason was never determined by feelings and interests;
and second, that for Kant, the moral law, together with the religious
1* Loc. cit*. Theism
, 1902, p* 26*
2* Hoc* cit*. Thought and Knowledge
, 1897, p* 376*
3* Hibbert Journal, 8(1909-1910), p. 892*
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postulates logically presupposed by it, was valid because, as a priori,
it was necessary and universal; its validity did not depend upon the
empirical discovery of its generality in human experience* There was
no emphasis of Kant's that was clearer than that the principles of
pure reason cannot be established empirically* Experience cannot make
moral obligation binding upon us* Only reason can do that* Yet Bowne
argues to the rationality of the moral and religious interests on the
grounds that experience finds them to be general, that they are to be
regarded as a natural product of the universe of mind, and that they
are to be trusted as an essential part of our nature* How for these
same reasons, Bowne' s doctrine of interests even in this fourth period
is not to be identified with the Kantian doctrine of the practical
reason* It is true that he stresses more than in the earlier periods
the rational character of these interests and feelings; they may all
be included under the conception of reason in the larger sense of that
word; they are in themselves essential to cognition* Yet things are
not made rational simply bv calling them so, as Bowne has told us in
1
defending his doctrine, and the teaching as Bowne has formulated it
is essentially pragmatic rather than rationalistic*
The objedt of Bowne here is clear; his concern is primarily axio-
logical* His problem, though he does not so define it himself, is to
establish the objectivity of our value-judgpients. As seen by him, the
problem was simply the safeguarding of our moral and religious inter-
ests* Rather than focusing attention on moral and religious beliefs
in terms of objective value-judgments, he defended them on the ground
that they grow out of and are determined by essential needs and inter-
1* See Psychol* Theory , Loc.cit., pp* 206-207
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ests of the mind, -which interests and needs he assumes to he rational*
But there is difficulty here, manifestly* If the instincts and inter-
ests of life are to he subsumed under the concept practical reason,
then either all of them must he so subsumed or only a part of them*
If all of them, then there is left no distinction between the rational
and irrational in life* Yet Bowne clearly recognizes that some of our
interests and feelings are not rational grounds for belief* This leaves
us with the alternative that only part of the interests and instincts
of life are to identified with the practical reason* But if only part
of them, what is to be the principle of distinction between those inter-
ests which are essentially rational and those which are not ? Bovme*s
usual answer is that those interests are rational which are essential
to the mind and which are represented by the most catholic beliefs of
the race* But clearly generality of belief is no basis for determining
the essential or rational interests of mankind* In the first place,
the religious beliefs which Bowne speaks of as general are not general*
And Bowne himself recognizes this fact when he provides the criterion
of survival of the fittest as between the beliefs of those who are
favorable to religion and those who are opposed* But even if religious
belief were general, it might still be erroneous in spite of its gen-
erality* Bowne gives os, therefore, no basis by which the rationality
of the interests and instincts of the mind shall be determined. It is
true that Bowne, at one point in the third period, suggested that feel-
ings and interests are to be known as rational by their content. But
nowhere does he systematically develop this point, nor does he recog-
nize that if their validity rests in their rational content then their
validity is determined solely by that rational content and not by the
fact that it happens to be carried by feelings and interests* Peelings
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and interests may well be the source of cognitive data, but the test
of validity must rest not in the fact that their source is in feeling
but in the fact that their claims are seen to be essentially rational*
The appeal to feelings and interests qua feelings and interests contin-
ues in Bowne T s writings to the end of his work, and as such it is prim-
arily a pragmatic rather than a rationalistic doctrine*
The pragmatic tone of the appeal to feelings and interests is
made further clear when seen in the light of Bowne* s own doctrine of
free rational activity* His argument for the speculative significance
of freedom would make all rational activity, in so far as it is truly
objective and free from error, essentially free and undetermined activ-
ity* The mind distinguishes without any sort of compulsion, except that
of reason itself, the true from the false* Yet these great catholic
beliefs of the race are not, as defined by Bowne, the free achievement
of the mind; they are determined by vital interests; they grow; they
are products of the universe* Bowne seems in some places even to teach
that these beliefs are determined entirely beyond the possibility of
our rational control* Any reasons we may attempt to give for them are
nothing but rationalizations* The difficulty of reconciling this in-
sistence upon free activity of the mind in the pursuit of truth with
&he doctrine that our moral and religious postulates are determined by
our subjective interests is one that Bowne seems not to have given
attention to* Indeed, in the interests df moral and religious beliefs,
he seems to have ignored it* In the Theory of Thought and Knowledge, he
says:
We must find in human freedom, in our wilfulness and care-
lessness, an explanation in principle of the whims and ab-
errations of thought* But when we have done this we cannot
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discredit the great catholic beliefs and tendencies of
humanity without involving the whole system of knowledge
in disaster* Their universality and necessity in human
life are the best grounds for belief* *
The relation of the theoretical reason, or the logical under-
standing as Bowne usually calls it, to the basic feelings and interests
of the mind is, as we have seen in the preceding periods, essentially
one of regulation* Bowne states his view again in the Theory of
Thought and Knowledge :
What now is the function of the logical understanding in
the case?
This question, of course, has no application to those
beliefs which are admittedly based on objective evidence
which must be objectively presented* But even in the case
of beliefs based on mental interests and tendencies, logi6
lias a very important function. Our mental postulates
and interests exist primarily as implicit tendencies, and
not as clearly defined principles. In this state they read-
ily lose their way* —- Left to themselves and without the
guidance of criticism, they often fail to recognize their
own implications, and sometimes even contradict themselves*
— Hence the need of a critical procedure which shall help
the mind to self-knowledge, define and clarify its aims,
secure consistency in the development of its practical post-
ulates, and adjust their mutual relations* This is the field
of logic; and in this work of development, adjustment, and
rectification logic has its inalienable rights and a function
of supreme importance* 2
Bowne would thus give the logical tenderstanding the authority to correct
and harmonize the beliefs which grow out of our fundamental interests
and feelings* At first sight this would seem to be in conflict with
his repeated teaching that the great catholic beliefs of the race must
be allowed to stand even in the face of conflicting facts, that is,
against any interference by the theoretical reason* Bowne* s meaning
here, however, is clearly this: the beliefs in God, immortality, prayer,
etc., must be allowed to stand in their general form as required by
our fundamental feelings and interests* The specific forms of these
beliefs, however, that is, their detailed content, must be 'worked out
1* Loc* cit*. Thought and Knowledge , 1897, p* 377*
2* Ibid*, p* 383*
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and criticized by the logical understanding* In case of conflict
between a belief in God and disbelief in God, the conflict would
have to wait for pragmatic determination by survival* In case of
confliot between one particular idea of God and another particular
idea of God, the issue would be decided by the logical understand-
ing* That this, however, leaves the matter on a subjective plane
is clear enough* If Bowne argues that religious beliefs, even in
their general forms, find their rational validity in their satis-
faction of our essential interests of the mind, then manifestly the
door is open to any one to defend any idea of God by the same method*
If pragmatism becomes the validating principle of belief at any single
point, there is no possible rational way of keeping it from being
claimed as sufficient as a principle of validation at any, or all,
other points* As Bowne has formulated his views, therefore, theoret-
ical reason has only a pragmatic, regulative function so far as rel-
igious beliefs are conoamed*
(2) The Nature and Scope of Knowledge*
The dualistic nature of the cognitive relation remains a funda-
mental element in Bowne* s epistemology to the end of his work* ”How-
ever necessary our thoughts as mental events may be for the grasping
1
of the fact, they can never be identified with the fact*” And again,
’’From the human standpoint — there is an ineradicable dualism of
2
thought and thing.”
Bowne continues, in this last period of his writing, to make the
distinction between knowledge and belief* He writes:
1* Loc* cit*. Thought and Knowledge
, 1897, pp* 15-16*
2* Ibid., p.
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In strictness only that is knowledge which is indisputably
given, rationally self-evident, or cogently deduced from
unquestionable facts* Hence, strict knowledge is limited
to the immediate data of consciousness or to the contents
of the rational sciences* All other so-called knowledge
is properly belief. *
Whereas strict knowledge is the field of absolute certainty, belief
is the field of simply rational probability* All belief, that is,
all interpretations of the facts of experience, rests upon certain
assumptions or postulates concerning knowledge and nature* "We
assume that things form a rational and intelligible whole, that the
laws of our thought are parallel with the laws of things; but we can-
2
not be said to demonstrate any of these things*" Indeed, "Our
entire cognitive procedure rests upon postulates of this sort —
•
They spring out of our cognitive nature and cognitive interests,
and if we ask for their ultimate ground we find that they have no
other than the energy of the mental life itself*"
The general character of rational belief, in distinction
from knowledge, is that it is a conviction based on reasons
which lend some support but do not compel it* These may
make it probable, but do not prove it. 4
As we have before seen, Bovme distinguishes between those grounds
of belief which are objective and those which are subjective*
The grounds of belief may be both subjective and objective*
Many beliefs make no appeal to subjective interest, and
their grounds may be objectively set forth* This is the
case with most scientific beliefs, and with matters of
historical fact* Such beliefs, so far as they are rational,
are based upon objective facts and evidence* — But
many beliefs are not thus objective in their grounds*
They have their roots in feeling and our system of mental
interests* Their grounds, then, cannot be objectively pre-
sented, but must be sought rather in life itself*
1* Loc* cit*. Thought and Knowledge , 1897, p*
2* Ibid*, p* 374#
3* Ibid*, p* 374*
4* Ibid*, p* 369*
5* Ibid*, p* 369*
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With this distinction in the grounds of belief, it is clear, as
we have seen in the earlier periods , that science belongs to that part
of the field of belief which rests on objective grounds* This is also
true of metaphysics.
Philosophy aims at a rational and systematic comprehension
of reality* Or, since experience is the fundamental fact
in all theorizing, and since reality can be known only in
experience, in the largest sense of that word, we may say
that philosophy aims at a rational and systematic compre-
hension of experience*
Moral and religious belief, on the other hand, belong to that part of
the field of belief which rests on subjective grounds* But the voli-
tional element is not confined exclusively to moral and religious be-
liefs, inasmuch as it is present in all of the postulates of science
and philosophy# "There is an element of faith and volition latent in
all our theorizing* "There we cannot prove, we believe* Where we cannot
2
demonstrate, we choose sides*" The distinguishing difference in the
case of moral and religious beliefs is that their grounds, unlike those
of science and philosophy, are in no way objective*
Bowne recognizes that our interpretations of experience seldom,
if ever, achieve a final and fixed form. "If now we ask for a theory
which shall be final we must admit that we have very little that is
3
secure from overthrow," he affirms, for "the facts are rarely so unam-
4
biguous as to exclude competing interpretations*"
(3) Philosophical Method and Criteria*
There is no essentially new development in Bowne*s methodology in
this fourth period of his work* As we have already observed, he contin-
1* Loc. cit*. Thought and Knowledge
, 1897, p* 3*
2* Loc* cit.. Theism
, 1902, p* iv*
3* Loc* cit*. Thought and Knowledge
, 1897, p* 213*
4* Ibid*, p* 214*
• [o :• t \
•
• \ ' - . i ' >
'
‘5 tl. /
v.<., i ,
’
oei r >1 :* Li,".'
*
? o .
•
x
'
’
X
'
'
.
'
•
4 \
oo oi&s i
»<
t
. :
;
’
t :
T
:y-: caL'Ic
'
' v
"
j'. ' ' > * *
,
i?
-
.
, ;.i ,
•
'£ i bjL : I
•'
'•
- C -
. s o
'
.
•
r
,
• '
,
.
'
'
-
'
,
.
r
* 4
. .
'
» ,
-
. »
119
ues to divide the cognitive field between strict knowledge and rational
belief# The rational truths of logic and mathematics are alone designat-
ed as strict knowledge# Their criteria are their immediate self-evidence
and the inconceivability of their opposites. The field of rational
belief includes, as we have seen in the preceding period, science, meta-
physics and moral and religious belief, or, in other words, all beliefs,
which, though rationally probable, fall short of the absolute certainty
of strict knowledge# Science and metaphysics belong to that portion of
the field of rational belief which rests upon the objective facts of
perceptual experience, whereas moral and religious beliefs belong to
that portion of the field which rests upon the subjective facts of
feelings and interests# It is this distinction in the grounds of be-
lief, as we have noticed in the preceding periods, that is responsible
for the sharp differences in methodology between science and metaphy-
sics,on the one hand, and moral and religious belief on the other#
The very fact that Bowne regards the grounds of religious belief as
subjective is responsible for essentially pragmatic procedure in his
attempt to validate them#
The entire field of belief rests upon certain basic postulates or
assumptions# Indeed it is because of these necessary postulates, incap-
able in themselves of demonstration, that science, philosophy, and moral
and religious belief, must be designated as belief rather than as know-
ledge# They rest upon postulates which are simply to be accepted or re-
jected; they cannot be strictly proved# From the cognitive point of view,
these postulates are the trustworthiness of reason and the intelligibility
and rationality of the external world# Bowne emphasizes again and again
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that these postulates are not capable of being demonstrated* Their
only rational ground is that they satisfy our cognitive interests*
The emphasis here is certainly pragmatic* The strictly rationalistic
position would be that it is the nature of reason to require object-
ivity, consistency, and coherence of all propositions which claim to
be true* It is impossible to build a view of our experience that is
completely coherent which does not rest upon the postulate of the in-
telligibility of the external world# We cannot, indeed, strictly dem-
onstrate the postulate, but iib finds its rational ground not in the fact
that it satisfies our interests, but in the fact that it permits a
coherent view of experience#
Bowne*s references to science in this period are only casual and
incidental* Ee continues to accept experiment and observation as the
fundamental methods* Further, scientific theories, like those of meta-
physics, must be tested by their adequacy to the facts and by self-
consistency and harmony with the rest of knowledge# Bowne elaborates
still further in this period the differences between scientific and
philosophic method* The field of science is the field of the connect-
ions of things and events* "These uniformities of coexistence and se-
quence admit of being studied and described and registered without ref-
1
erence to metaphysics.' The knowledge of these uniformities "can be
gained only by observation and experiment# ITo amount of reflection upon
Z
ideas will enable us to deduce a priori any of these facts* 11 The
field of science is definitely limited. It does not touch the"question
a
of meaning and causal interpretation." "Science discovers,describes,
registers the facts; philosophy interprets they." And again, "We give
1# Loc* cit*. Personal ., 1908, p* 36*
2# Ibid*, pp* 37-38#
3# Ibid*, p# 40#
4# Ibid*, p# 41.
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up* then, the whole scientific apparatus, from mechanics on, as any-
thing ontological, and hold it only for its practical value in master-
1
ing experience#”
In metaphysics, Bowne continues to use the Eerbartian method of
critically examining and reworking the fundamental philosophical con-
cepts# Metaphysics was not, for him, an inductive science# This is
illustrated again in this period by his reference to the question of
causality. It is not, he says, "a question of inductive science or com-
2.
mon sense experience, but solely of consistent thinking.” This em-
phasis upon logical consistency in Bowne* s metaphysical writings is not
meant to exclude the criterion of adequacy to the facts, although the
use of the word 1 solely* in the sentence just quoted would suggest the
narrower view# The fuller method is indicated more clearly in the state-
ment: "The value of competing solutions is to be found in their adequacy
3
to the facts and to the demands of our reason#"
Boto describes his method in metaphysics in this period as follows
Our method, then, is critical, not creative# Experience, as
a whole, is our datum, and the question is. How must we
think about reality on the basis of this experience as in-
terpreted by thought ? We take, thetj, everything as it seems
to be, or as it reports itself, end make our conceptions
adequate and harmonious# ^
By adequacy to the facts, Bowne means that our notions and theories
must be capable of explaining experience# In his Personalism
,
he writes:
We have again and again pointed out that experience is
first and basal in all living and thinking, and that
all theorizing must go out from experience as its bas-
is, and must return to it for verification# ®
It must be understood, however, that verification by experience does not
1# Loc# cit#. Personal #, 1908, p# 212#
2# Ibid#, p# 195#
3# Ibid#, p# 196#
4# Bowne, B#P# , Metaphysics, (N#Y# : Harper & Brothers, 1898), p# 5#
5# Loc# cit#. Personal., p# 303#
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mean for Bowne any direct testing by experience* Rather it means that
any theory must be tested by its adequacy to explain experience* In
other words, Bowne does not use the appeal to experience positively to
establish the truth of any proposition; manifestly our basic philosophic
concepts could not be so tested; but rather negatively, to show that no
philosophical theory is to be regarded as true unless it provides an
adequate explanation of the facts of experience* ”Every speculator,"
Bowne insists, "has to go behind the world of experience, and his ex-
planation of the world must be judged by its own positive adequacy to
the facts or its ability to satisfy our reason*" This phrase
"adequacy to the facts" was undoubtedly close in meaning for Bowne to
the term 'coherence 1 as used ordinarily by the empirical rationalist*
Bowne himself, however, never made systematic use of the term 'coher-
ence* * It does appear in his Personalism
,
in 1908, where he says,
after outlining the general theory of philosophical naturalism, "To
what extent this is a ooherent and consistent system we have now to
2
consider*" And it appears again, in negative form, in Kant and
Spencer : "A system — depends only on its logic* An incoherent system
is none*"
The case for the metaphysical attributes df God was included by
Bowne within the field of metaphysics* The nature of his procedure
is indicated in the following passage:
From the side of pure intellect — the theistic question
can take on two forms* We can seek to show that the order
of the world cannot be understood without intelligence as
its cause, and that reason itself falls into discord and
despair without God* In the former case God appears as a
necessary hypothesis for the understanding of the facts;
in tlie latter case God, appears as a necessary implication
of the rational life* 4
It Meth* Fey*, 105(1922), p* 366*
2* Loc* cit*. Personal *, 1908, p* 222*
3* Loc* cit., Kant and Spencer
, 1912, p* 221*
4* Loc* cit*. Theism
, 1902, p* 40*
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But the speculative intellect, Bowne urged, can arrive only at the
purely metaphysical attributes of God. It cannot establish the relig-
ious conception. "From the religious standpoint, — in distinction
from the metaphysical, the important attributes concern the divine
1
character, or ethical nature." Concerning the moral character of
God, Bo-wne says;
There is no way of speculative deduction; for the meta-
physical attributes of the world-ground are ethically
barren. We must, then, either have immediate faith in
our ideal of the perfect being or else appeal to exper-
ience to prove that the world-ground proceeds according
to ethical principles. Our actual procedure is a mix —
tore of both. 2
However, the empirical arguments for the moral character of God
cannot be regarded as establishing the case. Eowne writes;
These empirical arguments, — while they serve to il-
lustrate and confirm our faith, are plainly not its source.
They all rest upon picked facts, and ignore same of the
most prominent aspects of experience. «
The final ground of the rationality of our religious beliefs, there-
fore, is our faith in the reality of the ideal and in the validity of
our human interests. Fow it is at this point that Bowne turns to prag-
matic methods and criteria. Rather than findoLng the justification of
our faith in the rationality of the universe and in the reality of the
moral ideal in the fact that such a faith permits the most rational
and coherent view of our total experience, Bowne continues to depend
primarily upon pragmatic considerations. Ee even begins with a prag-
matic formulation of the classes of belief. In the Theism
,
he -writes:
A mental inventory reveals several classes of propositions;
some which we must believe, same which we must not believe,
and some which we may believe or assume. The first two
classes rest upon the essential structure of intelligence;
and whatever conflicts with them will, sooner or later, be
1. Loc. cit.. Theism
, 1902, p. 249.
2. Ibid., p. 250.
3. Ibid., p. 256.
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abandoned* The third class belongs to the realm of practice
and probability, where most of what is valuable in life
and conduct lies* It is only in this class that our inter-
ests or desires can have a vote, or that the will to be-
lieve* has a permissible function* ^
And again, in The Bssence of Religion:
Our fundamental beliefs are never things which can be tech-
nically proved* They are of the nature of choices. They
represent our assumptions, or postulates, or practical
platform, or the things for which we stand* Or rather,
they represent us* They reveal the tendencies of our nature,
our affinities, the things we like or wish to be*
2
Probably no one would would question that our beliefs are in the
first instance largely determined by what we are, by our particular
interests and tendencies* But this leaves the flatter purely in the
realm of the psychology of belief, and in no way touches the question
of logical validity* Likewise, it may be -recognized that the volition-
al element, the element of choice, is an important factor in belief,
but unless this is to be regarded pragmatically, it must be emphasized
that the choice must be rationally made; it must be made in the light
of our total experience, and not blindly or simply because of inclina-
tion* It is because Bowne seldom speaks of the rational emphasis here,
that his formulation gives the impression of being essentially prag-
matic*
The pragnatic character of Bowne* s general treatment of religious
belief is shown even more strikingly in the following paragraph:
By way of speculation we can justify neither l’eligion
nor science; but since speculation itself is discredit-
ed, vie nedd not be concerned at its failure* But life
still remains with all its practical interests, and we
are permitted to believe and assume whatever this pract-
ical life may suggest or demand, and that without being
molested by speculative philosophy* 3
1* Loc* cit
• ,
Theism, 1902, pp* 33—34*
2* Bowne, B.P.j The Essence of Religion
,
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co.,
1910), p. 182*
3* Loc* cit*. Personal * 1908, p* 309*
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Again, the stress upon the practical life, rather than upon rational
considerations, as the test of belief, is distinctly pragmatic in tone*
"Our practical life has been the great source of belief and the constant
1
test of its practical validity, that is, of its truth#” Again, in one
of the last articles -which Bowne wrote, "Gains for Religious Thought
in the Last Generation,” he speaks of the general inorease of the prag-
matic emphasis as a distinct gain# He writes: "This result also has
great religious value# It changes the venue in the case of religious
belief from the court of logic and speculation to the court of life,
action, and history# We now see that we have to trust our nature or
2
instincts in order to move at all." The biological tone of this
pragmatic evaluation of life and instincts is further borne out by the
following reference: "Thus the old rationalising is finally discredited,
and religion has a free field for manifesting itself in life and action#
3
The argument is no longer syllogistic, but biologio and pragmatic •”
In his Kant and Spencer
,
published posthumously, Bowne specifically
refers to the procedure in the realm of moral and religious belief as
pragmatic# He writes: "Thought has become pragmatic, especially in ethi-
cal and religious field#,and we are very little concerned at speculative
inadequacy, provided a doctrine works well in practice and enriches and
4
furthers life#” By speculative inadequacy, Bowne means the impossibility
of defending religious belief upon what he has called the objective grounds
of perceptual fact#
Bowne felt that he could consistently hold to such a pragmatism in the
field of religious belief, no doubt, because he regarded the subjective
grounds upon which religious belief rests as essentially rational# As we have
pointed out, he assumed the identity of the interests and feelings of
1# loc# cit., personal#
, 1908, pp# 310-311; see also Thought & Knowl ., p# 376.
2# Hibbert Joum#
, 8(1909-1910), p# 893#
3# Ibid#, p# 893#
4# Loc# cit#, Kant and Spencer
, 1912, p# 209*
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the mind with the practical reason* But we have further pointed out
that he did not establish that identity; for him it was pure assumption*
For Kant, the primacy of the practical reason meant the rational uni-
versality and necessity of the moral law* For Bowne, it means the
setting of the vital over against and above the intellectual. Indeed,
Bowne so interprets Kant * s work, as permanently establishing "the
X
primacy of life over speculation." Bowne *s conception of the pract-
ical reason is well indicated in such a sentence as the following:
"We have come to a point at last where we are trusting our instincts
2
again, our higher spiritual instincts as well as the lower ones."
Bowne* s chief ground for asserting the identity of interests and feel-
ings with the practical reason was the universality, empirically
discoverable, of the beliefs which grow out of those interests and
feelings*
Historically, there has been a good deal to justify
suspicion of and impatience with appeals to feeling in
any form as reasons for belief*
But this impatience is itself short-sighted. First,
it overlooks the fact that there are feelings and
feelings* There are particular fancies, and there are
the great catholic sentiments of the race* There are
individual desires, and there are the great funda-
mental human interests in which life itself roots. ^
And further, these interests and feelings are to be regarded as rat-
ional because they are products of the world of reality. Bowne writes:
The mind itself, its nature and needs, are certiinly
parts and products of reality, and we are not to sup-
pose them misleading without good reason. ^
We have already pointed to the inadequacy of the argument from general-
ity of belief, particularly when no such generality can be established.
1* Independ. , 56 (Jan*14, 1904), p* 67.
2. North American Ep-ai.art. 191 (1910), p* 103.
3* Loc. cit*. Thought and Knowledge
, 1897, p* 370.
4* Ibid., p* 370.
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and we have pointed to the petitio prineipii present in the argument
that our interests and needs must be rational because they are the
product of a good, rational universe, -which is indeed the point to be
established*
Against the background of the assumed trustworthiness of our in-
terests and feelings and instincts, Bowne builds his case for the val-
idity of religious belief* The first point of importance in his method-
ology is that that validity rests upon the fact that religious belief
satisfies our basic interests* As we have shown, this argument has no
more than pragmatic value because of Bowne* s failure to establish the
interests as themselves rational* Bowne contrasts the method of strictly
logical demonstration, which he calls the method of " rigor and vigor,"
after Matthew Arnold, with the actual procedure of the mind in the field
of belief, quite as he did in the preceding period:
The law the logician lays down is this: nothing may be
believed which is not proved* The law the mind actually
follows is this: whatever the mind demands for the sat-
isfaction of its subjective interests and tendencies _
may be assumed as real in default of positive disproof* 1
The pragmatic character of the formulation here is clear* The cri-
terion of what is to be acoepted as true or as real is not self-consis-
tency and coherence, or harmony with experience, but rather satisfaction
of "subjective interests and tendencies*" With the moral and religious
nature designated as "subjective" it is only natural that Bowne fell into
this essentially pragmatic form of their defense*
Another pragmatic element in Bowne *s methodology is the insistence
that our fundamental postulates must be allowed to stand even if the
facts seem to contradict them. Our postulates that the universe is rational.
1* Loc*cit*, Theism, 1902, p* 10
'&• :•••• - " t\ j. , 3l • x b. : l 'x
-r. 1 ,v.
.
...
:• j .v
.,:
r$£ . • ..
*•
•
t
‘
. 'ir:.. . >
*
;
•
.
. v . r.
. o
. C : i
''
.
' '
.
:
.
;• : •
.
.*
-
•• ' r
. ...
r
.
..
.
. .'"TO. '“j
'
'
- U . " ' j • - -
» . '
j
'
'•
.
i • «... .
-
r
. C t ' so;>- L • k. f
.
•• o
. :.> £:>. fwj? ’ ;• .; ;
128
and righteous at its root, and that the inclusive ideal is real, must
all stand regardless of the facts* ”We do not ignore the facts which
make against the view; but we set them aside as things to be explained,
1
yet which must not in any way be allowed to weaken our faith* **
Bowne finds further support for moral and religious beliefs in the
view that they are products of the universe of mind* We have noticed
the use of this argument in connection with the interests and feelings
of the mind; here we indicate it further in connection with the validity
of our beliefs qua beliefs* Bowne writes:
As long as we viewed belief as consciously wrought out
by the formal logical processes it seemed permissible,
and even obligatory, to test it by syllogistio forms
and the law of contradiction* But when it is seen that
belief is made for us as well as by us, that it is wrought
out in action rather than in speculation, that the great
outlines of belief are the products of life itself, then
the basic catholic beliefs of humanity and the unfolding
tendencies to believe begin to acquire the significance
of any other great natural product* They show the direct-
ion of the evolving movement, the trend of the universe
of mind* They are no longer accidents or whims of the in-
dividual, but are as much entitled to be viewed as belong-
ing to the nature of things as the law of gravitation
itself* 2
As descriptive, this account is perfectly acceptable, for indeed every-
thing in the universe must be regarded as a product of the universe or
of the power baok of it* But as a logical case for the rational char-
acter of these beliefs which are the natural products of the universe,
it is clearly a petitio principii, as we have before observed* It as-
sumes the theistic position to validate our beliefs in theism* And
even with the theistic assumption, it affords no distinguishing criteria,
for all beliefs alike, true and false, are similarly the products of the
universe*
1* Loc*cit., Theism, 1902, p* 23*
2* Loc.oit*, Thought and Knowledge, p. 377*
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Another indication of the pragmatic character of Bowne' s proced-
ure is the loose way in which he speaks of proof of religious beliefs
in terns of vital energy* Indeed, speaking of the postulates of the
mind in general, Bowne says: "And the proof of such beliefs rests
entirely on the energy of the life thev express, and on their power
1
to further that life in practice •" To be sure, Bowne did not think
of vital energy as logical proof; his point was rather that no logical
proof is possible, and that the case must of necessity rest upon a
practical consideration*
Bowne* s use of the phrase "practical absurdity" in this last per-
iod of his work also has pragmatic tone* Whereas the test of formal
truth is the law of contradiction, "the test of concrete truth is
2
practical absurdity*" For example, in the case of solipsism, "The
absurdity that emerges is practical, rather than speculative* Life
5
is crippled* Thought has no object, action no aim*’ 1 Anything which
robs life of its fruitfulness must be regarded as untrue*
We have seen that much of Bowne* s case for the rationality of
the basic interests of the mind rested on the alleged generality of
those interests and the beliefs which grow out of them* Because of
this, it is somewhat surprising that Bowne should proceed to consider
what criterion must be adopted in those cases where the fundamental
interests of life conflict, that is, where they are actually not gen-
eral* And the criterion which Bowne repeatedly uses is that of survival*
Speaking of those who accept and those reject the belief in the res-
surrection of Christ, Bowne says:
1* Hibbert Journal , 8(1909-1910), p* 892*
2* Loc* cit*. Theism
, 1902, p* 25*
3* Ibid*, p* 25*
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As between these views decision must be made by the sur-
vival of the fittest, and the court has been in session
for nearly two thousand years* The anti-religious vievfs
have lived along in the lower ranges of human thought
and life, and they have been equally the enemies of hum-
anity, its hopes, its inspirations, and its aspirations*
These views have not been great enough to command the
faith or stir the hearts of men# In this fact the survival
of the fittest, as the supreme court for considering the
matter, hands down a final decision* ^
Likewise, in speaking of the attitude of acceptance or that of reject-
ion with reference to the Christian Gospel, Bowne writes; "At last the
personal equation decides, and the survival of the fittest revises the
2
decision*" And again, with reference to the differing moral inter-
ests of men, Bowne uses the same tests
We can only proclaim the faith that is in us, and the
reasons for it, in the hope that reality may not utterly
reject it* — Faith and unfaith alike can do no more;
and the survival of the fittest must decide between them* 3
And once more, referring to differences in personal beliefs;
The real conflict is between different ideas and ideals
and these have to fight it out on the field <?f personal
experience and the larger field of history* 4
Closely associated with survival value as a criterion, is fruit-
fulness, or results# In an examination of the various religions of
the world, Bowne says: "After all, fruit is the final test; and Asia,
past and oresent, is the sufficient condemnation of the Asiatic relig-
ions*" The same use is made of fruitfulness wk«n Bworve is considering,
at one point, the question of personal freedom* In Personalism
,
he
writes, referring to the idea of freedom, that it may seem "a poor
foundation for science and philosophy, but it is the best foundation
there is; and apart from closet intimidations it is good enough, and it
d
works well enough in practice#" It must be quickly added, however.
1# Loc* cit*. Essence of Religion, 1910, p# 298#
2* Meth . Rev » ,"~92Tl910l » p# 187#
3# Loc.cit*, The i an
, pp* 36-37#
4# Loc* cit*, TliouVKt and Knowledge, 1897, p* 181*
5# Bowne, B,P«‘, me' Ch'ristian Revelation
,
(N.Y. : Eaton & Mains, 1898 ),p* 25.
6# Loc* cit#. Personal*, p# 210*
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that Bowne*s chief case for freedom is a strictly logical and spec-
ulative one; the reference is included here only to indicate the
general way in which Bowne allowed pragmatic considerations to find
expression in his work#
In attempting to secure some sort of unity among the various
criteria which he has suggested for knowledge and belief, Bovme uses
again and again the rather obscurantist notion that in the final
an&lysis the mind itself must be the test of truth, and his emphasis
even here is pragmatic* He writes:
The general problem of the criterion of knowledge, in
whatever field, is practical rather than speculative*
Academic discussion is futile and barren* In both rel-
igion and philosophy there has been a deal of abstract
theorizing about the ultimate standard of truth or auth-
ority, as if there we re some simple standard which, by
external application, would reveal the truth* But there
is no such standard* The mind itself, alert and critical,
and with all of its furniture of experienced life, is the
only standard, and this can never be brought into any
single and compendious expression* The mind has no stand-
ard of certainty, but it is certain about various things*
Practical certainty is all we can hope for in concrete
matters; and this is bom, not of closet speculation,
but of actual contact with reality. *
Again:
The problem of knowledge can never be solved by itself in
advance of all concrete investigation, but only in the act-
ual exercise of all the cognitive powers* We learn that we
can walk by walking, end in the same way we learn that we
can know by knowing* Academic discussions of the the stand-
ard of certainty or of the criterion of truth are barren of
any valuable result* There is no general standard which the
mind can mechanically apply* The standard is the mind it-
self, dealing with particular and concrete cases; and any
item of knowledge must stand or fall, not because it agrees
or disagrees with some assumed standard, but because of the
evidence with which it presents itself to the living mind
in contact with the facts* 2
The specification of experience as a criterion of truth is clear
enough from this passage, as well as the implication of consistency in
1* Loc* cit*, Christ * Revelation , 1898, pp* 69-70*
2# Loc* cit*. Thought and Knowledge , 1897, pp* 292-293*
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the emphasis upon the mind* But it may well be asked whether the des-
ignation of the mind itself as criterion is not too vague and indefin-
ite to be indicated in more than a general* if not in an obscurantist.
way*
It is strange indeed that Bowne would include these pragmatic
considerations as steps in the rational validation of religious belief,
when he himself used at times essentially rationalistic arguments for
those beliefs* In presenting the moral argument for the existence of
God, for example, Bowne considers the objection sometimes made against
the argument on the ground of its being a selfish demand for a power
that will reward us for our present virtue* Bowne ? s answer to the ob-
jection is cogent, and shows the power of the rationalistic method
in his hand, Ee points out that we must distinguish
between a demand that we be paid for our virtue, and the
revolt of our nature against a system that treats good and
bad alike, and throws the better half of our nature back
upon itself as absurd and meaningless* Neither God nor the
future life is needed to pay us for our present virtue, but
rather as the conditions without which our nature falls into
discord rath itself, and passes on to pessimism end despair*
We need them, not for our egoistic satisfaction, but to save
the rationality of the system; and we believe in them on that
account* ^
That Bowne did not interpret the moral argument for the existence
of God in the Kantian or rationalistic sense, however, is indicated
by his own statement of its
God is seen to be that without which our ideals collapse
or are made unattainable, and the springs of action are
broken* Hence the existence of God is affirmed not on
speculative or theoretical grounds, but because of the
needs of the practical life* This has often been called
the moral argument for the divine existence; a better
name would be the practical argument* £
1* Loc* cit*. Theism, 1902, p* 309*
2* Ibid*, p* 291*
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That is, though Bowne occasionally used the moral argument, he inter-
preted it chiefly in a pragmatic rather than in a rationalistic sense*
Nowhere do we find him systematically developing the view that the
existence of God is rationally required to give the most coherent view
of the facts of our moral experience* He frequently approaches a
rationalistic formulation, as in his statement of the moral argument
that "it is essentially a conclusion from what we think ought to be
1.
to what is," but he keeps it from being fully rationalistic by some
qualification* In the case of the statement just quoted, for example,
he adds that it is thus a conclusion "from our subjective interests
2
to objective facts; and such a conclusion is forever invalid in logic*"
It is clear, therefore, that fundamentally Bowne was not arguing from
the objectivity of the moral law* This brings us to the end of our
survey of philosophical methods and criteria in the fourth period of
Bowne 1 s work* 1/Ve turn, finally, to the conception of the nature of truth*
(4) The Nature of Truth*
The conception of truth articulated by Bowne in the earlier periods
of his work remains basic in this last period* Truth, though rational
and independent, is essentially purposive* Knowing the truth means better
adjustment of life to the universe* It is helpful and beneficial* And
indeed that which works well must be presumptively true.
Every theory of knowledge implicitly assumes this test*
If we are theists, we can hardly believe that the truth
will work mischief* If we are evolutionists and believers
in natural selection, we must equally believe that these
evolved beliefs are the best adjusted to reality, as being
the outcome of that evolving and selecting process whose
function it is to eliminate the false and preserve the true* ^
1* Loc# cit*. Theism
, 1902, p* 291*
2* Ibid*, p* 291.
3* Hibbert Journal, 8(1909-1910), p* 892*
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Summary of the Epistemology for the Fourth Period (1897-1910):
Bourne- continues to think of the mind as a self-directing center
of activity whose unity is known both empirically and logically# The
categories are the mind*s modes of procedures, and are empirically
discoverable as norms of differentiation in the cognitive activity*
The number of categories is not fixed* By adding to their number
purpose Bowne makes his view of the mind completely teleological* He
continues to describe the mind as an organic unity d>f vital interests
which outline and control mental development and determine our basic
beliefs* Bowne continues to think of these interests and feelings as
essentially rational, out he fails both to establish their identity
with the Kantian practical reason and to establish their rationality
on any other ground* Interests as determining are thus placed over
against reason as free, and no harmony is effected between them,
except in so far as final supremacy is given to the practical inter-
ests* The function of theoretical reason with respect to them is merely
instrumental* The nature and scope of knowledge are defined and des-
cribed as in the earlier periods* With the cognitive field divided be-
tween knowledge and belief, logic and mathematics belong to strict know-
ledge and have as their criteria self-evidence and the inconceivability
of their oppp&ites* Science and metaphysics belong to that portion of the
field of rational belief which rests on the objective facts of sense-
perception; mental and religious belief to that portion of the field
which rests on the subjective grounds of feelings and interests* Infer-
ences from the facts of experience can establish the metaphysical attri-
butes of God but not the religious conception; this can be supported
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only by pragmatic methods* The chief method is that of the ’will to
believe,’ which is given characteristically pragmatic interpretation
with the satisfaction of our subjective interests as the criterion*
Although the doctrine is qualified by the phrase "in default of posi-
tive disproof, the qualification loses any possibility of being mean-
ingful by the further specification that our basic beliefs must stand
even in the face of opposing facts* The criteria employed in the field
of moral and religious belief are: (l) satisfaction of interests and
needs; (2) survival of the fittest among beliefs; (3) the life-energy
of beliefs; (4) favorable results; (5) the "living mind." Truth is
conceived of as purposive and beneficial, though at the same time
as rational and independent.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE PRAGMATIC ELEMENTS IN BOWNE*S EPISTEMOLOGY

137
As a result of our developmental analysis, we are now in a
position to distinguish and define the pragmatic elements in Bowne’s
epistemology as a whole* These may he summarized under the following
heads: (1) The Nature of the Mind 5 (2) The Method of Validating the
General Cognitive Postulates of Science and Philosophy; (3) The
Methods and Criteria of Moral and Religious Belief; (4) The Function
of the Theoretical Reason with Respect to the Interests of the Mind;
and (5) The Nature of Truth*
(1) The Nature of the Mind:
Beginning with the publication of Studies in Theism
,
in 1379,
and continuing to the end of his work, Bowne described the mind as
an organic whole of vital interests and feelings which outline and
control our mental development and determine our fundamental be-
liefs*
The mind is not a disinterested logic-machine, but a
living organism, with manifold interests and tendencies*
These outline its development, and furnish the driving
power* 1
The driving and directive force of the mind lies in its
living interests, and not in the discursive faculty*
The principles of mental movement are to be sought, not
in logic, but in life. — There is no department of
belief into which subjective interests do not enter as
controlling. Z
As Bowne presented this doctrine of interests and feelings as deter-
minative in the life of the mind, it is clear that he intended simply
1* Loc* cit., Phil * of. Theism
, 1887.^ p. 19*
2* Meth* Quart* Rev*, 66(1884), p* 660
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a restatement of the Kantian doctrine of the practical reason;
and many of those who have investigated his work, as we observed
in the Introduction of the present study, have accepted his state-
ment of intention. Nevertheless, it now appears clear that it is not
correct to identify Bowne’s doctrine of interests and feelings vhLth
the Kantian doctrine of the practical reason*
In the first place, the practical reason for Kant was strictly
autonomous* It had its interests, indeed, but its judgments were
made in the light of a priori principles, and not because of any
interests or feelings* Kant specified of the moral law "dass es
nicht darum fttr uns Gttltigkeit hat, weil es interessiert ,” but rather
"dass es interessiert, weil es ftir uns als Menschen gilt, da es aus
unserem Willen als Intelligenz, mithin aus unserem eigentlichen
1
Selbst entsprungen ist*" Bowne’s doctrine, on the other hand,
makes moral and religious beliefs, in so far as determined by the
interests and feelings of the mind, heteronomous expressions of reason,
rather than autonomous* These basic beliefs and postulates are not
the work of autonomous reason, but the result of the controlling
influence of interests and feelings; they are products, not conclus-
ions •
In the second place, for Kant the validity of the principles of
the practical reason rested in their a priori nature; they were seen
by reason to be a priori universal and necessary without respect to
experience* There was no emphasis of Kant’s that was clearer than
that the principles of pure reason cannot be established empirically*
1* Kant, loc* cit*, Vol* III* G*z*M»d*S *, p* 91 (Akademie-Ausgabe,
pp* 460-461^
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Experience cannot make moral obligation binding upon us; only reason
can do that. The primacy of the practical reason meant the validity
of the a priori principles of the practical reason, independent of
the possibility of their being established by the speculative reason,
so long as they do not contradict the speculative reason. Bowne, on
the other hand, made the rational validity of interests and feelings
depend upon their empirically discoverable generality and necessity
in human experience. That this is in direct conflict vrith Kant*s
conception is immediately evident. Further, empirically discoverable
generality establishes nothing. It is the consensus gentium argument
in a slightly altered form; obviously that which is general may be
utterly irrational. But further it is to be added that even Bovme
himself recognized that the interests and feelings of which he made so
much were not strictly general, for he specifically provided a cri-
terion for judging between those persons who do have moral end relig-
ious interests and those who do not.
It is clear, therefore, from these considerations that Bowne did
not succeed in establishing the identity of feelings and interests,
as he defined them, vd.th the Kantian practical reason. But further,
it is to be emphasized that Bovme did not establish their rationality
in any other way. He did indeed frequently support his affirmation
that they are rational by pointing to them as the natural product of
the universe of mind. But that this is a circle argument is manifest.
To assume a theistic hypothesis in order to validate our religious
feelings is a petitio principii indeed. The critical question at issue
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is precisely what is the rational validity of these interests and
feelings in and of -themselves j have we the rational right to accept
their claims in building our world-view ? Obviously we have no
right to assume a world-view in order to validate them* Bowne gives
us, therefore, no basis for distinguishing between those interests
and feelings which are rational and those which are not rational,
and he fully recognizes that there are irrational interests and
1 2
feelings. It is true that at one point Bowne does suggest that
the objective validity of interests and feelings depends upon their
content. But nowhere does Bowne develop this idea; he leaves it as
a casual reference, and repeatedly adduces the other considerations
which we have noticed* And even in the form in which Bowne has left
the idea, the implication is that the content has its validity be-
cause it rests in feeling rather than because it is seen to be rat-
ional by reason itself*
Both because Bowne does not succeed in establishing the identity
of the essential interests and feelings of the mind with the Kantian
practical reason and because he fails to establish their rationality
in any other way, it must be recognized that the doctrine of interests
3
and feelings as formulated by him is pragmatic rather than rationalistic*
(2) The Method of Validating the General Cognitive Postulates of
Science and Philosophy:
According to Bowne' s teaching, the fundamental interests of the
mind give rise to certain basic postulates without which the mind could
1* See Thought and Knowledge
, 1897, loc.cit*, p# 370*
2* See P sy°k°l * Theory , 1886, loc* cit., pp# 206-207.
3* Compare with James* pragmatic formulation: Collected Essays and
Reviews
,
loc* cit., pp* 46, 61*
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not proceed in its cognitive activity* The mind, because of its
cognitive interest, assumes that the world is intelligible and ration-
al, and because of its moral and religious interests., that it is
righteous and spiritual at its root* How as a part of his methodology
in supporting moral and religious beliefs, Bowne affirms that the
postulates of science, like moral and religious beliefs, are simply
1
assumptions based upon our subjective needs* But Bowne is confusing
here the questions of psychological origin and logical validity* The
uniformity and rationality of the external world may indeed rise as
postulates because of the cognitive needs of the mind; but the validity
of the postulates is found not in the fact that they rise out of sub-
jective needs, but rather in the fact that they permit a logical, con-
sistent, coherent view of experience, whatever their psychological
origin* The weakness of Bowne*s method here is in designating the cog-
nitive interests of the mind as subjective. Unless the purely rational
interest of the mind is objective and univsrsal then it is manifestly
absurd to speak of anything as rationally objective* As a consequence,
therefore, of describing the cognitive interest, together with the moral
and religious interests, as subjective, Bowne uses the purely pragmatic
criterion of the satisfaction of subjective needs and interests as suf-
ficient to establish the validity of the cognitive postulates*
(3) The Methods and Criteria of Moral and Religious Belief:
Although Bowne made use of several rationalistic arguments in the
field of moral and religious beliefs, the use is never systematic* The
1* See Studies
,
1879, loc.cit*, pp. 69,70,72; Independent, 36(Jan* 24,
1884), p* 98; Meth * Quart . Rev *, 66(1884), p* 657*
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considerations which he repeatedly depends upon are pragmatic. His
method is primarily that of the Twill to believe •’ "There is an ele-
ment of faith and volition latent in all our theorizing. Where we
cannot prove, we believe. Where we cannot demonstrate, we choose
'1
sides." But in the choosing of sides Bowne allowed our subjective
interests and feelings to be the determining factor without distin-
guishing those interests and feelings which are rational from those
which are not. And it is in this way that he interprets the ’will
2
to believe* element which we found in Kant. Bowne writes of Kant:
"He claimed to have shown that, by way of speculation, neither proof
nor disproof is possible; and in this balance of the speculative
3
reason practical interests may be allowed to turn the scale."
Boime’s own formulation of the method finally took the following
form: "Whatever the mind demands for the satisfaction of its subject-
ive interests and tendencies may be assumed as real, in default of
4
positive disproof." In the phrase "in default of positive disproof"
Bowne would seem to be qualifying what would otherwise be a completely
pragmatic formulation of method. But because Bowne frequently affirms
that positive disproof in the field of ultimate religious beliefs is
impossible, which he holds has been established by Kant, this qualify-
ing phrase becomes rather indifferent, and the method is left in purely
pragmatic terms. But even accepting the qualifying phrase as meaning-
ful, it is still clear that the positive formulation of the method is
pragmatic rather then rationalistic for it makes the criterion of be-
lief the satisfaction of our subjective interests and tendencies. With
1. Phil . Theism
,
loc* cit., 1887, p. iii; see also Theism , loc.cit., 1902,
p. iv.
2. See Kant, K.d.r.V ., loc.cit., Vol. I, p. 680(0rig. 2nd ed., p. 852);
and K.d.p.V., loc.cit. ,Vol. II, pp. 182-185 (Akademie-Ausgabe
,
pp.143-146)
•
3* Phil . Theism
,
loc.cit., p* 242c
4. Meth
. Quart . Rev., 66(1884),p.652; see also Phil .Theism , 1887, pp. 13,
14, 25; and Theism
, 1902, p. 18.
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this procedure Bowne affirms that moral and religious beliefs may be
admitted as just as valid as the postulates of science and philosophy,
because, like them, they satisfy the essential needs and interests of
the mind*
That Bowne made this method characteristically pragmatic is further
shown by the fact that he did not leave it simply with the qualifying
phrase "in default of positive disproof*" He repeatedly added that
the mind must hold to its fundamental beliefs even in the face of con-
flicting facts* "Our conviction does not rise or fall with each new
fact experienced," he writes, "but only with the intensity of the emo-
1
tion which produced it*" And again, "We do not ignore the facts which
make against the view; but we set them aside as things to be explained,
2
yet which must not in any way be allowed to weaken our faith*" Now we
may agree that faith rationally arrived at does not need to be modi-
fied in the light of every new opposing fact of experience; one may
wait to see if other facts of counteracting effect will not soon emerge*
This is particularly true if the faith rests upon the apprehension of
the moral law as rational and absolute, for in this case reason is, for
the time being, balancing empirical facts over against an a priori
principle* But faith that is grounded on empirical interests and needs
could scarcely offset opposing facts except on purely pragmatic grounds*
But the pragmatic tone in Bowne* s formulation lies chiefly in the defi-
ance it bespeaks to the facts of experience* The rationalist must, after
all, recognize that there may be facts in subsequent experience that may
change even his faith in the moral government of the world* To insist
1* Meth* Quart * Rev*, 66(1884), p* 649*
2* Theism , 1902, loc.cit., p* 23; see also Independ «37 (Jan* 8,1885),p*35
and Phil .Theism, 1887, pp* 223-224; end ibid. pp. 21,263*
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that opposing facts "must not in any way be allowed to weaken our
faith" loads the dice, and it does so on essentially pragmatic
grounds. One other element in Bowne * s pragmatic methodology that
should be mentioned, although it appears only incidentally, is the
1
doctrine that beliefs must be tested in action . Only as we act as
though a belief were true can we really test its validity. But
action and practice provide the data for belief; they are not them-
2
selves the sufficient criteria.
As regards the criteria of belief, Bowne* s methodology includes
several that are clearly pragmatic. We have already noticed the
first, namely, the satisfaction of subjective interests and needs.
The second is that of workability or favorable results. As early as
1879 Bowne uses this criterion: "We conclude — that it is no object-
ion to a belief that its grounds do not admit of satisfactory formal
3
statement, provided always that it works well," and: "In addition,
then, to beliefs deduced from formal data, there are other beliefs
4
which are based on results." And in one of the last articles that
Bowne wrote, in 1910, he says of the essential beliefs of the mind:
They are the principles by which men live, and without
which they cannot live their best life. And the proof
of such beliefs rests entirely on the energy of the life
they express, and on their power to further that life in
practice. They meet our mental needs and they work well
in life. This is the pragmatic test of truth, and for
^
concrete truth there is no deeper or surer test than this.
We have also noticed that Bowne combined the utilitarian emphasis upon
consequences with intuitionism in his ethical theory, but the emphasis
as he formulated it is not in itwelf characteristically pragmatic for
1. Independ
. , 48 (Apr. 2, 1896), p# 439.
2# For comparison with James* doctrine of the *will to believe* see
James, Collect . Essays and Reviews
, pp. 65-66; and The Will to Believe ,
loc.cit., p* 11.
3. Studies
,
loc.cit,, pp. 64-65.
4. Ibid., p* 75.
5. Hibbert Journal
, 8 (1909-1910),p. 892; see also Meth .Quart .Rev., 66(1884)
p. 654; Christ. Revelation, 1898 ,p. 25; Personalism, 1908, p. 210.
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the reason that it presupposes the moral -will as the source of moral
nrinciples; it does not make consequences an exclusively empirical
1
criterion* But another form in which the criterion of workability
or results appears that is clearly pragmatic is the phrase ”practical
2
absurdity.” Bowne uses it negatively to indicate unfavorable re-
3
suits.
A third pragmatic criterion used by Bowne is that of survival.
As between conflicting beliefs and interests, Bowne frequently affirms
4
that ”history and the survival of the fittest must decide between them.”
And speaking of anti-religio\is views of the world, he writes
These views have not been great enough to command the
faith or stir the hearts of men* In this fact the sur-
vival of the fittest, as the supreme court for consid-
ering the matter, hands down a final decision. ®
Other pragmatic expressions of criteria are these: that the only
proof for the fundamental beliefs of mankind is the energy which pro-
duces them, and that the only standard of truth is the living mind.
The first is expressed by Bowne thus: ”The proof of such beliefs rests
entirely on the energy of the life they express, and on their power
6
to further that life in practice*” The pragmatic, biological char-
acter of such a criterion is manifest; if taken seriously it could be
used to support any range of divergent and conflicting beliefs* The
other criterion is found in the following:
Academic discussions of the standard of certainty or of
the criterion of truth are barren of any valuable result*
There is no general standard which the mind can mechani-
cally apply* The standard is the mind itself, dealing with
1* Ethics
,
loc*cit., 1892, p* 140*
2o Theism , loc.cit., 1902, p* 25.
3* Compare with James' doctrine: Collect .Essays and Reviews, p* 66.
4. Independ
., 42(0ct. 9, 1890), p. 1401.
5* Essence of Relig ., loc.cit. ,1910, p*298; see also Meth.Quart .Rev * , 66(1884)
p* 665; Phil . Theism, 1887 ,p. 32; Thought and Knowledge, 1897, p* 181;
Theism
, T50Y, pp. 36-37 i Meth .Rev ., 92(l9lD), p* IBY* Compare with
James* doctrine: Collect .Essays and Reviews
, pp. 60-61, 65.
6* Eibbert Journal
, 8(1909-1910), p* 892.
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particular and concrete cases; and any given item of
knowledge must stand or fall, not because it agrees
or disagrees with some assumed standard, but because
of the evidence with which it presents itself to the
living mind in contact with the facts. 1
Experience and the reasonableness of evidence are certainly
Implied as criteria in this statement, and as such are sound, but
to indicate that the standard of truth is the living mind has little
of methodological value* It asserts the mind as the ultimate author-
ity, but it gives no standards of distinction by which the living
mind can judge the true from the false* Clearly the living mind
itself could be claimed as the warrant for almost any world-view*
(4) The Function of the Theoretical Reason with Respect to the
Interests of the Hind:
Bowne did not conceive reason simply in instrumental terms; his
own systematic metaphysics is evidence enough that he allowed reason
certain independent rights of its own. Nevertheless, he held that the
function of the theoretical reason with respect to the basic interests
and feelings of the mind is essentially instrumental. "For these
2
basal interests, the intellect is simply instrumental." The function
of the logical understanding with respect to the postulates which
grow out of these interests is "to bring them and their implications
3
out into clear consciousness, and to keep them from losing their way."
Again, "The understanding has only the negative function of maintain-
4
ing consistency and preventing collision with the laws of thought."
Bowne did not conceive it to be the positive function of the theoreti-
cal reason to establish the religious view of God as the most reason-
1* Thought and Knowledge
,
op* cit*, 1897, pp. 292-293*
2* Psych * Theory
,
op*cit*, p. 218.
3* Phil . Theism, op.cit., 1887, p. 26*
4. Ibid., p* 262; see also Studies , 1879, p* 69; Thought and Knowledge ,
1897, p* 383; Theism, 1902, p* 31*
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able explanation of our total experience in view of the facts of
moral and religious experience# Aid that the negative, or instrument-
al, function was pragmatically conceived is clear as one considers
Bowne * s real meaning# For example, where belief in a moral God and
disbelief in such a God clash, Bowne did not make reason 'the arbi-
ter, but left the issue to the survival of the fittest# And even
where two different ideas of God clash, in which case the theoret-
ical reason is supposed to have the instrumental function of adjust-
ing the differences and clearing away the inconsistencies, the
rational validity of the general belief in God still rests in the
fact that it satisfies our basic interests • But it is obvious that
if the argument from the satisfaction of our basic interests is
allowed for die validation of general religious belief, it may just
as well be claimed for the validation of any particular idea of God#
In other words, if pragmatism becomes the validating principle of
belief at any single point, nothing can keep it from being claimed
as sufficient as a principle of validation at any, or all, other
points. Even the instrumental function of the theoretical reason,
1
therefore, is left to operate in terms of subjective needs.
(5) The Nature of Truth:
Bowne conceived of truth as rational and independent. "The mind
2
does not make, it recognizes, die truth# Yet truth also has its
beneficial and fruitful aspects; the truth of any theory may be ration-
ally presumed if its results are favorable to human life# Referring
to the criterion of results as used by materialists, Bowne says:
1# Compare with Dewey *
3
instrumental view of the mind: Studies in
Logical Theory, p# 75#
2# Studies, op# cit#, 1879, p„ 14#
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1
as being made ; verification for him was veri-fication. This notion
of truth as being made by us does not appear at all in Bowne* It is
) not correct, therefore, to speak of Bowne 1 s conception of truth as
out-and-out pragmatic, but it is clear that his formulation was prag-
matic in tone*
This completes our definition of the pragmatic elements in the
epistemology of Bowne* They are confined, as we have seen, to Bowne*
s
conception of the nature of the mind, to the validation of the gen-
eral cognitive postulates, to methodology in the realm of moral and
religious belief, to the instrumentality of the mind with respect
to the basic interests of the mind, and to a pragmatically toned
conception of the nature of truth* But this leaves the entire sphere
of logic and mathematics, and that of science and systematic meta-
physics, to a strictly rationalistic methodology* The pragmatic ele-
ments, therefore, have relevance almost exclusively to the field of
moral and religious belief*
The ne>ct question to be raised is that of whether these pragmatic
elements are to be regarded as casual and incidental, in point of time,
or whether they are general and characteristic in the writings of
Bowne* As we observed in our review of the work of other investigators
in the field of this dissertation. Professor George C* Cell has taken
the view that the pragmatism of Bowne increased with the later develop-
ment of his thought, so that he was much more of a pragmatist at the
conclusion of his work than at the beginning* That this is not the
case is already clear from our developmental analysis of the thought of
1* James, Pragmatism, op*ci;t*, p* 201
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1
as being made ; verification for him was veri-fioation* This notion
of truth as being made by us does not appear at all in Bowne* It is
not correct, therefore, to speak of Bowne *s conception of truth as
out-and-out pragmatic, but it is clear that his formulation was prag-
matic in tone*
This completes our definition of the pragmatic elements in the
epistemology of Bowne* They are confined, as we have seen, to Bowne*
s
conception of the nature of the mind, to the validation of the gen-
eral cognitive postulates, to methodology in the realm of moral and
religious belief, to the instrumentality of the mind with respect
to the basic interests of the mind, and to a pragmatically toned
conception of the nature of truth* But this leaves the entire sphere
of logic and mathematics, and that of scienoe and systematic meta-
physics, to a strictly rationalistic methodology* The pragmatic ele-
ments, therefore, have relevance almost exclusively to the field of
moral and religious belief*
The next question to be raised is that of whether these pragmatic
elements are to be regarded as casual and incidental, in point of time,
or whether they are general and characteristic in the writings of
Bowne* As we observed in our review of the work of other investigators
in the field of this dissertation. Professor George C* Cell has taken
the view that the pragmatism of Bowne increased with the later develop-
ment of his thought, so that he was much more of a pragmatist at the
conclusion of his work than at the beginning* That this is not the
case is already clear from our developmental analysis of the thought of
1* James, Pragmati sm, op.cijs*, p. 201*
t
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Bowne* In the Studies in Theism
,
published in 1879, nearly every
element -which we have distinguished and defined is clearly expressed*
(1) the emphasis upon the determinative character of the interests
1
and feelings of the mind; (2) the validation of our cognitive postu-
lates in terras of the satisfaction of our subjective cognitive inter-
2 3
ests; (3) the criterion of workability and results; (4) the instrument-
4 5
al function of reason; and (5) the conception of truth as fruitful*
And the ’will to believe’ method was first stated in the article "The
6
Logic of Religious Belief,” published in 1884, and even in its extreme
form, namely, that our beliefs must stand even in the face of conflict-
ing facts* The criterion of survival appears for the first time in the
7 ' 8
same article* The idea of testing beliefs in action did not, it is
true, appear until 1896, but its appearance then was only casual; noth-
ing was made of it in the later work of Bowne* It is clear, therefore,
that the pragmatic development in the thought of Bowne came almost
entirely in "the early part of his work; practically everjr element
appearing either in the Studies in Theism in 1879 or in the article
”The Logic of Religious Belief" in 1884*
But the opposite question may be asked: is it possible that Bowne
developed his pragmatism in the early years of his worVf and then grad-
ually abandoned it in the later years ? The answer, as is clear from
our developmental analysis, is that these pragmatic elements continued
in Bowne ’s epistemology to the end of his work* In the Theism
,
published
in 1902, eight years before his death, and in his article "Gains for
1* Studies
,
op*cit*, 1879,pp* 65,66,69*
2* Ibid*, pp* 69-72*
3* Ibid*, pp* 64-65, 75*
4* Ibid*, p* 69*
5* Ibid*, p* 115*
S* Quart* Rev * , 66(1884), p* 652| see also ibid*, p* 649*
7* Ibid*, p* 665*
B* Independ *, 48 (Apr* 2, 1896), p* 439*
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Religious Thought in the Last Generation,” published in the Hibbert
Journal the -very year of his death, practically all of the pragmatic
elements which we have defined appeared* (1) the emphasis upon the
1
determinative character of interests and feelings; (2) the *will to
2 “ 3
believe* method, even in the face of opposing facts; (3) the criterion
4 ~ 5
of workability; (4) the criterion of survival; (5) the instrumental-
6 7
ity of reason; (6) the conception of truth as fruitful. The emphasis
upon the validation of the cognitive postulates in terms of the satis-
faction of our subjective interests does not, indeed, appear in the
work of these later years. But with this exception, all of the prag-
matic elements which we found in the early years of Bowne * s work
are to be found likewise in the work of the last eight years of his
life. We are justified in stating, therefore, that the pragmatic
emphases in Bowne* s thought were not casual and incidental, but gen-
eral and characteristic throughout the realm of moral and religious
belief, beginning chiefly in the Studies in Theism in 1879 and
continuing to the end of his work in 1910.
The general character and frequency of these pragmatic emphases
in Bowne *s writings will be further borne out by a listing of the
chief books and articles in which they appear. It will be noted that
their distribution throughout the period of his creative work, after
1879, is exceedingly uniform:
1* Theism
,
op.cit., 1902, p. 22.
2# Ibid., pp. iv, 18.
3. Ibid.
,
p* 23*
4. Hibbert Journal
, 8(1909-1910), p. 892.
5* Theism, op.cit., pp. 36-37.
6. Ibid., p# 31.
7. Hibbert goumal
, 8(1909-1910), p, 892.
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1879 - Studies in Theism , especially Chapter II, on "Knowledge
and Belief."
1884 - "Science Must Go," Independ ., 36 (Jan* 24), p* 98*
1884 - "The Logic of Religious Belief," Meth* Quart * Rev * , v*66,
pp* 642-665*
1885 - "Concerning the 1 Christian Consciousness^” Independ «
,
v. 37 (Jan* 8),pp* 35-36.
1887 - Philosophy of Theism , especially the Introduction*
1890 - "Cardinal Newman and Science," Independ*, v* 42(0ct*9),
op* 1401-1402.
1895 - *The Foundations of Belief,*" Zion *s Herald , v* 73, p* 274*
1896 - "Faith in Our Immortality," Independ . , v* 48, (Apr* 2),
p* 439*
1897 - Theory of Thought and Knowledge , especially Chapter V, on
"Knowledge and Belief."
1902 - Theism
,
especially the Introduction*
1904 - Spencer’s Nescience," Independ . , v* 56 (Jan* 14), pp. 67,71*
1909 - "Morals and Life," Meth . Rey., v* 91, op. 708-722.
1910 - "Gains for Religious Thought in the Last Generation,"
Hibbert Journal, v* 8, pp* 884-893*
1910 - "Present Status <6f the Conflict of Faith," Meth. Rev *, v* 105,
op* 358—369*
That the pragmatic emphases of Bovme were deeply and characteristically
rooted in his thinking throughout the entire period of his productive
work, after 1879, must now be clear*
With the isolation and definition of so many characteristically
pragmatic elements in the thought of Bowne, the question arises as to
his general relation to the development of pragmatism as a movement*
It is clear that although Bowne consciously employed much of pragmatic
methodology, he did not think of himself as a part of the new develop-
ment as a movement* And this fact is perfectly intelligible in the light
of Bowne *s conception of methodology in the fields of logic and mathe-
matics on the one hand, and in those of science and systematic metaphys-
ics on the other* In no sense did Bowne carry his pragmatism over into
these fields* Logic and mathematics belong, according to his classifica-
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tion, to the field of strict knowledge. They are rational truths, and
their criteria are immediate self-evidence and inconceivability of
their opposites. Science and metaphysics belong to that portion of
the field of rational belief which rests upon the objective grounds
of sense-perception. The methods of science are observation and exper-
iment, and the criteria are consistency, harmony with the rest of
knowledge, and adequacy to explain the facts. The methods of metaphys-
ics are those of inductive inference from the facts of experience, as
in the case of the general theistic arguments, and of deductive, criti-
cal examination of our basic philosophic concepts, as in the case of
systematic metaphysics proper. Consistency, harmony with the rest of
knowledge, and adequacy to explain the facts are likewise the criteria
here. It is clear, therefore, that Bowne remained a thoroughgoing
rationalist in the fields of logic, mathematics, science and metaphys-
ics. Only in the field of moral and religious belief did he depend upon
pragmatic methodology. TTith this limitation upon his use of pragmatic
method it is clear why Bowne did not think of himself as an integral
part of the pragmatic movement. It explains further why Bowne felt
critical of certain features of pragmatism. In his article "Gains for
Religious Thought in the Last Generation,” after describing certain
characteristic emphases of pragmatism, Bowne says: "This is the doc-
trine of pragmatism, which needs, indeed, some guarding lest it deny
intellect its full rights, but nevertheless it expresses an important
1
truth." This sentence epitomizes well Bowne' s entire attitude toward
the pragmatic movement. Its emphasis upon the controlling character
1. Hibbert Journal, 8(1909-1910), p. 892
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of the interests and feelings of the mind, its use of pragmatic
methods in support of moral and religious belief, its conception
of the intellect as instrumental with respect to the interests
and feelings of the mind, its conception of truth as fruitful -
all of this Bowne accepted; but he rejected outright its denial
of rationalistic method in the field of logic and mathematics and
metaphysics* Here, Bowne affirmed, the intellect has rights of its
own*
Bowne was further critical of pragmatism as a movement in so
far as its leaders presumed to be teaching a doctrine that was new,
for he accepted it simply as a restatement of the Kantian doctrine
of the primacy of the practical reason* In a letter which Bowne
wrote to Professor Khudson, January 18, 1905, he says:
Schiller’s Humanism, Dewey’s Pragmatism, and James*
Will to Believe are all one-sTded Wt‘ Useful • I
Tind nothing m them beyond what you suggest -
reaction against an overdone intellectualism.
Schiller’s fancy that he has anything new is certain-
ly naive* At best, it is only a specification of
Kant’s Primacy of the Practical Reason. However, it
is in vogue ’Just how, ancf we mu slfUnderstend it* You
will find Dewey’s utterances in a book on Logical
Theory published some two years ago* On the o'ther
irarfcTTB radley is just as one-sided* The truth lies
between them* The fact is in this matter, whichever
one has the last word -wins the day* Bradley’s criti-
cism of Schiller is capital and the retorts of Schil-
ler are excellent* 1
It is clear that Bowne did not regard himself as one of the movement.
Rather he stood aloof, taking whatever he regarded as valid, and
leaving the rest, and in the taking, fee ling no indebtedness to the
pragmatists as such for the reason that he regarded their doctrine
1* Quoted from: Borden Parker Bowne, by Francis John McConnell,
(N*Y. : Abingdon Press, 1929)
,
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as simply a specification of the Kantian doctrine of the primacy
of the practical reason*
Yet in spite of this critical attitude toward pragmatism as a
movement a.nd his feeling that it represented nothing original, Bovme
does express definite approval of its general work at several points.
In Personalism
,
for example, he va’ites approvingly:
And just now the pragmatists, distantly echoing Kant’s
doctrine of the primacy of the practical reason, are
pointing out what sorry stuff the traditional philos-
ophy is. 1
And criticizing the excesses and confusions of traditional philosophy
himself, Bovme continues:
It is equally clear from a survey of conditions that
philosophers themselves need to bring forth fruits
m£et for repentance, if their science is to receive
general respect. Some improvement in this direction
may be hoped for from the pragmatists’ criticism.
We need to pay more attention to first principles
and to practical bearing and outcome. 2
It is clear from both these passages that Bovme approved the general
work of pragmatism, although he himself did not regard himself as
one of them. He judged as an oiitsider.
Again, speaking of the traditional tendency to abstraction in the
field of ethical theory, Bovme writes, in 1S09,
One of the good signs of the times is a reaction
against this tendency* We are now testing these
abstractions more carefully, and inquiring into their
practical value and concrete significance. Pragmatism
is becoming the order of the day. Ethical science
also is sharing in this tendency, to its great enrich-
ment. 3
1. Personal., op*«it., 1908, p. 3
2. Ibid., p* 13.
3. Meth. Rev., 91(1909), p. 708.
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Perhaps the most extreme statement of approval with respect to
the emphases of pragmatism, and one that is especially difficult to
reconcile with the rationalistic side of Bowne *s thought, is the
following, in which Bowne is again interpreting pragmatism in terms
of the Kantian doctrine;
We have become so used to recognizing the practical and
volitional basis of most of our beliefs that no one
would be at present disturbed by anything that Kant has
said. Thought has become pragmatic, especially in ethical
and religious fields, and we are very little concerned
at speculative inadequacy, provided a doctrine works
well in practice and enriches and furthers life. 1
The emphasis here "especially in ethical and religious fields" is
significant in showing that Bowne consciously and openly accepted
pragmatic methodology in the field of moral and religious belief.
His own estimate of the use of pragmatic methodology, therefore,
coincides with what we have found to be true in our examination of
his epistemology.
It is now clear to what extent the terms rationalism and prag-
matism are applicable to the thought of Bowne. In his acceptance
of the trustworthiness of reason and of the rationality of the real,
in his conception of the mind as creative in its cognitive activity,
in his definition of logic and mathematics as strictly rational truths
which are valid independently of experience, in his use of the deduct-
ive method in systematic metaphysics in the critical examination of
our basic philosophic concepts, and in the acceptance of the criteria
of consistency, harmony with the rest of knowledge, and adequacy to
explain the facts, Bowne was completely and thoroughly rationalistic.
Even the empirical tendency, which is fairly strong in his work from
1. Kant and Spencer, op.cit.. pp. 208-209
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the beginning, is rationalistically rather than empiricistically
interpreted. On the other hand, in his description of the mind as an
organic unity of vital interests which outline and control basic
beliefs, in his doctrine of the instrumentality of the theoretical
reason with respect to these interests, in his validation of the
cognitive postulates in terms of interest-satisfaction, in his accept-
ance of the *will to believe 1 method in the field of moral and relig-
ious belief, and in his use of the criteria of interest-satisfaction,
workability and favorable results, and survival value, Bowne was
characteristically pragmatistic. His doctrine of truth, though funda-
mentally rationalistic, was pragmatically toned.
It must be recognized, therefore, that Bowne employed both ration-
alistic and pragmatic methodologies. For him the field of thought was
fundamentally divided between that portion which rested upon objective
grounds and that portion which rested on subjective grounds. And this
reflected an essential dualism in Bovme 1 s view of the mind, for it set
interests and feelings over against the theoretical reason, life over
against logic. With feelings and interests defined as determinative in
the field of belief, clearly those beliefs could not be the expression
of autbnomous reason. Bowne attempted to harmonize the two sides of
the mind-life by making the theoretical reason instrumental with respect
to the practical, as we have observed. But if interests and feelings
are determinants of beliefs even in their general form, then theoreti-
cal reason cannot be autonomous with respect to them, although it is
left supreme in the realms of logic and mathematics, science and meta-
physics. We have, therefore, a division of the cognitive field between
1 *•
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the theoretical and the practical, between freedom and determinism,
between rationalistic methodology and pragmatistic* In case of con-
flict between the two, as might well happen between a metaphysical
view and a religious belief, the practical must be given the supremacy,
for opposing facts or theories must not be allowed to destroy faith;
they must he held as simply not yet understood* The conflict,which
may exist so long as reflective reason is allowed to assert itself,
is only resolved by giving supremacy to the basic interests and feel-
ings which have not only not heen established as identical to the
Kantian practical reason but have not been established as rational
in any other way* The conclusion is evident; Bcwne used two distinct
types of methodology which he did not succeed in harmonizing*
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CHAPTER FOUR
SOURCES OF THE PRAGMATIC ELEMENTS IN BOWNE'S EPISTEMOLOGY
B>?
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Bowne made no claim to originality in his pragmatic defense of
moral and religious belief* If we were to accept his own judgment of
indebtedness, however, we should rest in the idea that his methodology
in this field was simply and entirely a restatement of the Kantian
doctrine of the primacy of the practical reason# In his first presenta-
tion of a completely pragmatic defense of religious belief in the
chapter on "Knowledge and Belief” in the Studies in Theism, Borne im-
plies directly the similarity of his doctrine with that of Kant:
"It is not without ground, therefore, that Kant insisted upon the pri-
macy of the practical reason, and the subordinate character of the
1
speculative*" And in his article "Gains for Religious Thought in the
Last Generation," published in 1910, Bowne says, in speaking of the
view which allows the fundamental needs and interests of the mind their
place in determining belief, "The view has not been unknown in philos-
ophic circles since Kant set forth the primacy of the practical reason,
but it has been more extensively and emphatically taught in recent
2
years*" It seems clear, however, that there other influences than
that of direct familiarity with Kant at work in the early development
of the pragmatic side of Bowne *s thought* Our purpose here is to distin-
guish any such other possible influences*
In an attempt to trace the sources of the pragmatic elements in the
epistemology of Bowne, it is important to bear in mind the general thought
1* Studies
,
op.cijs*, 1879, p* 74*
2* Eibbert Journal, 8(1909-1910), p* 892*
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milieu in 'which his first critical work was done* Bowne 1 s undergrad-
uate studies at New York University were done during the period from
1867 to 1871, and his first published articles began to appear the
1 2
following year* Prom September, 1873, to the fall of 1874, he carried
on graduate studies in Germany, chiefly at Halle and GBttingen* Bowne
was beginning his critical work, therefore, in the early seventies*
In the thought-life of the western world at that time there were at
least three major trends having direct relevance to the early develop-
ment of pragmatism* These were: (1) the doctrine of evolution, with its
biological emphases of adaptation and survival; (2) empirical psychology,
with its emphasis upon feelings and interests in the life of the mind;
and (3) utilitarianism in ethical theory with its emphasis upon conse-
quences as the moral criterion* All of these trends had their first,
and except for empirical psychology, their most imp6rtant, development
in Great Britain* These were trends with which Bowne must have come
in contact both during his undergraduate days in Hew York University
and during his studies of English writings in the years that followed*
It is significant to note that their characters distinctly empirical
and practical* Bowne f s work in Germany, on the other hand, carried on
chiefly under Ulrici and Lotze, brought him into close and sympathetic
touch with the traditional metaphysical and speculative emphases of
German thought* This very play of two widely different types of emphasis,
the English and the German, the empirical and practical and the specula-
tive and metaphysical, may well be reflected in the parallel develop-
1* This date is clear from a letter of Bowne to his Mother written
during the ocean passage to Europe, and dated Sept* 5, 1873* See
McConnell, Borden Parke r Bowne, op*cit*, p* 32*
2* I hage found no evidence of the exafct date of the return from Europe,
although it was some tine before the end of the year, 1874, inasmuch
as he assumed his duties on the editorial staff of the Independent
at the beginning of the year 1875*
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ment of the pragmatic and the rationalistic sides of Bowne * s thought.
It is not, of course, true that the German influence was lacking in
a practical and empirical emphasis; but it is true that that emphasis,
wherever it appeared in philosophical circles, tended to be subordinate
to the logical and speculative. Such, then, was the general thought
background of Bowne* s early work: the empirical, practical trends of
British philosophy, and the primarily metaphysical, speculative emphases
of German philosophy.
In our developmental analysis of Bowne* s thought, we found no out-
and-out pragnatism in the first period of his work, that is, from 1872
to 1878. There is no evidence that Bowne *s teacher of philosophy at
New York University, Professor Benjamin N. Martin, had exerted any in-
fluence on his thought that could be regarded as characteristically
pragmatic. He was a man of religious interests, and Bowne dedicated his
first book. The Philosophy of Herbert Spencer
,
to him as "one of those
rare souls who knew how to combine faith and freedom." His influence on
Bowne was chiefly in the field of metaphysics rather than in methodology.
But either under the teaching of Professor Martin, or very soon after
finishing his work at New York University, Bowne made his acquaintance
with utilitarianism, as evidenced by his article "Moral Intuition vs.
Utilitarianism," published in April, 1873. He states as his purpose in
this article the synthesizing of the utilitarian emphasis upon consequences
and the intuitionist emphasis upon an a priori moral faculty. That his under-
standing of the utilitarian emphasis came from John Stuart Mill, whose essay
on "Utilitarianism" was published in 1863,may be assumed from his references
to Mill and to his doctrine. He says, for example, "The best that can be
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said for utilitarianism as a complete system, has been said by Mr*
1
Mill*” And again.
We believe with the utilitarian that consequences are
the only test of abstract action; but when he applies
this canon to motives, he argues in a circle* ^
According to Bowne* s ethical formulation, conscience as the a priori
faculty furnishes the principles of judgment, arid reason applies the
principle with consequences as the criterion# Bowne is thus assimi-
lating to his own moral theory the utilitarian emphasis upon conse-
quences as criterion, although in no way whatever did he make any
epistemological use of the emphasis in the first period of his work*
And even in his moral theory he kept the doctrine from being prag-
matic by holding to a moral faculty of a priori principles. But
though Bowne* s use of the utilitarian doctrine was not directly prag-
matic, we may certainly indicate the writings of John Stuart Mill
as an influence closely akin, at least, to other more definitely prag-
matic influences that were to follow#
The chief critical occupation of Bowne in the first period of
his work was with Spencer, ITlrici, and Lotze* His attitude toward Spencer
was almost entirely a negative one# His early essays in The Hew Englander
,
which -were reproduced in book-form in The Philosophy of Herbe rt Spencer,
were severe in their criticism both of Spencer* s logic and of his con-
clusions# nevertheless, it is clear that Bowne made one of his first
contacts with evolutionary doctrines in Spencer’s work# As a consequence
of that contact, at least two ideas that came later to fit into his prag-
matic methodology became familiar to him, namely, the idea of our beliefs
1* Hew Englander
, 32 (1873) p* 231#
2# Ibid#, p# 234.
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as themselves an evolutionary product and the idea of the survival of
the fittest as an explanatory principle of evolution. The idea of
belief as a cosmic product is clearly suggested in Spencer* s First
Principles, -which Bowne reviewed in The Hew Englander in January,
1872. Spencer writes:
He (man), with all his capacities, and aspirations, and
beliefs, is not an accident, but a product of the time*
— He, like every other man, may properly consider him-
self as on© of the myriad agencies through whom works
the Unknown Cause; and when the Unknown Cause produces
in him a certain belief, he is thereby authorized to pro-
fess and act out that belief. — Hot as adventitious
therefore will the wise man regard the faith which is in
him. 1
The similarity of Bowne *s statement of the same idea is evident. In
the Studies in Theism , he writes:
We do hold that a general belief renders a corresponding
reality highly probable, even when no sufficient formal
defense is possible. Such a belief represents the total
outcome of a race-experience, the Impression which the
universe has made upon us. It is the way in which
reality manifests itself in us. Our feelings are the
subjective side of the universe* Upon this point we are
in full accord with the evolutionist. 2
And again, speaking of "the basal catholic beliefs of humanity," Bowne
writes:
They show the direction of the evolving movement, the
trend of the universe of mind. They are no longer ac-
cidents or whims of the individual, but are as much
entitled to be viewed as belonging to the nature of
things as the law of gravitation itself. 3
Hot only is Bowne* s statement of the idea closely similar to that of
Spencer, but he definitely speaks of his view as "in full accord with
1* Spencer, Herbert, First Principles of & Hew System of Philosophy
,
(H.Y. : Appleton & Co., 1864) p* 123*
2* Studies , op.cit., 1879, pp. 76-78.
3. Thought and Knowledge, op.cit., 1897, p. 377.
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the evolutionist,” and the one evolutionist whom Bowne knew well in the
early period of his work was Herbert Spencer* That we may think of this
as a definite mark of influence would seem, therefore, to be reasonably
clear# The second idea with which uowne must have become familiar in the
reading of Spencer is that of the survival of the fittest# This idea was
not, however, present in Spencer* s first edition of the Principles of
Psychology
,
published in 1855# As a formulated doctrine it appeared first
in Darwin’s Origin of Species in 1859# But in the second edition of Spencer’s
Principle
s
of Psychology
,
which Bowne reviewed in The New Englander in
1873, Spencer does refer to the survival of the fittest as ”a oo-operat-
1
ing cause” in the evolutionary prooess# It is possible, of course, that
Bowne may have read Darwin before reading this second edition of Spencr’s
works but we know that he read Spencer’s work and there is no indication
in his writings that he had already read Darwin’s# At least it is clear
that the idea must have been familiar to him in the reading of Spencer
whether he had read Darwin previously or not# However, the pragmatic sig-
nificance of the idea of survival of the fittest lay in its epistemological
application as a criterion of belief, and Spencer did not so use it in his
Psychology# And because the pragmatic use of survival as a criterion of
belief does not appear in Bowne until 1880 ( "A New Aspect of Natural
Selection,” Independent
, 32, July 22,1880, pp.2-3) and 1884 ( “The Logic
of Religious Belief,” Methodist Quarterly Review, 66, Oct# 1884, p# 665),
another source for it is made probable#
We indicated that Bowne ’s chief critical occupation during the
first period of his work was with Spencer, Ulrici and Lotze# His contaot
with Ulrici and Lotze was in a teacher-student relationship# He studied
1# Spencer, Herbert, The Principles of Psychology
,
(N*Y. s Appleton & Co#,
1888) Vol. I, footnote, p# 423; see also Tfol# I, pp* 615-616#
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1
under Ulrici at Halle during the winter-semester of 1873-1874. IJlrici’s
influence on Bowne *s general theory of thought and knowledge was defini-
2
tive, as Bowne himself recognized. His insistence that the mind must
be studied as we find it in our experience and not simply a priori and
his description of mind-activity as a differentiating activity became
permanent elements in Bowne ’s system of thought. Neverthless, there
seems to have been no pragpiatic emphasis in Ulrici’ s teaching, so that
Ulrici is not to be indicated as & source for this side of Bowne ’s
thought.
Bowne studied voider Lotze at GBttingen during the summer-semester
of 1874. Although Lotze’s influence on Bowne was almost exclusively
a speculative one, for Bowne’ s whole procedure in metaphysics followed
closely that of Lotze, there were certain emphases in his thought which
indicate a genuine practical interest. He stressed in his teaching that
philosophy must keep close to the facts of life and experience, and
3
he held that ’’reality is infinitely richer than thought." The close-
ness to this statement of that of Bowne* s - "Life is richer end deeper
4
than speculation" - is evident. Further, in Lotze’s interest in the
moral and religious life the Kantian doctrine of the. primacy of the
practical reason found new expression. Lotze’s interpretation of the
doctrine was, however, strictly rationalistic. He closes the second
edition of his Metaphysics with the well-known passage:
Tfifhen, now several decades since, I ventured on a still
more imperfect attempt, I closed it with the dictum
that the true beginning of Metaphysics lies in Ethics.
I admit that the expression is not exact, but I still
feel certain of being on the right track, when I seek
in that which should be the ground of that which is. 5
1. This date is confirmed by the notation at the end of Bowne *s article
"Faith and Morals," Independ., 26(May 14,1874) ,p.3, which reads:
Halle,Prussia, Feb. Ib, 1874.
2. See Bovme’s article: "Ulrici’s Logic," New England., 33 (1874), pp.
458-492| and Metaphysics
,
op.cit., 1882, p. ’36Y.
’
3. Lotze, Hermann, Metaphysic, trans. by T.H.Green, B.Bosanquet, C.A.
Wittuck, A. C .Bradlyy, (Oxford Press, 1887), Vol. I, p. 178.
4. Phil . Theism, op.cit., 1887, p. 14 j see also Theism , 1902, p. 18.
5. bot'ze
,~
lfet'aphysic
,
op.cit., Vol. II, p. 319.
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We have seen that this ethical emphasis was taken up by Bourne and
occasionally given rationalistic expression* In general, however,
his use of the moral argument was pragmatic, rather than rational-
istic* Although there are clearly marked influences of Lotze on the
thought of Bourne, therefore, they can scarcely be regarded as prag-
matic*
During the first period of Bowne *s work as we have designated
it, that is, from 1872 through 1878, Bowne wrote at least twenty-
three signed articles, in addition to several unsigned editorials
in the Independent during 1875, and published his first volume:
The Philosophy of Herbert Spencer * It is conspicuously true that
no characteristically pragnatic elements appear in Bowne *s method-
ology in these first years* We have noticed, indeed, that Bowne
borrowed the doctrine of consequences from utilitarianism in the
formulation of his own ethical theory, but this was kept from being
pragmatic by its synthesis with the doctrine of an a priori moral faculty,
and further, it was at no point carried over into methodology in the
field of knowledge and belief* With characteristically pragmatic ele-
ments in methodology lacking entirely in the first six years of Bowne *s
work, it is striking indeed that with the appearance of the Studies in
Theism
,
in 1879, he should suddenly adopt an out-and-out pragmatic
methodology in the field of religious belief* If the Studies in Theism
represented Bowne* s first treatment of religious belief it might be sup-
posed that the pragmatic methodology was simply incidental to that first
treatment, and that had he treated religious belief earlier the pragmat-
ic methodology would have appeared earlier* That this was not the case.
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hovrever, is shown by the fact that as early as 1872 Bowne began writ-
ing on religious questions* In that year his article "Aspects of Theism"
appeared in The New Englander * Likewise, it is perfectly evident that
the chief motivating force in Bowne* s criticism of Spencer was his inter-
est in a spiritual view of the universe and his feeling that the philos-
ophy of Spencer was destructive of religious belief. The Studies in
Theism
,
therefore, does not represent either Bowne *s first interest in,
or his first treatment of, religious belief. The sudden appearance of
pragmatic methodology in the Studies in Theism must, therefore, be
accounted for on some other basis.
The Preface to the Studie s in Theism is dated May 5, 1879. Nearly
a year and a half earlier, namely, in January, 1878, an article by
William James under the title "Remarks on Spencer* s Definition of Mind
as Correspondence" appeared in The {Journal of Speculative Philosophy .
We gave attention to this article in our survey of pragmatism in Chapter
One, where we noticed that practically all of James* later doctrine of
pragmatism is here expressed, either explicitly or in the*germ. That
Bowne was familiar with this article is clear from his own specific
reference to it, which occurs as a footnote on page 66 of the Studies
in Theism . Bowne is discussing the determinative character of interests
and feelings in the life of the mind. The footnote reference follows
the sentence, "It is demonstrable that our sentiments outline and con-
trol all mental development," and reads: "This point has been very
happily put by Dr. James in the Journal of Speculative Philosophy
,
for
January and July, 1878."
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Not only do we thus know that Bowne had read the January article
of James; we are further confronted with a striking parallelism of the
pragmatic emphases inBowne* * s chapter on ’’Knowledge and Belief” in the
Studies in Theism and in the article by James* It will be instructive
to make something of a detailed comparison of Bowne* s use of method
and his description of the nature of the mind with these same elements
in James* treatment* In the first place, Bowne is emphasizing for the
first time, in this chapter, the nature of the mind as a vital unity
of interests and the determinative character of these interests in
mental development* Bowne writes;
When the human mind comes to self-consciousness, it be-
comes aware of many interests* There are practical, spec-
ulative, esthetic, and moral interests* These are the
motive-powers of the mind, and outline its development* 1
The whole mental life — springs out of feeling* It is
extremely doubtful if a purely perceptive being, without
any subjective interests, could attain to rationality,
even if its physical existence were secured* Indeed, it
is demonstrable that our sentiments outline and control
all mental development* Before mental growth can begin,
there must be an awakened interest*
We conclude -— that all general theories of life and the
world are based on subjective interests* 3
Now if we may compare with these statements of Bowne sections from
the article written by James sixteen months before:
*Mind,* as we actually find it, contains all sorts of
laws - those of logic, of fancy, of wit, of taste, de-
corum, beauty, morals, and so forth, as well as percep-
tion of fact. Common sense estimates mental excellence
by a combination of all of these standards, and yet how
few of them correspond to anything that actually is -
they are laws of the Ideal, dictated by subjective
interests pure and simple* ^
We are all fated to be a priori teleologists whether we
will or not* Interests which' we bring with us, and simply
1* Studies
,
op.cit*, 1879, p* 69*
2* Ibid*, pp* 65-66*
3* Ibid*, p* 75*
4* Collected Essays and Reviews, op*cit«, p* 46.
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posit or take our stand upon, are the very flour out
of -which our mental dough is kneaded. 1
Interests are the real a priori element in cognition.
The interests precede the' outer relations noticed,
— (before these outer relations can be altered,
something must first) awaken an interest . 2
In the second place, Bowne makes use for the first time, in
this chapter, of the criterion of workability. The following sen-
tences are taken from the chapter:
We conclude — that it is no objection to a belief
that its grounds do not admit of satisfactory formal
statement, providea^iiat it works well. 3
We conclude — that all general theories of life
and the world are based on subjective interests, and
that the only questions which can be raised are,
which of these interests should rule, and which works
best as a ruler* 4
Those views, therefore, of man and his relations
which must develop and dignify human nature, and which
work best in practice, are at least presumptively true.
— In addition, then, to beliefs deduced from formal
data, there are other beliefs which are based on re-
sults# Such beliefs have not the support of formal
proof, but they have what is better, the attestation
of reality* 5
Parallel to these statements of Bowne are the following taken from
the article by James:
-—our several individual hypotheses, convictions, and
beliefs* Far from being vouohed for by the past, these
are verified only by the future.-— They have to keep
house together, and the weakest goes to the wall • The
survivors constitute the right way of thinking# ^
How shall I say that knowing fact with Messrs# Huxley
and Clifford is a better use to put my mind to than
feeling good with Messrs* Moody and Sankey, unless by
slowly and painfully finding out that in the long run
it works best? 7
1* Collected Essays and Reviews, op*cit., p* 61*
2* Tbid#, p* 50, footnote.
3* Studie
s
,
op.cit*, pp* 64-65*
4* Tbid., p. 75#
5* Ibid., p* 75#
6* Collected E-ssays and Reviews, op*cit., p* 65#
7# Ibid., p. 66#
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The criterion of survival suggested in these last citations from
James was not explicitly used by Bowne in Studies in Theism
,
although
it made its appearance in the article nThe Logic of Religious Belief"
published five years later*
Another close similarity between Bowne *s treatment and that of
James is to be found in the notion of coerciveness as a criterion of
reality* It is an idea that Bowne does not make use of in subsequent
writings, at least in this form, but it is worth noting here because
of its striking closeness to the idea as presented in James* article*
Bowne writes;
The final test of reality in perception is, that it com-
pels and coerces our sensations* — - If, then, there is
any other element in the totality of our experience which
equally coerces our belief, and which, when denied, invar-
iably comes back, then there is the best ground for saying
that in such experience, as well as in sense-perception,
we come in contact with something not ourselves. -
James* putting of the same idea sixteen months before is as follows:
The only objective criterion of reality is coerciveness,
in the long run, over thought. Objective facts — are
real only because they coerce sensation* Any interest
which should be coercive on the same massive scale would
be eodem jure real* 2
Because, therefore, Bowne had not made use of pragmatic methods
before the writing of the Studies in Theism, and because the treat-
ment which he gives to them and to the pragmatic conception of the
nature of mind as a unity of interests follows so closely the treat-
ment given by James to the same topics sixteen months before, it
would seem highly probable that Bowne is direotly indebted to James
for these emphases* The matter is complicated, however, by Bowne*
s
1* Studies ,op.cit
., p* 79*
2* Collected Essays and Reviews
,
op.cit*, p* 67.
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failure to acknowledge indebtedness to James in the Preface to the
Studies in Theism, where he does acknowledge indebtedness to Ulrici
and Lot ze, and by the fact that Bowne is reported by at least one
2
of his students, namely. Bishop Francis John McConnell, as stating
that he was conscious of no indebtedness to James* It is possible,
of course, that Bowne and James had happened to read independently
a common source for these pragmatic elements and that each worked
them into his own writing independently of the other* But there
seems to be no indication of any work that could have been a com-
mon source to both writers of all of these common elements* As
we indicated at the opening of the present chapter, empirical psy-
chology had already begun,by the early seventies, to stress the
importance of feelings and interests in the life of the mind* Indeed,
even as early as 1822, Thomas Brown* s Lectures on the Philosophy of
the Human Mind devoted a chapter to the controlling influence of
3
feeling in the mental life, particularly in the association of ideas*
And Bowne shows that he was familiar with the work of Brown by refer-
ring, in an article published in The New Englander in 1872, to Brown*
s
4 . ^
causal argument for theism* There is nothing in Bowne *s writings to
indicate, however, that he was familiar with Brown* s thirty-fifth
lecture, in which the emphasis upon feelings is made; or* if he had
been, it is strange that he should wait for seven years before making
use of the idea* But even if Bowne had been familiar with Brown* s thirty-
fif€h lecture, it could not be the common source for James and Bowne for
1* Studies
,
op*cit*, p* vi*
2* This item was given to me by Professor Edgar S. Brightman.
3# Brown, Thomas, Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind
,
(Andover: Mark Newman, 1822, 3 volumes) Chp. 35, Vol.II*
4* New Englander, 31(1872) p* 467*
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•which we are looking, for (l) its doctrine of feelings is not developed
in the form in which we find it in both James and Bowne, (2) it makes no
suggestion of the criterion of workability which we find in both James
and Bowne, and (3) it makes no use of the criterion of coerciveness of
experience which -we likewise find in both James and Bowne,
In 1365, Shadworth Hodgson published his Time and Space , in which
he devotes a chapter ( Chapter 5) to the subject of the determinative
character of feelings and interests in the processes of association and
redintegration, James refers to this chapter of Hodgson in his article
'1
in the Journal of Speculative Philosophy , but there is nothing to indi-
cate that Bowne was familiar with it. But even had he been familiar
with it, it would not provide a common source of the Elements which we
have found in common in James and Bowne for the same reasons which we
have specified in the case of the work of Thomas Brown, Likewise
Wilhelm Windelband, in his essay "tJber Denken und Hachdenken,” published
in 1878 in the Vierteljahresschrift fflr wissenschaftliche Philosophie
und Soziologie, stresses the determinative character of feelings and
2
interests in the life of the mind. It is possible, of course, that
Bowne had read this article in the Vie rteljahresschrift
,
although he
gives no indication of it. But in any case the article could not have
been a common source for James and Bowne, for it ’.ms published after
3
the appearance of James* article; furthermore it makes no use of the
criteria of workability and coerciveness and hence could not explain
the presence of these elements in Bowne* s Studies in Theism , Again,
had Bowne read the article it is likely that he would have referred to
1, Colleoted Essays and Reviews
,
op.cit,, p, 57.
2, This essay by Windelband was called to my attention by Mr, Arthur
A. Schoolcraft,
3, Vierteljahresschrift ftir wissenschaftliche Philosophie u*d Soziologie ,
2 (1878), pp, 265-297; reprinted in Pr&ludien , (Tflbingen: J,C,B,Mohr,
1921), pp, 24-58,
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it in the same way in which he referred to the article by James. Finally,
it must be indicated that James gave the credit for his pragmatism to
early personal oontaots with Charles Sanders Peiroe# In his essay "Phil-
osophical Conceptions and Practical Results" (1898) he gave specific
credit to Peirce# Speaking of the pragnatic approach to the problem of
truth, James states: "Years ago this direction was given to me by an
American philosopher — Mr# Charles S# Peirce, the principle of
practicalism - or pragmatism, as he called it, when I first heard him
1
enunciate it at Cambridge in the early *70*8." Now there is no indica-
tion whatever that Bowne had any contacts with, or that he was acquainted
with the works of, Peirce#
With these facts before us, it seems very likely that Bowne was
actually influenced direot}y by the article of James in The Journal of
Speculative Philosophy
, in spite of any reported statement that he was
not conscious of any such indebtedness# Such an attitude on Bowne*
s
part is probably to be explained on the ground that he regarded the
elements found in James* article simply as a restatement of Kant's doc-
trine of the primacy of the practical reason, so that he thought of his
indebtedness in relation to Kant rather than in relation to James# But
that such would not be a correct interpretation of Kant we have already
seen as a result of our previous investigations. It seems olear, there-
fore, that James was almost certainly responsible for opening up the
pragmatic interest in the work of Bowne# Bowne was no doubt ready for
the emphasis# His understanding of Kant, the utilitarian emphasis upon
consequences as an ethical criterion, the growing interest in the doc-
1# James, Collected Essays and Reviews, op#oit#, p# 410#
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trine of evolution, and the development of empirical psychology -
all of these may well have had their part in preparing Bowne for
laying hold on pragmatic methods in his own philosophy, but the read-
ing of the articles by James would seem to have been the final, direct
and decisive influence* With this point we have also made clear that
Bowne* s pragmatism did not have priority in tire over that of James
as Professors Coe and Flewelling and Bishop McConnell have all stated
1
in their writings on Bowne*
A final word remains to be said concerning the relation of Bowne
to Kant. We have seen that he thought of his methodology in religious
belief as simply a restatement of the Kantian doctrine of the primacy
of the practical reason, but we have also seen that such would involve
an erroneous interpretation of Kant* Nevertheless it seems clear that
Bowne* s statement of method as he first made it in the article "The
Logic of Religious Belief," in 1884 was directly influenced by Kant*
Bowne *s statement* as we have seen, is this: "Whatever the mind de-
mands for the satisfaction of its subjective interests and tendencies
2
may be assumed as real in default of positive disproof." In the
doctrine of the primacy of the practical reason, Kant was defending
the independent validity of the moral law as an a priori principle of
pure practical reason. As such an a priori principle, any propositions
inseparably connected with it, as Kant believed the postulates of free-
dom, God, and immortality to be, though not capable of being established
by theoretical reason, may be regarded as sufficiently authenticated,
provided they do not contradict theoretical reason ("indessen dass sie
1* See references to the work of these investigators in the Introduction
of the present study*
2* Meth* Quart Rev ., 66(1884), p* 652*
.•
i
'
•
• rl: j- . ' v- r
.
• ; 1
'i
-
^
'
"
'
.
-
1 l M '
.
r
*
>c
-•
- [« : . .
‘
v>.
."
:
l
: 'v -
•
’.
'
.
r
.' r • v - ' i ' ’ or. • ->
: : ..: t c ' ' >
• • '
u
.
*
• lr: i r, X- t V ].'• . f '.cl r
,
7 / '• •*.’ • *. 1 : 1
.
•
'
: •
.
'
"J
r "
_
•
,
< ,
. , . . «
176
1
ihr auch. eben nicht widersprechen" )• Accepting the demands of
the practical reason, or,as Bowne taught, the demands of our subjective
interests, seemed pefectly permissible "in default of positive disproof,"
that is, "provided they do not contradict theoretical reason." The
similarity of the two formulations is evident. It is possible, further,
that Bowne was impressed by Kant’s use of the term ’interests,’ al-
though he ignored completely the rationalistic qualifications which
Kant made and taught the doctrine as James had begun to teach it.
At no point, however, did Bowne distinguish in detail pragmatic sug-
gestions to be found in Kant; his references were always to the doctrine
of the primacy of the practical reason. It is not likely, therefore,
that Bowne was directly influenced by any of the various elements which
we distinguished in Kant as being susceptible of pragmatic interpre-
2
tation beyond the statement of method which we have already indicated.
But it would seem clear that we may accept Bowne* s statement of indebt-
edness to Kant for at least the suggestiveness of the doctrine of the
practical reason, although we must recognize that what was strictly
rationalistic with Kant became characteristically pragmatic with Bowne.
This, then, completes our study of the sources of the pragmatic elements
in Bowne* s epistemology.
1. Kant, op.cit., Vol.II, K.d.p.V
., p. 155 (ikademie-Ausgabe, p. 121).
2. See Chapter One for study of Kant.
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CONCLUSIONS
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The results of our investigation may be summarized as follows:
I# Bcwne was a rationalist in his acceptance of the trustworthiness
of reason and of the rationality of the real, in his conception of the
mind as creative in its cognitive activity, in his definition of logic
and mathematics as strictly rational truths which are valid independ-
ently of experience, in his use of the deductive method in the critical
examination of concepts in metaphysics, and in the acceptance of the
criteria of consistency, harmony with the rest of knowledge, and ade-
quacy to explain the facts#
II# Bonne was a pragmatist in his use of the following characteristically
pragmatic elements: (l) the description of the mind as an organic whole
of vital interests and feelings which outline and control mental devel-
opment and determine our fundamental beliefs; (2) the validation of the
general cognitive postulates in terms of the satisfaction of our subject-
ive interests; (s) the use of the *will to believe* method in the field
of moral and religious belief with the criterion of interest-satisfaction
extended to apply, in the oase of fundamental beliefs, even where facts
stand opposed; (4) the use of the criteria of interest-satisfaction,
workability, survival, and vital energy, together with the general cri-
terion of the "living mind"; (5) the conception of the function of the
theoretical reason with respect to the interests of the mind as merely
instrumental; (6) the conception of truth as beneficial and fruitful,
although indeed also rational and independent#
I
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III* The occurrence of these pragmatic elements is not incidental or
casual, but general and characteristic, in Bowne* s treatment of moral
and religious belief, beginning in 1879 in Studies in Theism and in
1884 in the article "The Logic of Religious Belief," and continuing
uniformly through -the whole of Bowne *s work* It is not true that
Bowne* s pragmatism was chiefly a development of the later years of
his work, nor is it true that it was an early development that tended
later to be outworn; rather it is a constant and characteristic part
of his epistemology from 1879 to the end of his work in 1910*
IV* Although Bowne intended to identify his doctrine of the determina-
tive character of the interests and feelings of the mind with the Kant-
ian doctrine of the primacy of the practical reason, he failed to estab-
lish that identity, for s (1) Kant viewed the practical reason as auton-
omous, not as determined by interests and feelings; and (2) Kant made
the validity of the principles of practical reason lie in their a priori
character as universal and necessary, not in their empirically discover-
able generality in human experience,
V, Not only did Bowne fail to establish the identity of the interests
and feelings, as he defined them, with the Kantian practical reason, but
he failed to establish their rationality on any other ground. He frequent-
ly adduced in support of their rationality that they are to be regarded
as the natural product of the universe of mind, but this is a petitio
principii and establishes nothing,
VI* Bowne t 8 use of two distinct types of methodology was a consequence
of his distinguishing between the grounds of belief in soience and phil-
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osophy as objective and those of moral and religious belief as subject-
ive, and of his setting the interests and feelings of the mind as sub-
jective and determining over against the intellect as oojeotive and free*
He resolved the conflict between the two only by giving supremacy to the
practical interests, the fundamental beliefs of which must be allowed to
stand even in the face of opposing facts*
VII* Bowne did not identify himself with pragmatism as a movement, for,
althougjh agreeing with the characteristic emphases of pragmatism in the
field of moral and religious belief, he rejected the pragmatio denial
of the rationalistic method in xhe fields of logic, mathematics, and
metaphysics* He was further critical of the movement in so far as it
pre sinned to be anything new in the world of philosophy, for he regarded
the doctrine as simply a restatement of the Kantian doctrine of the prim-
acy of the practical reason* Nevertheless, he wrote approvingly of the
general work of the movement, but he always judged as an outsider, never
as one within the ranks*
VIII* Bowne showed interest in religious writing from the first, but he
made no use of pragjaatic methodology until 1879 in the Studies in Theism*
Although Bowne was prepared for the pragmatic emphasis by his understand-
ing of Kant, by his acceptance of the utilitarian criterion of consequenoes
(which he received from J* S* Mill) as synthesized with the intuitionist
vievr of an a priori moral faculty in his ethical theory, by his contact
with the doctrine of evolution in the writings of Herbert Spencer, which
seems clearly to have been the source of his idea of belief as a natural
product, and by his possible familiarity with the attention of empirical
»
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psychology to the controlling character of interests and feelings in
the life of the mind, it seems probable that the immediate, direct,
and decisive influence toward a pragmatic methodology was the reading
of James* article in The Journal of Speculative Philosophy for January,
1878, to -which Bovme specifically refers and with which his own treat-
ment of interests and beliefs in Studies in Theism is strikingly paral-
lel# Among his teachers. Professor Martin seems to have had no influence
upon his thought that could be regarded as characteristically pragmatic#
Ulrici, although influencing Bowne*s general epistemology definitively,
seems also to have exerted no pragmatic influence# Lotze, influencing
Bowne chiefly in the field of metaphysics, did have certain practical
emphases in his teaching, and was undoubtedly the source of Bowne*
s
"Life is deeper than speculation"; nevertheless, Lotze *s general influ-
ence was deoidely rationalistic rather than pragmatic# The suggestion
for his statement of the *will to believe* method Bowne quite evidently
got from Kant *s treatment of the primacy of the practical reason, but
Bowne *s interpretation of the Kantian doctrine was pragmatic rather
than rationalistic as Kant certainly intended it#
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The problem to which the present study has been devoted is one
that emerged in the confliot of various interpretations that have been
given to the epistemology of Bowne* That Bowne employed both rational-
istic and pragmatic methodologies was clear# The problem concerned their
relation in his thought* As explicitly formulated at the outset of the
study the problem was stated thus* precisely what are the pragmatic ele-
ments in the epistemology of Bowne; how are they related to the theoret-
ical function of reasons from what sources are they drawn; what was
Bowne *s relation to the pragmatic movement in general; and finally, to
what extent is the term pragmatism applicable to his epistemology ?
As a preliminary to the direct study of Bowne* s works, we reviewed
the writings of other investigators in the field of the dissertation*
We found that all writers on Bowne have recognized to some extent at
least the presence of both the pragmatic and rationalistic tendencies in
his philosophy* Among those who have sought to harmonize these two sides
of his thought under the Kantian conception of the primacy of the practi-
cal reason have been Professor Knudson, Professor Brightraan ( in his
published writings). Professor Hocking and Bishop McConnell* Among those
who have stressed the pragmatism of Bowne without attempting to relate
it to the rationalism have been Professor Cell, Professor Coe, and Pro-
fessor Flewelling* In no case had the pragmatic elements in Bowne*s
epistemology been previously systematically isolated and defined*
I
In Chapter One we examined the meaning of the tern rationalism and
its general relevance to -che thought of Bowne; and, to show the meaning
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of the term pragmatism and its applicability to Bowne* s -work, we sketched
the early development of pragmatism as a movement, exhibiting develop-
mentally its characteristic emphases# We found the antecedents of the
movement in Kant, and then traced its more formal development through
the work of Peirce and James to that of Dewey#
In Chapter Two, using the historical and critical methods, we turned
to a direct study of Bowne *s ovm work# For purposes of convenience the
thirty-nine yearw of his critical writing were divided, somewhat arbi-
trarily, into four periods, as follows: the first period, from 1872 to
1878, representing the beginnings of his work; the second period, from
1879 to 1883, marled by the publication of Studio
s
in Theism; the third
period, from 1884 to 1896, marked by the two articles "Science Must Go"
and "The Logic of Religious Belief"; and the fourth period, from 1897 to
1910, dated from the publication of The Theory of Thought and Knowledge .
In eaoh of these periods, the writings of Bovme were investigated with
reference to the following topics: (1) The Nature of the Mind, (2) The
Nature and Scope of Knowledge, (3) Philosophical Method and Criteria,
end (4) The Nature of Truth#
In the first period our analysis revealed no characteristically
pragnatic elements# Bowne conceived the mind activist!cally and regarded
the cognitive relation as dualistic# The reality of the knowing subject
is known both direotly in self-experience and logically as a presupposi-
tion of experience# From the beginning we found that Bowne accepted the
possibility of metaphysical knowledge, but he insisted that all theories
be tested not alone by consistency and harmony but also by adequacy to
explain the facts. In moral theory we discovered that Bowne had borrowed
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from utilitarianism the concept of consequences as a criterion of moral
judgment, but he kept it from being pragmatic by synthesizing it -with
an a priori intuitionism. Concerning the nature of truth, he regarded
it as rational and independent, but at the same time as essentially
purposive and useful# The elements -which were thus found in Bowne*
s
thought in the first period were discovered subsequently to be constant
throughout the rest of his work* Each successive period brought further
development but no rejection of the fundamental positions of the preced-
ing periods*
In the second period, we found Bowne for the first time describing
the mind in pragmatic terms as an organic thole of vital interests* and
designating the function of the theoretical reason with respect to these
interests as regulative* For the first time, further, in this period,
Bowne divided the cognitive field between strict knowledge and rational
belief, with logic and mathematics belonging to strict laiowledge,and
science, metaphysics, and moral and religious belief belonging to ration-
al belief* Be distinguished between the grounds of belief as objective,
that is, the facts of perceptual experience, upon which science and meta-
physics rest, and as subjective, that is, feelings, interests and needs
of the mind, upon which moral and religious beliefs rest* It was this dis-
tinction between the grounds of belief and the setting of the interests
and needs of the mind over against the theoretical function of reason
that led to the use of pragmatic methods and criteria in the field of
moral and religious belief* In the third and fourth periods, we found
Bowne developing further the methods and criteria used in the first two
periods, but without adding any essentially new element*
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As a consequence of the historical and critical analysis of Bowne*
s
writings in Chapter Two* it was possible in Chapter Three systematically
to isolate and define the pragmatic elements in his epistemology* We
showed that although Bcmne intended an identification of his doctrine of
interests with the Kantian doctrine of the primacy of the practical reason,
he did not establish that identification* nor did he establish their
rationality on any other ground* We showed that the pragmatic elements
appearing in Bowne ’s work were not casual and incidental, but that they
were characteristic and constant throughout the whole of his treatment
of moral and religious belief after their f5r st appearance in 1879* We
indicated that Bowne’ s relation to pragmatism as a movement was one of
sympathy in so far as pragmatic methods were applicable to the field of
moral and religious belief, but that he rejected the pragmatic denial
of rationalistic method in the fields of logic* mathematics and meta-
physics*
In Chapter Four we examined the sources of the pragmatic elements
in Bonne’s epistemology in so far as these sources are now evident* We
described the general thoughtsackground of the period in which Bowne
began his work, in so far as that background was related to his pragmat-
ism* We found no evidence of pragaatic influence upon Bowne in the case
of Martin and TJlrioi, and we measured the extent of the influence in
the cases of Mill, Spencer and Lctze, respectively* The relation of Bowne
to James we examined in detail and found the evidence for a direct rela-
tion of indebtedness clear* We closed the chapter with an estimate of
the extent to which Bowne was indebted to Kant for pragnatic suggestions*
Following Chapter Four we have listed in summary form the eight principal
conclusions which have emerged from the present investigation*
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AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL STATEMENT
Edward Thomas Ramsdell was born in Bay City, Michigan,
May 27, 1902* His parents are Phebe Voorheis and Dwight Horace
Ramsdell* His secondary school preparation ms done in Adrian
and Ann Arbor, Michigan; his high school work in Ann Arbor and
Detroit. He was graduated from the Detroit Central High School
in 1919* Four years of undergraduate college work were completed,
with the B.A. degree from the University of Michigan, in 1923*
From 1923 to 1926 he was instructor, and then assistant profes-
sor, of English and Public Speaking at the University of Colo-
rado* The work for the M*A. degree, done largely in the summers
of 1923 and 1924 was completed and the degree granted from the
University of Michigan in 1926* Then followed a three years’
course in theology at Boston University School of Theology,
from which the degree of S.T.B* -was received in 1929* The summer
semester of 1927 had been spent at Marburg University in Germany,
and secondary enrollment in the Divinity School at Harvard dur-
ing the years 1927-1929 had allowed work in the department of
philosophy at Harvard University* In 1929-1930, he studied at
the University of Edinburgh, Scotland, under a fellowship from
Boston University School of Theology* The work for the Ph*D.
degree was carried on at Boston University during the two years
1930-1932.
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THE WRITINGS OF BORDEN P. BOWNE
(Notes The writings of Bowne that are chiefly philosophic, or
that have some particular philosophic interest, are designated
by the asterisk: *)
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"Herbert Spencer* s Laws of the Knowable," * New England «,
32(Jan*,1873), pp* 1-34*
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"The Old Faith and the New," V ‘ MeTh* Quart. Rev., 56(Apr*,1874)
pp* 268-296*
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pp* 655-678*
"The Assumption of the Anti-Design Argument," * Independ*,
2 9 (Mar*29,1877) pp. 1-2.
s—
1* In the preparation of this bibliography of Bowne* s writings, I
have followed closely the bibliography prepared by Professor
Carroll D. W. Hildebrand, of De Pauw University, as printed in
Bishop Francis John McConnell* s Borden Parker Bowne (N*Y. : Abingdon
Press, 1929), pp* 282-286, except that the order here used is
chronological rather than alphabetical. The present bibliography
omits two articles listed by Professor Hildebrand which are articles
about Bowne rather than by him, namely: "Philosophy of Herbert Spen-
cer," Meth* Rev.
, 56(1874; pp. 510-514; and "Philosophy of Herbert
SpenoerV,r
"
i.Ielsli *' Rev*, 57(1875) pp* 97-114* Further, the present
bibliography "includes the following article by Bowne which was omit-
ted by Professor Hildebrand: "The Logic of Religious Belief," Meth *
Quart . Rev*
, 66(1884) pp. 642-665.
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M
*The Ant 5.-Design Argument* Stated.,” * Independ., 29(Mar. 22,
1877) pp. 1-2.
"The Design Argument," * Independ . , 29(July 5,1877) pp. 2-3.
"The Design Argument," * Independ ., 29 (Aug. 2,1877) pp. 2-3.
"The Conservation of Energy," * Zion*s Her ., 54(0ct. 11,1877)
p. 321.
"The New Logic," * Zion*s Her
., 54 (Nov. 15,1877) , p. 361.
"The *Prayer Test* Improved," * Zion*s Her ., 54 (Dec.20,1877)
pp. 401,409; (continued in issue of Dec, 27,1877, p. 409)
"The New Gospel," Zion*s Her ., 55(Jan.31, 1878) p. 33.
"Shall We Kill Our Advanced Scientists ?" Zion*s Her., 55(Feb.21,
1878) p. 57.
"Chauncey Wright as a Philosopher," * New England., 37(Sept.
1878) pp. 585-603.
"The Divine Foreknowledge," * Zion* s Her
., 56 (Mar .6, 1879) p. 73.
"Some Objections to Theism," * Meth.Qaurt.Rev., 61 (Apr. 1879)
pp. 224-246.
Studies in Theism
, * (N.Y. : Phillips & Hunt, 1879).
" A Difficulty in the Materialistic Theory of Life," * Independ.,
32 (May 20, 1880) pp, 2-3.
‘
"The Ethics of Evolution," * Meth •Quart .Eev., 62 (July, 1880)
pp. 430-455.
"A New Aspect of Natural Selection," * Independ., 32 (July 22,
1880) pp. 2-3.
Metaphysics
, A Study in First Principles , * (N.Y.s Harper &
Brothers, 1882).
"Evolution in Psychology," * Independ
., 35(Dec.27,1883) p. 1641.
"Science Must Go," * Independ
., 36(Jan.24,1884) p. 98.
"Manicheism in Advanced Thought," Zion*s Her
., 61 (Apr. 23, 1884) p.129.
"What is Truth ?" * Independ
., 36 (Sept. 18 , 1884 ) p. 1185.
"The Logic of Religious Belief," * Meth .Quart .Rev
. , 66(1884)
pp. 642-665.
"Concerning the *§hristian Consciousness,!" * Independ., 37(Jan.8,
1885) pp. 35-36. “
"Comparing Religions," Zion*s Her .,- 62(Jan.21,1885) p. 17.
"*Paradise Found*" Zion*s Her
., 62(Apr. 1, 1885) p. 97.
"A Vford About the *New Education, *" Independ
. , 37(Apr.9,1885) p. 449.
"The College Must Go," Zion*s Her
., 62(June 3,1885) p. 169.
"Nerves as Scientists," Independ
. , 37(Aug.l3,1885) pp. 1029-1030.
"Concerning Liberality," Zion*s Her
., 63(Jan.27,1886)- p. 25.
"An American Philosophy," * Independ
. ,
38(Feb.4,1886) p. 134.
"The Significance of the Body for Mental Action," * Meth.Rev.,
68 (Mar.1886) pp. 262-272. -
"Religion in Education," Zion*s Her
., 63(Mar.31,1886) p. 97.
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"Conn on Evolution,” * Zion t s Her * , 63(June 2,1886) p. 169*
"Religion in the Schools," Zion*s Her *, 63(Julv 14, 1886) p. 217*
"The Mind-Cure," Independ
., 38(July 15,1886) pp875-876.
"About Tips," Independ
., 38 (Sept #2,1886) p. 1105.
Introduction to Psychological Theory
, * (N.Y.: Harper & Brothers,
1886),
"Religion and Theology," Independ ., 38(0ct.l4,1886) p. 1296*
"Second Probation," Zion*s Her ., 63(Nov.lO,1886) p. 353#
"Some Shortcomings of^he Labor Debate," Independ., 38 (Dec. 16,
1886) pp. 1619-1620.
“
"•Realistic Philosophy,*" * Zion*s Her ., 64 (Apr .20, 1887) p. 121.
Philosophy of Theism
, * (N.Y.s Harper & Brothers, 1887).
""What is Rationalism ?" * Independ.
,
40(Jan.26,1888) pp. 99-100.
"If It Yfere So, What Of It ?" *. Independ., 40 (May 24,1888) pp.641-
642.
"
"Physiological Psychology," * Independ
., 40 (Aug.23,1888) p.1062.
"Explanation - A Logical Study," * Meth.Rev. , 70 (Sept., 1888)
pp. 649-665.
"On Evolving Something Fran Nothing," * Independ., 40 (Oct .18, 1888)
p. 1332.
"Theology and Reason," * Zion > s Her
., 66(Dec.l9,1888) p. 401
"Philosophical Idealism," * Meth. Rev., 71(May-June,1889) pp.
395- 412.
"A = A," * Independ ., 41(June 20,1889), p. 788.
"What Is It To Be a Christian ?" Zion*s Her
., 67(Nov.6,1889) p. 353.
"Notes on Philosophy: I. The Question," * Independ., 42 (May 15,1890)
p. 651.
'
"Notes on Philosophy: II* Idealism - What Is It ?" * Independ*,
42 (May 22,1890) p. 687.
" ‘
"Notes on Philosophy: III* Problem of Knowledge," * Independ.,
42(June 5,1890) p. 772.
"Notes on Philosophy: IV. The Problem of Knowledge," * Independ.,
42 (June 12,1890) pp. 806-807.
"Notes on Philosophy: V. Space and Time as Ideal," * Independ.,
42 (June 26,1890) pp. 871-872.
"Notes on Philosophy: VI. Skepticism," * Independ., 42 (July 10,
1890) pp. 952-953.
‘
"Notes on Philosophy: VII. Pantheism," * Independ., 42(July 24,
1890) pp. 1018-1019.
"Notes on Philosophy: VIII. Natural and Supernatural," * Independ.,
42 (July 31, 1890) pp. 1050-1051.
"Notes on Philosophy: IX. The Fallacy of the Universal," * Independ.,
42 (Aug. 21, 1890) p. 1155.
"Cardinal Neman and Science," * Independ., 42(0ct .9,1890)
pp. 1401-1402.
The Principles of Ethics
, * (N.Y. : Harper & Brothers, 1892)
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"Science, Ignorance, and Religion," * Independ . , 45(Feb*2,1893)
pp* 137-138*
"Evolution and Evolution," * Meth*Rev*, 75 (Septr-Cct
.
,1893) pp*
681-696.
"Some Popular Mistakes Respecting Evolution," * Meth. Rev.,
75 (Nov. -Dec., 18 93) pp. 849-866*
"Natural and Supernatural," * Meth * Rev *, 77 (Jan*, 1895) pp*9-24*
"’The Foundations of Belief,*" * Zion* 3 Her ., 73(May 1,1895) p.274*
"The Speculative Significance of Freedom," * Meth* Rev., 77(Sept.,
1895) pp* 681-697*
"Faith in Our Immortality," * Independ ., 48 (Apr *2, 18 96) p* 439*
"The Christian Revelation," * Zion's Her*, 74 (June 10,1896) pp*
374-375*
Theory of Thought and Knowledge
,
* (N.Y. sHarper & Brothers,1897)
"The Inerrancy of the Scriptures," * Zion*s Her *, 76(Jan*5,1898)
p • 7
.
Metaphysics
, * (N*Y*s Harper & Brothers, 1898)
"Ethical Legislation by the Church," Meth * Rev *, 80 (May, 1898)
pp. 370-386.
"The Divine Immanence , " * Independ
.
, 50 (June 30,1898) Pp. 841-842*
The Christian Revelation
,
(N*Y*s Eaton & Mains, 1898)
"Distinguo," * Independ
., 50(Sept.8,1898) pp* 695-697.
"Studies in the Christian Life: I," Zion*s Her*, 77(Jan*18,1899)
pp* 78-79*
"Studies in the Christian Life: II," Zion*s Her., 77 (Jan* 25, 1899)
pp* 108-109*
"Studies in the Christian Life: III," Zion*s Her *, 77 (Feb.1,1899)
pp* 142-143*
"Studies in the Christian Life: IV," Zion*s Her., 77(Feb*8,1899)
pp* 172-173*
"Studies in the Christian Life: V," Zion’s Her. 77 (Feb. 15, 1899)
pp* 206-207.
The Christian Life - A Study
,
(N*Y. : Eaton & Mains, 1899)
Zion’s Her .,
Zion’s Her.,
"The Atonement : I ,
"
"The Atonement: II,"
"The Atonement: III," Zion’ s Her .,
"The Atonements IV," Zion’s Her.,
77 (July 26,1899) Pp. 942-943.
77 (Aug. 9, 1899) pp. 1006-1007.
77 (Aug* 16, 1899)pp.1038-1039.
77 (Aug. 23, 1899)pp. 1072-1073.
Zion’s Her*, 77(0ct.4,1899)p.l265<"Comments on Dr* Steele’s Paper,"
Tlie Atonement
,
(N*Y* : Eaton & Mains, 1900)
"Aberrant Moralizers," * Meth.Rev.
, 82 (Mar*,1900) pp. 247-261*
"Thoughts for the Present Distress in Matters Biblical," Zion’s Her.,
78 (Mar* 7,1900) pp. 298-300; (continued in issue of Mar. 14,1'5’(5C,
pp. 331-333)
£
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,rWhat is of Faith Respecting the Scriptures ?" * Independ*,
52 (Apr • 19*1900 ) pp. 919-921.
"What is ’Special Creation ?" Independ . * 52(Nov*8,1900) pp*2684-2686*
"The Incarnation," Zion’s Her ., 78(Dec*19,1900) pp* 1631-1632.
"Prayer," Zion’s Her *, 79(Mar*20,190l) pp* 363-365*
"The Supremacy of Christ," Zion’ s Her *, 79(June 5,1901) pp*714-716*
"Christian Casuistry," Zion’s Her* , 79(Sept*4,1901) pp. 1131-1133*
Theism
, * (N*Y* : American Book Company, 1902)
"Obedience the Test of Disciple ship," Zion’s Her *, 81(Jan*7,1903)
pp* 10-11*
"Supernatural in Religion," Zion’s Her ., 81(Jan*14,1903) §p* 42-43.
"As to Miracles," Independ * , 55(Jan*15,1903) pp* 150-152*
"Religious Experience," Zion’s Her *, 81(Jan*21,1903) pp* 74-75*
"The Recession of Mechanism," Independ* , 55(Jan*29,1903) pp.245-248*
"Childhood Piety," Zion’s Her
. , 81 (Feb *4, 1903) pp* 138-139.
"But Are They Converted" ZionSs Her ., 81 (Mar *11, 1903) pp.301-302*
"The Supernatural and Mature," Zion’s Her*, 81(0ct* 7,1903) pp*
1270-1271.
"The Supernatural and the Bible," Zion’s Her*, 81 (Oct *14, 1903)
pp* 1302-1303.
"The Supernatural and leligion," Zion’s Her., 81 (Oct. 21, 1903)
pp. 1334-1335.
~
"Spencer’s Nescience," * Independ *, 56 (Jan* 14, 1904) pp*67-71*
"Law of Successful Living," Zion’s Her*, 82(June 15,1904) pp*
748-749; continued on pp* Y5B-T69'*
’
"Mr* Spencer’s Philosophy," * Meth * Rev *, 86(July,1904) pp*513-531.
"A Remarkable Book," Zion’s Her
., 82 (Nov*30, 1904) pp* 1518-1519*
"’God’s 'White Throne,’ by Rev* Byron Palmer," Bostonia, 5(Jan*1905)
p* 18.
The Immanence of God
, * (Bostons Houghton Mifflin Co., 1905)
"Address," Zion’s Her *, 84 (Nov* 21,1906) pp. 1483-1484*
Personalism
, * (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co*, 1908)
Studies in Christianity
,
(Bostons Houghton Mifflin Co., 1909)
"Morals and Life," * Meth* Rev ., 91(Sept.,1909) pp* 708-722*
"Darwin and Darwinism," * Iiib . Joum
. ,
8(1909-1910) pp. 122-138*
"Present Status of the Argument for Life after Death," * No. Amer *
Rev.
, 191 (Jan., 1910) pp. 96-104*
"Jesus or Christ ?" Meth. Rev
., 92(March-April,1910) pp. 177-193.
"Concerning Miracle," Harvard Theol. Rev ., 3(Apr*,1910) pp*143-166*
"Woman and Democracy," No. Amor . Rev * , 191 (Apr*,1910) pp* 527-536*
"Gains for Religious Thought in the Last Generation," * Hib. Journ*,
8(1909-1910) pp. 884-893*
"A Letter from Professor Bovme," Meth* Rev., 92(Jul3r-August,1910)
,
pp. 619-620* (posthumous)
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"Gains for Religious Thought in the Last Generation," * The Living
Age , 266 (Aug.20,1910) pp. 451-456. (reprinted from Ifi¥»Journ.,
8(1909-1910) pp. 884-893. (posthumous)
The Essence of Religion
,
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Go., 1910) (posthum.)
"The Supremacy of Christ," Meth .Rev . , 92 (How-Dec. ,1910) pp.881-889. (p.h.)
Kant and Spencer, * (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1912) (posthum.)
"Present Status of the Conflict of Faith," * Meth.Rev., 105 (May,
1922) pp. 358-369. (posthumous)
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